



# Terrorism in Africa: Mapping the Nigeria and Kenya situation

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## Abstract

As terrorism thrives in other climes, the governments of Kenya and Nigeria are increasingly pressured by the activities of al-Shabaab and Boko-Haram. This study thus examined terrorism in Africa using Nigeria and Kenya as case studies. Terror incidents from 2010 to 2016 were examined using data from Armed Conflict Location and Event Data. Spatial and inferential analysis and visualization techniques were adopted. Results showed similarities in the trend of attacks in both countries, peaking in 2012 and declining in 2016. Shooting was the highest mode of attack in Nigeria and grenades in Kenya with civilians mostly targeted, resulting in deaths and injuries which climaxed in 2014. Spatial analysis revealed a cluster pattern typical to terror in both countries. In view of these, both governments have made frantic efforts to curb the menace, with varying degrees of success. Peace in the African giants undoubtedly is gateway to harmony and quality livelihood in Africa.

**Keywords:** Terrorism; GIS; Boko Haram; Al-Shabaab; Incidents; Impacts; Nigeria; Kenya

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## **1. Introduction**

Africa has played host to the scourge of terrorism in recent years, emerging in different parts of the continent as a major challenge. The terrorists are diverse in terms of their activities, motivation, networks, financing, security implications and results. Terrorist activities, successive attacks, and propaganda in the world stage and in Africa demonstrate new intentions, capabilities, and opportunities for further attacks. Among other reasons, their activities are results of lethal offshoots of political use of religion, defective education system and the socio-economic backwardness of the continent, generating national security threats, creating bottlenecks in socio-economic and political development. Among the nations of the world, the sub-Saharan region of Africa is more popular for terror with 16 countries having high terror risk ratings. These countries are chiefly clustered in an adjoining block stretching from west to east Africa, such as Nigeria, Kenya, Somalia, Mali, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, South Sudan, Chad etc. This is unlike the southern region which stands out as a sub-region of relative stability (Aon, 2015).

Amidst the inconclusive debate on the definition of terrorism, The United Nations (1999) in Vázquez, Pérez-Sales and Hervás (2008) defined terrorism is any act carried out in a bid to cause death or serious injury to the body of a civilian, or to other persons that hitherto do not take active part in the hostilities. The objective of such terror acts, by their very nature or context, is geared towards intimidating a group of people or to coerce the government or an international organization to do or not to do an act. Most definitions of terrorism consider two large categories. First is state terrorism which pursues the govern a society through the real or mental use of fear and terror and second, terrorism as asymmetric warfare, which is a form of conflict in which a group, organized or otherwise with weak conventional military forte and economic influence seeks to attack the weak points integral in relatively prosperous and free societies. The attacks take place with alternative armaments and strategies without regard to military or political cyphers of conduct (WHO, 2002). In both the state and asymmetric warfare kinds of terrorism, the aim of the terrorist is to achieve political, religions other goals by instilling fear and creating panic in the civil populace (Chomsky, 2004).

Terrorism has been at the forefront of recent media coverage of Sub-Saharan Africa. A total of thirteen countries have attained a terrorism peril powered majorly by Boko Haram domiciled in Nigeria with activities recorded in neighbouring Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Also, the al-Shabaab homed in Somalia with series of operations in Kenya and other neighbouring countries. Boko Haram is a feared Islamic sect with its official name adopted as "the Congregation of the People of Tradition for Proselytism and Jihad", which is the English translation from Arabic *Jamā'at ahl as-sunnah lid-da'wa wa-l-jihād* (Akinfala, Akinbode and Kemmer, 2014). Boko Haram has not only constituted serious security threats in the Northern part of Nigeria but has also turned an indelible burden on the shoulder of the federal government. The terror campaign of the group assumed an alarming dimension from 2010 till date with the bombing of the Nigeria Police Headquarters and the United Nation House both in Abuja in 2011 as their first attacks outside the Northern zone (Ogege, 2013). The current trend of violence in Nigeria has reached unprecedented heights and it has raised the concerns of security agencies. Amidst the incessant insurgency in the North East, the cattle rustlers maiming in the Middle Belt, the unrest in the Niger Delta and the spate of kidnapping and armed robbery in various parts of the

country, the security agencies undoubtedly have a huge burden to quell the violence menace in the country (Aov et al., 2017).


