



Analysis of the politico – Ecology of electoral management towards Kenya’s 2007 post-election violence

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Abstract

By Using Political ecology as an expression which is contemporary yet with no clear and settled meaning, this study seeks to analyze the politico - ecology of Electoral Management towards Kenya’s 2007 Election Violence. Political ecology used herein refers to taking a political view within the context of electoral management especially on the Post – 2007 election violence. Such analysis can be useful in understanding many interrelating variables in this mix. The study construes in its analysis that the violence was not a pop – up event, the historical behind the same activity show a progressive trend which players could have acted on to determine a desired outcome. Certain causal – effect objectives guided this study; evaluation of causes of the 2007 Post Election Violence (PEV), examining the effects of 2007 Post - Election Violence in Eldoret East District, and the purpose of the study itself. This research took an analytical descriptive method. It applied Lisa Blaydes trajectory of Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management Theory and employed content analysis framework. It was found out among others that post – election violence undermines stability of states and to a great extent in regionalizing age interferes with inter-state relations.

Keywords: Electoral Management, Political Ecology, Electoral Violence, Kenya’s 2007 Elections

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1. Introduction

The study makes an analysis of 2007 PEV, using cause and effects from its scope; in Eldoret East district of the Seventh day Adventist church. Contained in this study are; study objectives, statement of the problem, methodology, theory applied, and discussions in the literature section. Political ecology is an issue widely looked at in relation to electoral management. This environment of politics has a number of manifestations to this important exercise. It juxtaposes normally between two variables, in the Kenyan 2007 we set to look at election management and ensuing violence. Political ecology of electoral management determines how a given violence is successfully handled or how fast normalcy is reached amid tension.

Digressing to political ecology in disaster, we borrow some valuable lessons of interplay within the political environment and final outcomes to a crisis. According to www.opendemocracy.net, Greece is experiencing an environmental catastrophe. Forest fires are raging through the centre and south of the country, from the Peloponnese to the island of Evoia, near Athens. The crisis has been escalating since late June, when the most intense heatwave in Greece in over a century saw temperatures climb above 40 degrees Celsius for six consecutive days. One forest fire spilled over Mount Parnitha, twenty-five kilometers north of Athens, and turned into ashes the last oasis of lush greenery and semi-wildlife to be found in the Attica region. The scene was an apocalyptic one of utter desolation and destruction, with blazing fires and billowing smoke rising high into the sky. This crisis demands a longer perspective and a larger mindset than Greek politicians are currently offering. Since the mid-1980s, Greece's forests have been shrinking at an alarming rate, and few of them - even before the current tragedy - retained their historic beauty and diversity. The ecological and environmental crisis engulfing Greece also highlights the deep flaws of the contemporary Greek political and social landscape. The inefficient and dilatory official response to the burgeoning crisis has revealed a public-administration system staffed by poorly trained personnel (who in key areas collude with bribery-fuelled illegal building in forested areas); a political elite which caters largely to the needs of its financial patrons, and bickers over which of the leading parties (the ruling New Democracy and the opposition Pasok) steals more from the national treasury when in power; and a disillusioned, cynical citizenry.

In Swiss politics, the distinction between rural and urban areas is usually emphasized as one of the crucial factors for the explanation of its polity. Indeed, tense relationships between cities and the countryside during long historical periods in Switzerland resulted in a persistent political cleavage are still felt in multiple ways. On the other hand, the quest for a balance of power between the progressive urban and the conservative rural areas was the main drive in Swiss constitutional history in the early nineteenth century (Masnata and Rubatell, 1991). Here the political ecology is concerned with contestations between the urban versus the rural in their times of tensions when somehow the balance of power seems to work positively.

In Nigeria, two authors underscore proper democracy as a catalyst in political ecology especially viewing Nigeria in past periods and later after beginning of democratic elections. In their supposition, the authors suggest; the popular view about democracy in Nigeria is that, it is a preferred regime above authoritarian alternative (The Comet, 2005). Democracy in a complex society writes Lipset (1963), is a political system which supplies regular constitutional opportunities for changing the governing officials and social

mechanism which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence major decisions by choosing among contenders for political office.

1.1. Study Objectives

In achieving this it used certain objectives as; analysis of the Politico – Ecology of Electoral Management towards Kenya's 2007 Post Election Violence, evaluation of causes of the 2007 Post Election Violence (PEV), and examining the effects of 2007 Post - Election Violence in Eldoret East District.

2. Statement of the problem

With a common observation among many African countries Kenya included, there seems to be a connection between elections conducted with high elite contestations and conflicts. This guiding observation formed the basis for analysis to find the facts behind the Kenya's 2007 episodic occurrence. Political ecology as used here allowed application of a political view within the context of electoral management of 2007 to evaluate violence. The analysis used interrelating variables to arrive at its conclusions that the violence did not a pop – up but seemed to point a progressive trend of cause and effect.

3. Methodology

The methodology entailed a field study conducted in form of a research survey. For the purpose of paper publication because of size expectations, the study was condensed guided by an analytical descriptive method. This entailed the use of writing by other scholars to corroborate the field findings.