The al-Shabaab on the other hand, an Al Qaeda linked militant group said to have been created from Al-Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI, or "Unity of Islam"). AIAI was a militant Salafi group that peaked its activities in the 1990s civil war in Somalia, after the fall of the Siad Barre regime (1969 – 1991). To date, al-Shabaab has executed attacks on targets not only within Somalia but also in the region. Recent attacks by al-Shabaab in Kenya were likely in response to Kenya's sending of troops to Somalia in 2011 in an attempt to eliminate rebel strongholds and to prevent al-Shabaab from gaining further ground. Notable among the al-Shabaab terrors in Kenya is the bombing of the United States (US) embassy in Nairobi in 1998, the Westgate shopping mall siege of 2013 and the Garissa University College attack in 2015 (Watkins, 2015).

Furthermore, in comparison, according to the 2012 Global Terrorism Index (GTI) of the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP, 2012), Nigeria ranked 7th, on the first group of countries with the highest impacts of terrorism with an index score of 7.242, only behind terrorism strongholds such as Iraq, Pakistan, Afghanistan, India, Yemen and Somalia. Kenya on the other hand ranked 18th in the second group with an index of 5.266, worse off the United States, Egypt, Mali and 139 other countries on the list. Meanwhile, in 2014 the sum of deaths from terrorism in the world increased by 80 per cent when compared to the prior year. Since the beginning of the 21st century, there has been over a nine-fold increase in the number of deaths from terrorism. The statistics of mortality increased from 3,329 in 2000 to 32,685 in 2014. In 2015, Boko Haram overtook ISIL (also identified as the Islamic State) to become the most deadly terrorist group in the world. In the GTI 2015 report, Nigeria moved up to the 3rd country with the highest impact of terrorism with an index score of 9.213, only surpassed by Iraq and Afghanistan, while Kenya, also with a very high index remained at 18th with a score of 6.66 (IEP, 2015). However, in 2016, while Nigeria remained in the 3rd and Kenya moving lower to the 19th position, deaths from terrorism decreased in number of deaths recorded since 2010. Iraq and Nigeria had the biggest decreases with 5,556 fewer deaths (IEP, 2016).

Research on terrorism and related issues has increased dramatically since the occurrence of the 9/11 attacks on the US. This is not unforeseen as the 9/11 witnessed the most destructive terrorist assaults in human history, and the attacks led to far bloodier conflicts as part of the subsequent war on terror. Terrorism has since become the defining issue of international politics of the first decade of the 21st century. It would thus be remarkable if such prominence was not matched by a significant increase in research interest in this area (Chen, Reid, Sinai, Silke and Ganor, 2008). Also, with the prominence of the chaos meted out by these most prolific terror groups in Africa, it becomes necessary to study their operations to support earlier studies (Watkins, 2015; Bamidele, 2015; Government of Kenya and UNDP, 2015; Otiso, 2009; Ogege, 2013, etc.). However, to distinguish this study, spatial representations were adopted to symbolize the events surrounding the activities of these terror groups in Africa with specific emphasis on Nigeria and Kenya.

Nigeria is a West African country, geometrically located at longitude 7°29'28.68"E and latitude 9°4'20.15"N, bordered by Niger in the North, Benin in the West, the Atlantic Ocean's Gulf of Guinea in the South and Chad and Cameroon in the East. She is politically divided into 6 geo-political zones (South South, South East, South West, North Central, North West and the North East which has been the strong-hold of the Boko

Haram sect). Nigeria has 36 states excluding Abuja, its Federal Capital Territory (FCT). Nigeria has a total land area of 924,000 sq. km, population estimate of 173 million in 2015, a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 520.1 billion US Dollars and a Human Development Index of 153/187. Kenya on the other hand covers a land area of 580,000 sq. km, has a GDP of 44.9 Billion US Dollars, a population of 44.4 million in 2015 and a Human Development Index rank of 145/187 (Africa Development Bank, 2017). Kenya is geographically located in East Africa at longitude 37°542'9.98"E and latitude 0°10'36.73"N, bounded by the Indian Ocean to the South-East, Tanzania to the South, Uganda to the West, South Sudan to the North-West, Ethiopia to the North and Somalia to the North-East. She is administratively divided into 47 semi-autonomous counties and has Nairobi as its capital city. The study locations are depicted in Figure 1.



**Figure 1.** Study area map

The scope of this study was tied majorly around the operations of the Boko Haram sect in Nigeria and the Al- Shabaab in Kenya between 2010 and 2016. Likewise, the terror scenarios that had signatures of both groups, though unclaimed were also included in the study. Objectives of the study were to; assess terror incidents in Nigeria and Kenya, examine the pattern of terror attacks by both terror groups, evaluate the impacts of terrorism on both countries and assess the response of the government so far in curbing the menace.

## 2. Reviewing and conceptualizing terrorism

Terrorism in Africa is growing exponentially due to the continent being home to both a facilitating and target-rich environment for terrorists that are seeking global influence. Going through literatures, it can safely be concluded that there is no universal agreement on the concept of terrorism. With well over 100 definitions, the basic conclusion is that terrorism involves not just violence, but also the threat of violence (Laqueur, 2003.) Dempsey (2006) posited that terrorism also implies a failure of the government that normally starts with corruption, inequalities and injustice. The process translates from a frustrated shot at restructuring that breeds fear and anger, to political confrontation and conspicuously eruption into violence.

Ohuoha and Ezirim (2013) defined it as the premeditated use of threat or use of violence by an individual or group to cause fear, destruction or death, especially against unarmed targets, property or infrastructure in a state, intended to compel those in authority to respond to the demands and expectations of the individual or group behind such violent acts. The demands and expectations of terrorists may be for a change in status quo in terms of the political, economic, ideological, religious or social order within the affected state or for a change in the (in)actions or policies of the affected state in relation to its interaction with (an)other group(s) or states. The mutual theme across all the several possible meanings of terrorism is political motivation. However, there is another trend which appears to be of even greater motivation for numerous terrorist organizations the world over: religious motivation.

Religion driven terrorism is arguably the largest terrorism threat today. Although Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, and other religions have given rise to their own forms of extremism, it is Islamic groups that have now come to the forefront (Zulman, 2017). Extremists have manipulated religion and religious precepts to justify their actions. The growth of radicalism in Africa can be viewed as a direct result of socio-political turmoil that developed from poor socio-economic conditions, which have plagued the continent ever since independence. For instance, In Eastern Africa, the development of radical Islamic groups came about because of social tumult on the part of the Muslim minority that experienced feelings of discrimination, marginalization and systematic dispossession (Ackerman, 2014).

In terms of impact, Ackerman (2014) is of the view that terrorism across the African continent can be seen in two lights: the 'direct costs' in terms of damage to infrastructure, and the 'indirect costs' in terms of withdrawal of investments and decline in tourism through global image problem. He further noted that the effect terrorism has on the African continent can be categorized into two distinctive groups, targets and agents: One where African countries were targets of acts of terrorism, and the other where African nationals were the terrorists in other countries. The bombing of the US Embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 aligns with the first category, as two countries in Africa became the targets, or victims of acts of terrorism. Although the bombings targeted a foreign entity, it was still on African soil. African agents of terrorism can be seen in many regional terror groups such as Boko Haram and al-Shabaab in West and East Africa respectively.