4. Theoretical Framework

From the politico - ecological context of elections, this paper precedes on the premise that elections conducted with high elite contestations breed conflicts. On this basis therefore, fundamental theories shape a tense political atmosphere into a conflict laden outcome such as the 2007 post election violence. In our own analysis, this atmosphere emanates first from existing authoritarianism; secondly, deep seated unsolved historical injustices; and thirdly, a sense of entitlement to statehood by existing ruling regime.

In such existing politico – ecology based on the portrayed class; Blaydes (2008) asserts, the existence of elections and parliaments also conveys a certain degree of legitimacy to the outside world. Levitsky and Way in this article argue that following the collapse of the Soviet Union, a period of Western liberal hegemony began and with it the costs associated with the maintenance of full-scale authoritarian institutions". The concern of most authoritarian regimes is majorly to convey an aura of legitimacy, both domestically and to the outside world. In fact, by many authoritarian regimes there is surprising attention if any paid to issues of procedural integrity, even when passing the most draconian and undemocratic of laws. Their main aim once a web of power acquisition is complete is where the back – end of power associated with Nicollo Machiavelli is normally dragged in, maintaining status quo whether violence tatters the state.

As we theorize the thesis, we follow Lisa Blaydes trajectory of *Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management Theory* which Geddes attempt to expound. Geddes who has argued that dictators spend scarce resources on parties and elections despite the risks because these institutions help to solve intra-regime conflict that would otherwise destabilize the country (2005). As a result, parties and elections are a central part of a survival strategy (Geddes, 2005; Magaloni, 2006). Geddes primarily emphasizes the use of parties and elections as a counterbalance (Brownlee, 2007) who points that it is effective parties, not elections that matter for solving intra-elite conflict. Informing this theory is that authoritarian elections are good for elite management through causing violence among masses, creating fear, and dangling goodies to the potential elite - class.

The product of chaotic election management environment (Blaydes, 2008) then accord members of the elite coalition that operate in bureaucratic or party channels to seek political appointment to high-level positions that afford them influence and opportunities for rents. Elections are thus used as the primary mechanism distributing these opportunities to provide two important benefits to the regime. First, competitive markets, including electoral markets, provide information; McMillan writes well-functioning markets remove the need, in other words, for the government to pick winners." This is particularly important in an authoritarian setting where making poor choices about these issues has particularly high stakes. Second, performance in elections provides a clear and public pattern of merit that is rewarded. Under a system of competitive electoral competition, all potential political entrepreneurs have a chance to bid for public office.

5. Analysis of the politico – ecology of electoral management towards 2007 PEV

Kenya has been riddled with conflict and violence throughout its brief history as a nation. The country of Kenya was ruled by the iron hands of two men in succession from 1963 to 2002: Jomo Kenyatta (1963-1978) and Daniel Moi (1978-2002) and the Kenya African National Union (KANU) was the ruling political party. KANU's dominance was achieved by banning opposition parties in 1969 leaving Kenya a *de facto* one-party State to a *de jure* one-party State when a constitutional amendment in 1978 ruled that no other party was able to contest in the elections (Gutierrez-Romero, 2008). The life experience that has shaped the typical Kenyan citizen's understanding of conflict is similar to those in post-colonial nations that have succumbed to dictatorship. In the Kenyan context, this translates into the average citizen believing that the executive branch always wins, and that those in power will do whatever it takes to stay in power. This was seen with Kenyatta (a Kikuyu who was Kenya's first president) who utilized his position to consolidate power by encouraging KANU members of parliament (MPs) to make significant ratifications to the constitution between 1964 and 1969, thus effectively create a dictatorship. Upon Kenyatta's death in 1978, Moi (from the Kalenjin tribe) assumed the presidency through his constitutional right as Vice President, and was able to take advantage of the vast infrastructure of executive power Kenyatta had created. This was especially seen by Moi's ability to abolish the multiparty system through an amendment to the constitution in 1982, effectively making him head of both the executive branch and Parliament (Mutua, 2008). In my view,

however, anybody would do what both President Kenyatta and President Moi did no matter which tribe they belonged.

In 1991 after much pressure from Kenyan activists and the international community multi-party elections were re-introduced (Markussen, 2011). According to Kwanja (2003) several opposition parties emerged (Ford Kenya, Ford Asili, Democratic Party of Kenya, National Development of Kenya, Social Democratic Party, and other smaller parties). Nonetheless, KANU remained in power winning the general elections of 1992 and 1997 amid violence and allegations of electoral irregularities. Much of the violence occurred during the pre-elections period and was concentrated in the Rift Valley and Western provinces and apparent local 'Kalenjin warriors' attacked the homes and farms of migrant non-Kalenjin groups. Even when the multiparty system reemerged in 1991, Moi was able to use his position to limit the opposition through intimidation as well as create votes through voting fraud in the elections of 1992 and 1997. For example in the 1992 election, it is estimated that around 1 million youth were not allowed to register to vote because they were denied the national identity cards needed to register (Mutua, 2008). This is an example of structural violence. However, in my opinion, the opposition parties which were formed to rally against KANU would not win the general elections of 1992 and 1997. This is because KANU was more organized than the opposition.