In conceptualizing terrorism it is possible to explain it in terms of the behavior of terrorist groups. Drawing from established bodies of theory, Crenshaw (1987) used the instrumental and organizational approaches to explain terrorism. The instrumental approach is founded on the supposition that the act of terrorism is an intentional choice by a political actor. The terrorist organization acts as a unit to achieve set goals and values

which involves radical changes in the political and social conditions. This perspective views violence as intentional and terrorism is used as a means to achieving a political end. It further argues that government and adversaries are analyzed as if engaged in a typical conflict in which each party tries to influence each other's behaviour. On the other hand, the organizational approach focuses on the internal organizational processes within the group that adopts the act of terror. Terrorism is explained as the result of the group's struggle for survival, usually in a competitive setting. The principals of the groups make sure the organization grows and survives by offering various incentives to followers in a bid to avoid defection and dissent by developing intense loyalties among group members.

A combination of the two theories is needed to analyze terrorist actions as Book Haram and al-Shabaab in Nigeria and Kenya closely mirror these approaches. Both groups use terrorism as a means to achieving their set goals and objectives which involves a change in the political and social conditions in their areas of operation from constituted governments to Islamic caliphates, hence a conflict situation has ensued with the use of violence to bring about regime change and / or to implement fanatical Islamic principles. Again, these groups are organized in such a way that they command intense loyalties from their members that defections are hardly experienced. Rewards ranging from pecuniary to religious (approval of God and a place in heaven) have been used to incentivize their cause and garner support from followers.

### **3. Methodology**


Principally, secondary data was used for this study, obtained from existing literatures and database. The terrorism data was acquired from the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED, 2016). The database comprises of all recorded armed conflicts for various countries, but then, was painstakingly sieved, arranged and reduced to the activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria and the al-Shabaab in Kenya. The edited data comprised of the following fields: date, type, actor and location of events as well as deaths and a brief summary of the circumstances surrounding the event. Based on the extra information on the attached notes which explained the circumstances surrounding a particular event, new fields were added to the data such as the mode of attack (bomb blast, shooting, kidnapping, etc.), targets (businesses and markets, telecommunication, schools, teachers and students, Christians, Muslims, politicians, infrastructure, etc.) and the number of injured persons.

The data was further filtered such that events such as strategic actions of the government were not included in as much as they were in the original ACLED data. Examples of such strategic actions are cases not motivated by the terror groups, where government forces; either the police or the military carried out actions against the sect; dislodging, arresting or killing them. Maps were created using the Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) ArcMap desktop software. Densities and hot-spots were mapped and the symbology tool was used to enable proper visualization of the outputs. Tables and charts were then used to present results and conventional and spatial statistical tools were adopted to make necessary inferences.




## 4. Data analysis, results and discussions

### 4.1. Spatio-temporal assessment of terror incidents in the study areas




**Figure 2.** Incidents of attacks between 2010 and 2016 in Nigeria and Kenya



**Figure 3.** Boko Haram terror incidents in Nigeria from 2010 to 2016

Between 2010 and 2016, there have been various incidents of Boko Haram and al-Shabaab in Nigeria and Kenya respectively at various scales. As depicted in Figure 2 and Table 2, there were similarities in the trend of attacks in both countries during the period considered. Notably, the number of attacks by the terror groups were low in 2010. Nigeria had 34 while Kenya had 15 incidents. In the next year, it increased and by 2012 it skyrocketed to the highest of 390 incidents for Nigeria (an average of at least one incident per day) and 70 for Kenya. There was a decline for both countries in 2013, with another upsurge in 2014 and then a continuous downtrend up till 2016 with as few as 17 occurrences in Kenya and 52 in Nigeria. In all, the total incidents in the 7 year period for Nigeria was 1508, outclassing Kenya which had only 255 incidents.

However, in terms of the spatial pattern of attacks, there were differences between Nigeria and Kenya. Figure 3 shows that majority of the attacks occurred in the North-Eastern part of Nigeria. Borno State alone witnessed 801 incidents, more than half of the total incidents for the period, Yobe State had the second highest with 156, while the Federal Capital Territory had its share of 18 occurrences. There were also incidents in Southern Nigeria, most of which were either mere threats or unconfirmed reports. Among other reasons, the spatial cluster pattern of attack in and around Borno State is a result of the birthing of the group from the State. Therefore, their sphere of influence is in the region and they find it easier to strike within the region, which they swore to make an Islamic Caliphate.



**Figure 4.** al-Shabaab terror incidents in Kenya from 2010 to 2016



On the other hand, in Kenya, as depicted in Figure 4, the majority of attacks in Kenya were along the eastern fringes of the country. As is the popular assertion and as cited in literatures, the bulk of incidents in this region is likely due to the presence of Kenya's military in Somalia (Watkins, 2015), the country's close ties with the west, its very active coastal beaches used for tourism that is at odds with the Islamic culture. Also, is the perception that the country's largely Christian populace is an hindrance to the Islamization of Eastern Africa (Otiso, 2009). Garrisa had the highest attacks (71), Mombassa, 27 and Lamu, 14. Mandera witnessed 51 incidents during the 7-year period and Nairobi had a fair share of 39.

#### 4.2. Modes and target of attacks


There were different scopes in the modes of attacks within the study areas (See Table 1). For instance, shooting (42.6%) was the highest recorded mode of attack in Nigeria while grenades (31%) were mostly adopted in Kenya. Also noteworthy, suicide bombing or Person Borne Explosive Device (PBED) which ranked 4<sup>th</sup> in Nigeria was the 10<sup>th</sup> mode in Kenya. This means suicide bombing was the least mode of attacks in Kenya whilst one of the most preferred modes in Nigeria from 2010 to 2016. There were however more kidnapping, especially of foreign nationals and diplomats in Kenya (10.6%) than in Nigeria (3%). Bombing (Improvised Explosive Devices) were nearly at par in both countries and no event of poisoning was recorded in the East African Giant.

Furthermore, there were similarities in the targets of attacks over the years in both Nigeria and Kenya as it is shown in Figures 5. The premier target from 2010 to 2016 of both Boko Haram (34%) and al-Shabaab (47%) were civilians who are either direct victims or tools for passing messages to the government or other groups. There were also series of attacks on government operatives, particularly the police and the military which are at the fore-front of counter terrorism. In both countries, these government operatives ranked 2<sup>nd</sup> most targeted by the groups, although there were fewer attacks on them in Kenya. Although, there were no recorded attacks on infrastructure, private and public properties as well as electoral processes in Kenya, the country had more foreigners targeted as well as business environments (such as markets, hotels, shopping malls, etc.), telecommunication facilities and Muslims. Nigeria on the other hand had more Christian targets. However, because of the perceived religious undertone to terror attacks in the region, the independent sample T-Test was adopted to make inference from the number of attacks on faithfuls of the predominantly practiced religions. The result revealed there was no significant statistical difference in the number of recorded attacks on Christians and Muslims from 2010 to 2016 in Nigeria ( $t(12) = 0.741, P = 0.473 > 0.05$ ) and Kenya as well ( $t(12) = 0.799, P = 0.440 > 0.05$ ). This implies that although there are visibly more Christian terror targets compared to their Muslim counterparts (Figure 7), the difference is not statistically significant.

**Table 1.** Proportion of various modes of attacks from 2010 to 2016

Modes of attacks	Nigeria (%)	Kenya (%)
Bombing	17.5	16.9
Suicide Bombing	10.6	0.4
Grenade Attack	0.4	31

Shooting	42.6	19.6
Assassination	4.3	3.1
Robbery/ Looting	1.7	1.2
Battle	13.6	1.6
Kidnapping/ Abduction	3	10.6
Poisoning	0.1	
Knife/ Throat Slitting	0.9	0.8
Others	5.3	14.9
Total	100	100