In 2002, there was a change and KANU, collapsed. It collapsed beneath a new political party comprised of an alliance that had formed between all of the major Kenyan tribes (Mara, 2009). This political stakeholder was named the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC). Within NARC, the following agreements had been reached as conditions for appointing Kibaki as a presidential candidate for the 2002 election (Daily Nation, October 23rd, 2002): (1) divide the cabinet posts equally between the Democratic Party (DP) group which was led by Kibaki and the other group which was led by Odinga, (2) set up a new constitution and devolve to Prime Minister part of the authority that the president held under the existing constitution, and (3) support Mr. Odinga to be elected as the Prime Minister. The election victory was a landslide. Mwai Kibaki of the NARC won 62% of the vote on a platform of fighting corruption, forming a coalition government that shared power amongst the various tribes, and changing the constitution within 100 days of being elected to limit the executive power that had ballooned over the previous four decades (Mutua, 2008; Calas, 2008). Most people felt hope that the country's government was finally on the verge of a system of governance that would have accountability through shared power (Mara, 2009; Takashi and Deininger, 2009). In my view however, NARC Coalition was still wanting because not all tribes in Kenya were represented in the coalition. Smaller tribes were marginalized.

Within few weeks of election the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that forged the tribal factions into the NARC alliance and that got Kibaki elected as president had effectively collapsed. The agreement in the MOU to share power within the cabinet did not occur as four key positions that were to be created, including that of a Prime Minister position, did not materialize forward (Mutua, 2008). Kibaki, from the Kikuyu tribe, broke his election promise and filled many appointed positions with fellow tribesmen, thus following in the footsteps of his presidential predecessors by selecting people for appointed positions primarily through tribal bias (Mutua, 2008). This in turn led to discrimination of many people of other tribes who were equally qualified (Mara, 2009).

Additionally, as the new government was formed, the process of cabinet formation and constitutional reform faced constant delay, and the relationship between the camps under NARC started to fall apart. This left many citizens tasting what could have been and frustrated over what should have resulted from the new government to power in 2002 (Mara, 2009). The existing constitution then, which had been written at the time of independence from the British, gave the Kenyan president significant power initially designed to overcome obstacles for the newly created country. During the presidential campaign for the 2002 election, NARC pleaded to devolve certain presidential power to other posts and regional governments as already mentioned. However, the “new” constitution proposal, which was drafted under a close supervision of the newly elected president Kibaki, failed to devolve much of the presidential power. The draft was eventually vetoed by the disillusioned public in the referendum of 2005, greatly undermining public support for President Kibaki. Meanwhile, Odinga newly formed a political force namely the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) which was an opposition party. ODM continued to gain support throughout the country by setting up the Pentagon or a political partnership among regional politicians from not only Nyanza Province where Odinga comes from but also from the Western, Rift Valley, Eastern, and Coastal Provinces. The significance of this partnership was that ODM was given a national outlook (Markussen, 2011). While the above claims seem to be true, am of a different view. I dismiss what the ODM claimed to be delays in cabinet formation. Also, matters concerning constitutional reforms were so critical that they needed consultations and more time. Therefore, ODM seemed to be power-thirsty.

The 2007 post-election violence in Kenya, however, was of a different magnitude. Thus, this section makes an analysis of 2007 PEV. In the 2007 general election, most Kenyans invested their faith in the electoral process. As Murunga (2011) notes, Kenyans not only expected a transparent process and outcome, but also assumed the incumbent would, at the very least, respect their choice. According to Independent Review Commission (2008) on the general election that was chaired by a former South African appeal court judge, Johann Kriegler, Kenyans registered to vote in vast numbers, braved long queues, the hot sun or rainy conditions, and cast their votes in a relatively peaceful process. In my view, suffering on long queues while voting did not mean a win for either PNU or ODM. That’s being biased; otherwise the Electoral Commission of Kenya chairperson was to announce the presidential poll result to determine the winner.

Two major parties contested during 2007 general elections. The ODM had a strong institutional framework known as the “Pentagon”- in the persons of Henry Koskei and William Ruto from Rift Valley, Musalia Mudavadi from Western, Joseph Nyagah from Eastern and Najib Balala from Coast, and later Charity Ngilu from Eastern and representing women’s interests. ODM and its presidential candidate had more or less locked up most regional votes. The ODM “Pentagon” aimed at power-sharing arrangement across the provinces, as well as redistribution of resources, equitable development and resolution of the constitutional stalemate (Macarthur, 2008). Musalia Mudavadi was Odinga’s viable running mate, with Rift Valley’s William Ruto expected to become the Prime Minister in the ODM government. Equally disaffected were voters in Coast Province, a rich region which had been fully exploited by upcountry people at the expense of the coastal people who now had the chance to vote out an unpopular, untrustworthy government which had perpetuated longstanding marginalization of this potentially rich region. With Nyanza province’s longstanding disaffection with previous governments and Rift Valley province opposing Kibaki for

ungratefulness to the region, after Moi an alliance between them was to be expected. Most unexpected, however, was Western province, with a former short-lived Vice President - Musalia Mudavadi - becoming part of a formidable opposition. I don't see anything new in the formation of the Pentagon team other than tribalism of the highest order. In my opinion, the ODM sought to include key players (representatives of major tribes) in their team against the Kikuyu tribe.