**Figure 5.** Targets of attacks in the study areas from 2010 to 2016

#### 4.3. Impacts of the attacks

The study examined the impacts of the attacks of both Boko Haram and al-Shabaab using the number of deaths and injuries from 2010 to 2016. A comparison of both countries as depicted in Table 2 shows that the number of deaths and injuries as a result of terrorist attacks were highest in 2014. Apart from 2010, number of deaths was more than the injuries in Nigeria. Simply put, there was a significant positive relationship ( $r = 0.937$ ,  $P = 0.002 < 0.05$ ) between number of deaths and injuries for the period in Nigeria. However, it was in opposite direction in Kenya. This means, the number of injuries were more than the deaths. This situation among other reasons was a result of the fact that bombing (vehicle or human borne) which are very deadly and could claim more lives in one attack was a predominant mode of attack in Nigeria. The total deaths for Nigeria in the 7 year period were a whopping 17124 and 770 in Kenya. This, of no doubt buttresses why Boko Haram is regarded as one of the deadliest terror sects in the world.

In terms of the spatial pattern of mortality, as pictured in Figure 6, there were more occurrences of deaths in the North Eastern part of Nigeria (particularly Borno and Yobe States). Most of the incidents had at least 10

mortalities and cases of more than 50 deaths as well. Parts of Adamawa, Kano, Kaduna and the FCT also had high mortality occurrences. Bauchi, Jigawa and Katsina States, though in the middle of the whole chaos were relatively spared, as well as Sokoto and Kebbi States. The Southern parts of Nigeria were mere onlookers of the Northern catastrophe. In the same vein, the Hot-Spot Analysis (*Getis Ord Gi*) revealed 11 hot-spots in Nigeria (Figure 7); apart from Borno, the FCT and Kaduna were also mortality hot-spots. Equally, Borno State was inferred to be the stronghold of Boko-Haram activities with the mean center analysis revealing a location of  $12^{\circ} 22' 24.71''\text{E}$  and  $11^{\circ} 22' 12.723''\text{N}$  (Figure 3). This is hardly surprising, given the fact that Borno is the origin and home of the dreaded sect.


In Kenya, high mortality density as presented in Figure 8 is visible in Samburu, Garissa, Lamu, Mandera Counties and Nairobi with most deaths greater than 50 persons recorded in some incidents. The hot-spot analysis for Kenya presented in Figure 9, in the same light depicted mortality hot-spots in Mandera, Lamu and Nairobi. Similarly, the stronghold of al-Shabaab in Kenya was revealed to be Garissa Province, a major gateway of the sect into Kenya, with the mean center location at  $39^{\circ} 40' 34.961''\text{E}$  and  $0^{\circ} 2' 9.536''\text{N}$  (Figure 4). For both countries, the Average Nearest Neighbour (ANN) analysis shows the spatial pattern of mortality was clustered (*ANN ratio* = 0.207 and 0.209) for Nigeria and Kenya respectively. A further analysis using the high/low clustering (*Getis-Ord General G*) spatial statistics depicted low clustering in the pattern of mortality in Nigeria ( $Z = -2.08$ ,  $P = 0.036$ ) and random clustering in Kenya ( $Z = 0.004$ ,  $P = 0.963$ ).

Furthermore, in terms of the spatial pattern of injuries, Figure 10 shows that there was a cluster and high density of injuries in the FCT, Kaduna and Nasarawa than any other part of Nigeria; even in the Boko Haram stronghold where there were more fatalities. More likely, as the terrorists move away from their stronghold, they become weaker and thus inflict more injuries than deaths. Similarly, in Kenya, as shown in Figure 11, Nairobi, the capital city, just like the Nigeria scenario had the highest density of injuries.


The interactive maps and tables made available through the web-links in the Appendices provides better dynamic visualization of the terror events with more details of the circumstances that surrounded the occurrence and the density of mortalities and injuries for both Kenya and Nigeria.