Macarthur (2008) notes that PNU, was for the incumbent President Mwai Kibaki the man who had become President in 2002-2007 when Raila Odinga's famous "Kibaki *tosha*" (Kiswahili for Kibaki "fits the bid") wooed majority vote for him and crippled Uhuru Kenyatta, the KANU Presidential candidate in 2002 who was easily dismissed as a 'Moi project', that is, Moi's proxy to maintain the status quo. The PNU camp was more in Central Province and the northern portion of Eastern Province (better known as the Mount Kenya region) but drew support from a divided KANU, NARC-Kenya, Ford Kenya with a home in part of Western Province, New Ford Kenya which split from it, Safina Party, Shirikisho and other smaller parties. The PNU party thus, had more of the strong leaders from the Kikuyu community. PNU was more of a patchwork of several parties posturing for the booty and having a candidate who was not too sure of votes beyond the Mount Kenya region. I don't see anything wrong for the PNU to have had members from Mount Kenya region yet, served to the interest of all Kenyans. In this case, I have a different opinion. Now that ODM had formed the Pentagon team, PNU had to find a way of future survival by involving those members who were pro-government.

In the run-up to the 2007 elections, both ODM and PNU subtly appealed to ethnic identity and ethnic prejudice. Opinion polls taken before elections reveal strong correlations between ethnicity and voting intentions (Kimenyi and Gutierrez-Romero, 2008). The message of change propagated by ODM made the young voters hopeful that things might just be different next time around. The 2007 general election was a contest of Kenyan veterans vis-à-vis younger and more popular politicians who relied on specific alliances which they believed would win the day. For post-*uhuru* (Kiswahili for 'independence') children then aged anything up to 43 years, the election marked their moment of reckoning, an opportunity for determining change in the country and a challenge to consign the older generation to political wilderness. In relation to the above, am of the view that the politicians were only playing games with the minds of the youth who believed that there was going to be a new dawn in their lives if ODM won the 2007 poll and therefore, influenced to vote in vast numbers.

In response to the election uncertainties Mwai Kibaki the incumbent was to maintain power using all means. In my view this was meant to achieve the long agenda for the Kikuyu people and fulfill Moi's plans of the 2002 "project". Kibaki had to cling to power until Uhuru Kenyatta, President Jomo Kenyatta's son, assumes power. The Kikuyu's unpredictable movement involved in petty trade, transportation business and other income-generating activities taking place. This "business migration" entails largely movement of people from Central Province to other parts of Kenya where they run shops or kiosks, *matatu* transport and vendors of all manner of business. There is never overt complaint against such business people until a crisis such as post-election violence emerges. A few weeks towards the 2007 general election, rumours had it that large numbers of Administrative Police had been transported to the ODM strongholds in Nyanza province either to vote for the incumbent or to cause mayhem to disenfranchise registered voters. Photographs taken

and television footages by the media verified transportation of unknown people to undisclosed destinations a few days towards the general election, and local people reacted angrily by stopping the buses and beating up their occupants who failed to identify themselves, some of them escaping (Kimenyi and Gutierrez-Romero, 2008).

In context, whether ODM took over there would have been some ethnic violence. ODM taking power would mean that the majority of the people from different ethnic background would have settle down more freely than what was seen in the violence. This is because violence was caused by power struggle among ethnic groups. Attacks targeting certain ethnic groups induced revenge attacks, resulting in over two months of civil unrest throughout Kenya. As much as taking power could not have stopped the ethnic violence, the major issue that the contest between the incumbent President Kibaki, a Kikuyu, and the opposition candidate Odinga, of Luo origin, each of whom involved different ethnic groups to form a coalition for the election campaign. Odinga represented the voice of the smaller ethnic groups that have felt marginalized by the central government and yearned for devolution of power. On the other hand, President Kibaki represented the largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, and others who favored a strong centralized system (Nguyen, 2007; Gibson and Long, 2009). However, as many experts had anticipated election-related ethnic conflicts would occur in Kenya because ethnic clashes have become a common phenomenon during and after the presidential elections since 1992 when the first election under the multi-party system was held (Kimenyi and Ndung'u, 2005).

During the campaigns the opinion polls showed Odinga leading. In fact, he opened a wider lead in September and October 2007 and maintained a slim lead up to eleven days before the poll date must have been a source of worry for Kibaki and the PNU. For the first time in Kenya's history, an incumbent President was trailing in opinion polls and his defeat was expected unless something extra-ordinarily favorable to him happened. The extra-ordinary occurrence was the announcement of the presidential election results in the evening of 30 December 2007, followed by an unprecedented situation of hurried swearing in of Mwai Kibaki a few minutes thereafter (Gibson and Long, 2009).

The time leading up to the general elections was quite hopeful and the day of election, 27th of December, 2007, went rather smoothly according to many observers and journalists (Steven, December, 2008). There was relatively little political violence before the 2007 general elections (Markussen, 2011; Ksoll et al., 2009). Steven (December, 2008) notes that observers from Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice (KPTJ) which is an account of the irregularities that showed up on the 29th and 30th of December, the last two days during the tallying process. All had run smoothly until about 3.00pm when unusually long delays in receiving ballots started to concern the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) Commissioners, since none were experienced in the 2002 general elections. At around 4.00pm, discrepancies began to show up in the tallying between the main ECK tallying center and the local constituency tallying centers. Throughout the night, tensions heightened in the ECK as serious anomalies arose (Steven, 2008). First, the forms that were received did not match up with the results that were phoned in. In many cases, the documents were photocopied (law requires that they be originals) and many were submitted without the proper signatures of agents and officers at the local stations (Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice). The situation was worse in relation to the recruitment and training of temporary personnel. The recruitment did not into account the

requirements of the approved method for the tallying and transmission of results at constituency level, as it did not include the required qualifications in the process (Kriegler and Waki Report on 2007 Elections).

In relation to the above, there were many cases of ECK Commissioners allowing the officers to “correct” the mistakes and resubmit them. ECK Regulations also stated that any results showing a voter turnout of 100 percent or higher should not be accepted. This regulation was violated. An example is a result from Maragwa, which showed a 115 percent voter turnout. However, the officer was allowed to alter the result to 85.24 percent and was accepted by the ECK. Despite all the inconsistencies and violations, results were still being announced, though it was against law as well. At around midnight, one of the ECK senior staff disclosed to a KPTJ observer that discrepancies had been systematically planned and not accidental, as a scheme involving most of the ECK Commissioners. On Sunday morning ECK began printing up tally results that were much higher than submitted results and denied observers opportunity to verify files. On Sunday afternoon, the ODM party announced that poll results had been manipulated by the ECK and demanded a resolution (Kenyans for Peace with Truth and Justice).

As mentioned above, during the voting time Raila Odinga of ODM party held a lead of over one million votes ahead of Mwai Kibaki, yet only hours before the closing of voting, that lead transformed into a thin margin of victory for Kibaki. The result was also in a stark contrast with ODM’s parliamentary votes which won 99 seats to the PNU’s 43 seats (Human Rights Watch, 2008). At round 5.30pm the ECK Chair announced Mwai Kibaki as the winner of the presidential election. Hours after the announcement of this highly controversial outcome, Kibaki was sworn in as president in a ceremony witnessed only by a few political backers and not broadcasted on television. In my view, it was necessary to swear in Kibaki as president as soon as possible following the prevailing circumstances and to organize for the security of the country as the commander in chief of the Kenya Defense Force. In a press conference on January 1st, 2008, Samuel Kivuitu, the ECK Chairman, acknowledged that irregularities had occurred and, stunningly enough, admitted that he did not know for sure who had actually won the election (Markussen, 2011).

Soon a dark cloud settled on the Kenyan scene as another extra-ordinary response, a post-election violence never seen before in Kenya, erupted in different parts of the country. Immediately after the announcement of the presidential election results, violence erupted almost simultaneously in a number of different locations (Steven, December 2008; Markussen, 2011). In Nairobi, Mombasa, Kisumu, Eldoret and other urban centers, angry mobs took to the streets. The police reacted to these activities with fierce use of force and killed a large number of persons, especially in Kisumu town. In the multi-ethnic slums of Nairobi ethnic based fighting erupted and more than 100 persons were killed. In rural areas and towns of the Rift Valley and other provinces, militias were organized to attack the settlements of ethnic groups perceived as rivals. Most violence was of a “low-tech” nature, conducted mostly with machetes, clubs, bows and arrows. Only the police made significant use of firearms (Markussen, 2011).

According to Steven (December, 2008), the 2007 post-election violence occurred over the course of the following month, with certain periods of intense violence. The United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights Mission to Kenya (February 2008) notes roughly 3 periods of heightened conflict: immediately after the elections, mid -January (16th -18th) and during the last week of the month. The initial

wave of evidence occurred in the form of riots and demonstrations, and was primarily a reaction from angry ODM supporters who felt the election was stolen from them and stormed the streets in large crowds seeing the reaction of the public, the Kibaki government placed a blanket ban on all public demonstrations which is actually illegal under Kenyan law, but justified it as necessary means to prevent further violence and chaos. However, the requirement of a heavy police presence resulted in numerous deadly clashes between police and crowds. Though Kenyan police were sent to disperse rioters, some reports indicate that they targeted specifically opposition supporters and assisted pro-government gangs (Markussen, 2011).

As the clashes went on, they became more targeted, deliberate and ethicized (United Nations Office of the High Commission for Human Rights Mission to Kenya, February 2008). Primarily, Kikuyu communities seen to be supportive of Kibaki were driven from their homes and killed. The final wave of violence occurred at the end of January as a Kikuyu retaliation for the first attacks. After the violence had subsided, reports indicated there were deaths and 41,396 houses burned, and approximately 300,000 people were displaced during the riots and lived in IDP camps. Under this intense competition, the exit poll predicted Odinga to be slightly in the lead for the presidential seat. The exit poll suggested that Odinga had won the seat registering 46.1 percent of total votes against Kibaki's 40.2 percent. The ODM declared victory for Raila Odinga on 29 December but as more results were announced on the same day, the lead that Odinga had shrunk to only 38,000 votes with 90% of the votes counted. Against the predictions of opinion polls and the early counts of the votes, the Election Commission of Kenya found Mwai Kibaki the winner of the presidential election on 30 December, placing him ahead of Odinga by 232,000 votes. The result contradicted the parliamentary election that was conducted at the same time as Odinga's ODM won against President Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) by a large margin as already mentioned. Cries and doubts for a stolen election were immediately shared by the ODM party and international electoral observers (Markussen, 2011).