**Table 2.** Incidents, deaths and injuries in the study areas from 2010 to 2016

Year	Incidents		Deaths		Injuries	
	Nigeria	Kenya	Nigeria	Kenya	Nigeria	Kenya
2010	34	15	119	44	138	210
2011	124	30	611	37	166	108
2012	390	70	1719	85	599	78
2013	242	46	2326	154	231	253
2014	368	50	6588	221	1303	273
2015	298	27	5215	201	1122	133
2016	52	17	546	28	396	33
Total	1508	255	17124	770	3955	1088




**Figure 6.** Mortality density from Boko Haram terror in Nigeria from 2010 to 2016




**Figure 7.** Mortality hot-spots of Boko Haram terror in Nigeria from 2010 to 2016






**Figure 8.** Mortality density from al-Shabaab terror in Kenya from 2010 to 2016






**Figure 9.** Mortality hot-spots of al-Shabaab terror in Kenya from 2010 to 2016



**Figure 10.** Injury density from Boko Haram terror in Nigeria from 2010 to 2016



**Figure 11.** Injury density from al-Shabaab terror in Kenya from 2010 to 2016

#### 4.4. Government response so far

In the wake of the Boko Haram onslaught the Nigerian government made series of moves in an attempt to curb the menace, with varying degrees of success. There arose a need to set up legislations that would support in curbing the prevalence of terrorism thus the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 which seeks to provide measures for the prevention, prohibition and combating of acts of terrorism as well as the funding of the act in Nigeria. The Act recommended penalties for any one or group that violates any of the provisions within the Act. It further authorizes the death penalty for any acts of terrorism and allows the government to send her military against any such groups or persons at any part of the country with the approval of the National Assembly (Oyebode, 2012). The administration of President Goodluck Jonathan also declared a state of emergency in Adamawa, Yobe and Borno States in 2013 given the intensity of Boko Haram's attacks against civilians in those areas (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, START, 2014). This was followed by the formation of the Joint Task Force (JTF) comprising the military, the state security services, and the police to repel Boko Haram fighters (Campbell, 2014.)

On assuming office in May 2015, the Buhari administration fast-tracked the Nigerian government's response to the Boko Haram insurgency, first by moving the military headquarters from the FCT to Maiduguri, the birthplace of Boko Haram. Next, given the transnational dimension of Boko Haram, he reached out to garner support from Nigeria's immediate neighbours of Chad, Niger and Cameroon, which culminated in the setting-up of the regional Multi-National Joint Task Force (MNJTF). The MNJTF framework allowed for joint operations between the countries concerned such that troops from Chad and Niger were permitted to operate on Nigerian soil, specifically in the Lake Chad axis. This gave rise to a slow, but steady recapture of a sizeable portion of territories initially over-throned by Boko Haram. These territories during the peak of the violence in late 2014, covered an expanse the size of Belgium (Matfess, 2015; Fielding, 2016).

Civilians have also formed a vigilante movement known as the Borno Youth Association of Peace and Justice, or the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF), to protect their villages from Boko Haram (Ogene, 2014). The Nigerian army's intelligence gathering abilities, operational scope, and overall impetus also became more effective with the incorporation and cooperation of local vigilante groups (Fielding, 2016). Furthermore, Nigeria also entered into pacts with foreign nations in the fight against terrorism. This meant military aids from the west (US, France, the United Kingdom), and other allies especially with regards to training of personnel, provision of ammunitions and intelligence sharing. This sure improved the morale and made better the abilities of local and regional troops.

In the same vein, in Kenya, the aftermath of the Westgate attack made the East African giant institute measures to improve its internal security. Part of the measures set up was the *nyumba kumi* initiative. The initiative delineated households into clusters and required people in the households to hold each other answerable to themselves. There were also encouraged to share information on any perceived distrustful activity. This singled-out Kenyan Somalis and anyone who looked Somali for surveillance, thus escalating the mistrust already existing between the Kenyans and the Somalis.

Further, the government of Kenya launched *Operation Usalama Watch* to detect illegal immigrants, arrest and prosecute people suspected of engaging in terrorist activities. The operation was also aimed at detecting



places that shelter criminals and encourage disorder and mayhem in general. During one of such operations, thousands of Somalis were arrested and more than 300 persons were extradited to Somalia. These activities attracted the attention of human rights groups who raised concerns about the security situation in Somalia for the deportees. The campaign in due course yielded little results as to strengthening the security situation in Kenya (Dua, 2014).

Additionally, in the year 2014, President Uhuru Kenyatta signed a new counter-terrorism law that strengthened the authority of security forces. There were also new anti-terrorism measures such as restricting media freedoms, increasing the conviction period of a terror suspects and compelling refugee applicants to remain in their camps (Blackwell, 2015). Following from increased pressure to tackle the al-Shabaab and the poor outcomes of the existing approach, the government of Kenya proposed a novel plot. They decided to shut down the Dadaab refugee camp. The reason being that, the camp, home to 350,000 Somalis and situated in northeast Kenya and in close proximity to the borders of Somalia, serves as a sanctuary for al-Shabaab militants (Campbell, 2015). The government also shifted focus to cracking down on NGOs and Civil Society Organizations with a focus on Muslims support. This is evidenced by the targeting of *Haki Africa* and *Muslims for Human Rights* based on their ideology and support of Muslims refugees (The Washington Post, 2015).

Not exhausting the efforts of the Kenyan government, one successful counter terrorism strategy was the setting up of the National Counter Terrorism Center. The legal mission of the center under Security Laws Amendment Act 2014 was to “be responsible for the co-ordination of national counter-terrorism efforts in order to detect, deter and disrupt terrorism acts”. The mission aims to strengthen and create connectivity for security, government and non-governmental networks as well as frameworks that deliver counter-terrorism in Kenya (Government of Kenya and UNDP, 2015).

## 5. Conclusion and recommendations

This thesis explores terrorism in Nigeria and Kenya. Both countries have experienced some of the bloodiest terrorist attacks carried out by Africa’s radical Islamists and other militant outfits. These entities, including the Nigerian Boko Haram and the al-Shabaab in Kenya, have exploited the porous borders and areas with insignificant government presence in the continent. At the same time, vulnerable and corrupt central governments, and the out-dated security and intelligence apparatus of the concerned countries have created hospitable conditions for these militants to thrive. Spatial, inferential and descriptive techniques were adopted to study the incidents and pattern of the Boko Haram and al-Shabaab insurgency in Nigeria and Kenya respectively.

There seemed to be no bases of comparison between both countries as Nigeria surpassed Kenya in the number of incidents and impacts of the attacks, but for the fact that both terror groups had similar ideologies and operated at similar intensities over time. The modes and targets of attacks varied, although both groups preferred bombing, accruing mostly civilian casualties. Notwithstanding the cluster pattern of their activities in both countries, Borno proved to be the stronghold of the Boko Haram reign and Garissa for Kenya.

Undoubtedly, the governments of both countries have taken steps to quell the onslaught and dividends have been reaped. However, there is need to do more. It goes more than just winning the battles, but winning the war at large. Specifically, the governments should not only disburse funds for fighting terror, but also ensure that the funds are put to proper use. More so, terrorism is spatial problem, thus, as demonstrated in this thesis, spatial analytical methods must be adopted to give light to the decision making process of tackling the insurgents. The people also have a huge role to play. They must condemn every act of terror in their disposition and actions and ensure not to incline to political and religious bigotry in their condemnation of the act.

## Appendices

Interactive maps and charts for incidents, mortalities and injuries can be viewed at:

*Kenya*: <http://geospatiallinks.com.ng/2018/04/01/injuries-and-mortalities-from-al-shabaab-terror-onslaught-in-kenya-2010-2016/>

*Nigeria*: <http://geospatiallinks.com.ng/2018/04/01/injuries-and-mortalities-from-boko-haram-terror-onslaught-in-nigeria-2010-2016/>

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