On 2 January 2009 Samuel Kivuitu, the Chairman of the Electoral Commission, admitted "I do not know whether Kibaki won the election" (Ongiri, 2008). Kivuitu also revealed that he was put under pressure by "some PNU and ODM-Kenya leaders" by calling him frequently and asking to announce the results immediately. Kivuitu agreed to take the presidential election winner's certificate to the State House after "some people threatened to collect it...". To Kivuitu's surprise "the Chief Justice was already there ready to swear-in Kibaki". Kivuitu agreed to announce the results because the Electoral Commission had no legal mandate to investigate complaints raised by the opposition immediately. It was a matter for the courts to investigate the irregularities.

According to the media reports, after the elections and especially once the results were announced, the opposition party supporters went on an unprecedented level of 'orgy of violence' which led to counter attacks and 'revenge killings' (Otieno, 2009; The Standard, 2009). Violence spread to five out of the eight provinces in Kenya (Nairobi, Nyanza, Rift Valley, Western, Coast and Central). The bulk of the violence was reported in Nairobi and the Rift Valley, due to the proximity between feuding ethnic communities in these places. Initially, the main targets of the violence were the Kikuyu people, to which President Kibaki belonged. They were attacked in various spots including Kibera Slum of Nairobi, in the city of Kisumu of Nyanza Province, and locations in Coastal Province that are inhabited by Kikuyu and Luo people. In Rift Valley Province, not only spontaneous attacks but also more systematic raids, mainly organized by groups of

Kalenjin origin, occurred (Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, 2008). January 2008 was dominated by demonstrations with the slogan 'No Raila, no peace!' as the ODM called several times for nationwide demonstrations aimed at forcing the elected president to resign (De Smedt, 2009). In the Rift Valley revenge attacks which began in Nakuru in late January rose in intensity and spread along the main highway to affect the towns of Naivasha and also Limuru and Kikuyu in the Central province. In Nairobi, the police tried to stop demonstrations with water cannon, teargas, arrests and barricades between slums and wealthier suburbs resulting in more clashes (De Smedt, 2009) and more alleged cases of people killed by police bullets.

Thus, the violence witnessed in the wake of Kenya's 2007 general election has a consistent history, namely a contest between reactionaries who insist on status quo to ensure their grip of power and revolutionaries who would stop at nothing before change engulfs Kenya. The two parties were strange bedfellows; reactionaries (exclusively within the PNU) pledged continuation of the status quo while their opponents, the ODM, clamoured for change which the NARC government had failed to deliver. This analysis sheds light on ethnic balkanization of the country and its implications for bloc voting; the emergent pattern of regional voting blocs and swing provinces; the electorate's consciousness of and sensitivity which moved them to vote out the Kibaki regime; a call by the proponents of change for reinvigoration of a stalled revolution; heightened mistrust among political leaders in the run-up to the 2007 general election; and the crave for devolution and regionalism as an alternative to a powerful central governance.

In summary, the 2007 Post-election violence was triggered by the announcement that Mwai Kibaki won the presidential election which causes violence across much of the country. However, not all violence erupted 'spontaneously'. Violence broke out in Nairobi slums and other major cities and soon developed into a series of attacks throughout the country, quickly worsening the public order that was not to be restored for over two months (Commission of Inquiry on Post Election Violence, 2008; Human Right Watch, 2008). The 2007 PEV was based on ethnicity, since Kenya political is divided under ethnic lines. Thus, in analyzing the 2007 PEV, one can never do away with the ethnicity which plays a vital role in Kenya's politics. Political parties in Kenya typically fall under tribal lines, valuing ethnicity above political ideology and policy. This is due to the perception that the party offers the best hope for one within the tribe to assume power and then share state resources with tribal members (Mutua, 2008). The result of this view has historically been tribalism or prejudice across tribes, and favoritism within the tribe. As mentioned above, the Kenyan culture is deeply tribal. The average person identifies with the tribe and values the tribe. In addition to this, Kenyans are an inherently agrarian society. This means that land is very important. Indeed, the topic of land has been an acute issue in the majority of conflicts since Kenyan independence, the history of which is discussed in detail under the Stakeholder mapping tool. The issue of land in Kenya is central in its history of conflict and is an example of structural violence. This is in part because of long and complex histories of land dealings among tribes. Often the members of the tribe in power were unethically given or allowed to use land, frequently at the expense of other tribes. This is also in part due to the complex legal structure surrounding land (there are at least 42 laws that apply to land, some of which contradict to the other) combined with the weak judicial branch to carry out these laws effectively (Calas, 2008). During the 2007 post-election violence, the historic land issues between the Kikuyu and Kalenjins continued to be a major cause of conflict. Thus, Post-election

violence resulting from the abnormalities seen in the 2007 election in Kenya involved many facets of society. Perhaps the most volatile of these were youth with little opportunity within the previous Kibaki government for jobs and had even less hope for the future. The ODM understood this and harnessed the youth vote by organizing them, for the first time in a Kenyan election, into voting blocks.

6. Causes of 2007 post election violence

A number of causes of 2007 PEV are discussed below;

6.1. Manipulation by leaders

It was found out that manipulation by leaders contributed towards 2007 PEV in Eldoret East District. It was noted that the process of manipulation was a long term aspect that was sparked by rigged election of 2007. During the previous general elections, Kenya had suffered major structural change and found itself on a dangerous political crossroads. National intellectuals and leaders used the weapons of nationalist rhetoric to intensify ethnic divisions and ethnic intolerance which culminated into violence shortly after the 2007 elections. Prior to the elections, the economic, political and social crisis caused a readily “mobilizable” emotional response. National leaders of the Kalenjin communities used the rhetoric of “us” (our ethnic/national group) being exploited by “them” (other ethnic/national groups like the Kikuyus and Abagusii). People developed grudges against each other. The manipulation of emotions culminated in the violence which, as one respondent noted “was the expression of a politically organized attempt to radically redefine categories of belonging.” Everybody was afraid about the uncertain fate of Eldoret East, especially after the news of the general election results of 2007, reportedly purported for rigged elections.

Respondents lamented that the eruption of violence could not have occurred had the leaders exercised restraint and preached peace before the elections. Seeds of animosity had been sown in the minds and hearts of the people such that by the time they were going for elections, hatred and anger was high. This was so especially with the Kalenjin communities in Eldoret. In fact, the respondents who were interviewed claimed that they had received warnings to vacate Eldoret immediately after the elections. They noted that some leaflets had been left within their homes. A number of those who received were from the Kikuyu community. When asked to state the real cause of the animosity, most of them said that the leaders from the Kalenjin community had manipulated the mind of the people by giving them money and other things. This they did to agitate them against other communities so that they can chase them from Eldoret.

6.2. Economic performance and competition for economic resources

The study found that the pathetic economic performance of many communities in Eldoret East district contributed towards the 2007 PEV. The idea of the communities that had settled in the area gaining ground against the locals was a long-term issue that triggered conflicts during the 2007 general election. The long term issue was the national disparity of income distribution problem in Kenya which created economic discomfort that boosted the 2007 PEV. It was observed that the deepest causes of conflict are economic despair which was always coupled with social injustice and political oppression. According to Kenya Human

Rights Report (2008), in the midst of poverty, the ruling classes, or the elite group who happen to hold power at a particular time, have enriched themselves and become the targets of envy or of rivalry by other elite groups. Politics is a commercial venture in their view. Conflicts arise not so much out of clashes of ideologies or programs, but for profit – often for just an elite few, for the masses take little part in this part of conflict (Kenya Human Rights Commission, 2008). The ethnic violence in Eldoret East district has been nearly tribal or rooted in competition between individuals, for the scarce resources of wealth, state and power. The researcher observed that there were real conflicts between the people of Eldoret East district. In fact, there is a pull towards individualistic ownership at the peril of others. Some people have been using politics as a private hunting ground for more wealth and in causing animosity among the communities that contributed towards the 2007 PEV.

In reference to economic performance and competition for economic resources, most conflicts had early emerged due to fight over grazing land, cattle, water points and cultivable land as reflected by the many cases of frequent fights between the Pokots and Marakwets. These conflicts go back a long way, in some cases to the pre-colonial period. Thus, they aggravated major changes which had been introduced in the Kenya's economy such as changes over land laws which often contradict customary laws, confiscation of large tracts of land for ranching and large-scale farming, and increase in population leading into the 2007 PEV. Most important is the rise of rural inequalities – between rich and poor/landless farmers, between rich ranchers and poor cattle owners. These changes have led to a considerable competition for the scarce resources of land (cultivable and grazing, including water). Furthermore, environmental deterioration in land productivity and scarcity of water in Eldoret East district has contributed to the intensity of the competition. Amongst pastoral societies in particular, the system of grazing which involves movement of large herds to water points and in search for pasture, had created a serious problem. Private ownership of land restricted these necessary movements of pastoralist and the impact was serious and catastrophic on pastoralist societies since it led to eruption of ethnic wars, leaving many people injured and some dead.

The study found the idea that the settlement of 'outside' communities in Eldoret East district like in other dotted parts of the country caused economic disruption. This disruption which took place caused considerable problems and tensions in almost all the communities. Some of the respondents noted that individual ownership of land, the development of agricultural economy for both internal market and for export through large-scale plantations as well as small-scale farming has inevitably led to shortage of land in fertile areas, economic differentiations, landless peasants and inevitable tension and conflict over land and other resources. The state promoted the escalation of tension when the 2007 PEV begun and the local community felt it was their right to fight and re-own their ancestral land.

6.3. Communal Conflicts

Communal and mass conflicts were also pointed out as one of the major issues that created tension towards 2007 post-election violence. It was found out that some of the different communities had different perception towards issues relating with legitimacy of specific regimes. Some of the communities felt that their counterparts had been in power for long as well as undermining other communities' territory. Thus, they

challenged the state's territorial integrity and protested existing distribution of power. By far, the most prevalent in the post-colonial Africa, communal conflicts seek the promotion of sub-national identities – a goal which can be achieved either through adequate representation, including the protection of minority rights, the granting of autonomy, or through outright secession. Inter-ethnic animosity obviously grows where religion and customs are clearly distinguished among groups (The New York Times, February 22, 2008).

In Eldoret East district, churches were burnt down which were believed to be belonging to communities who are not part of the Kalenjin community. Schools of private developers who had settled in the area were also destroyed completely. People took mass action and destroyed property which they knew were not owned by the indigenous communities due to communal conflicts. Most of the respondents of the study revealed that for many years, inequitable decisions have continued to be implemented in the Rift Valley. As a result, ethno-regional began to reassess profitability of continued participation in the political centre, demanding greater representation and when they are not met, begin to conscript the idea of autonomy or separate independence, as a way of assuring their survival and development. Total assessment of Eldoret revealed that the indigenous people were being overtaken by immigrants, leading to the 2007 PEV in order to repossess what they had lost.

A fresh phenomenon was cited which has added the intensity and occurrence of conflicts amongst cattle grazing people. Eldoret East and other parts of Rift Valley have had serious rebel movements, which had often raided the pastoralists for cattle in order to sell them for arms or for food. The pastoralists in their turn had to acquire arms to defend themselves. Another phenomenon is the highly organized and extensive cattle stealing from one pastoralist group by another, with automatic weapons often being used. This is because cattle had reduced among some communities posing a considerable demand. For example, the Pokots had been raiding the Kalenjin communities to steal cattle and this has led to subsequent ethnic violence and clashes.

6.4. Failure of the police

At the core of R2P (Responsibility to Protect) is the commitment to prevent mass atrocity crimes. As part of this commitment, the government had a responsibility to ensure that the police have the capacity to respond to developing threats, observe international human rights standards and do not facilitate the commission of rights violations (Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence, 2008). It was affirmed through this study that in during the 2007 PEV, the police in Eldoret East district and its environs failed to espouse these responsibilities. Respondents reported that some police refused to intervene to protect victims of ethnic attacks, resorted to disproportionate force when they did disperse crowds and sometimes carried out extra-judicial killings. Some sidelined with their communities while other did not take action at all claiming that they were not given any command so they did not know which action to take. Interestingly, as earlier report had indicated that the police reportedly killed one third of the victims who died in the post-election violence, (Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence, 2008) was found true in Eldoret East district. Some of those who had lost their loved ones have blamed the police as the sole killer.

It should be noted that lack of coordination and poor training, combined with divisions within the police command structure, further contributed to the violence in many parts of Kenya. In addition, this is not the first time that the police in Kenya have been implicated in election-related violence. The police also have a history of being used by senior government officials to intimidate opponents. Until the passage of the 2010 Constitution, the Office of the President appointed senior police officials and was able to rely upon them to protect its interests rather than the well-being of the broader Kenyan public (Kenya Human Right Commission, August, 2011).

As a result, many respondents viewed the police as corrupt, ineffective and unable to protect them in accordance to the Kenya National Dialogue and Reconciliation Monitoring Project (February, 2013). The belief that the government was unable to ensure the safety and security of ordinary Kenyans, particularly those residing outside of large urban centers, previously contributed to a rise in individuals arming themselves during electoral periods. The study established that in Eldoret East district, there has been laxity in the part of the police in disarming the people and gangs who had been terrorizing people along ethnic lines. They claimed that government arms and other imported ones were used during ethnic violence. For example, AK47 rifles were found with many people. Most people lamented that they were at the mercy of God only since the police could not be trusted any more. Some respondents even noted that the government has been making a dire mistake by posting police into Eldoret East district based on their tribe. Kalenjin police are posted into their original homes and when issues of violence arise, it becomes hard to report since the causers are tribe-mates to the police.

The respondents noted that lack of security in Eldoret East district was a cause towards 2007 PEV. They argued that in Eldoret in general, conflicts were as a result of lack of security and there is always a psychological fear of political uncertainty since the police force has been taking sides. This explains why there have been attacks even amongst the Kalenjin communities especially over grazing grounds and water while others have been caused by warring communities stealing from one another.

The study findings revealed that there still exists fear of fresh attack, since throughout the region; conflicts have been as a result of consequences of the fear of the future, lived through the past. It has been a collective fear of the future based on a history of social uncertainty, due to the failure of the government to arbitrate justly between or provide credible guarantee of protection for groups, resulting in emerging anarchy and social fractures. The respondents felt that conflicts were caused by fear of anarchy and political uncertainty more than simple competition for resources at deeper levels. In fact, I observed and saw that some of the respondents expressed skepticism and were not willing to give information on the problem which was being investigated because of fear.

6.5. Colonial factors

The study also discovered that colonial effects and consequences also had a part in the 2007 PEV in Eldoret East district. The eruption of 2007 PEV was a culmination of previous numerous ethnic conflicts and violence. For example, those experienced in 1992 and 1997 in most parts of the country. The tensions and conflicts which developed as a result of the imposition of political and administrative structures and those which developed as a result of economic processes of the colonial economy. These tensions and conflicts did not

simply remain at the structural level; nor were they temporary phenomenon, which were expected to disappear after a brief period. They have translated into values and expectations and stored in long historical memories through a process of in-effective socialization. Both individual and collective memories affect both concealed and manifest behavior, often hostile, towards other groups. And these memories have been exploited on a large-scale during the nationalist period, and presently by political leaders during election periods. This contributed greatly toward the post election violence in 2007. But more significantly, these memories have been the pedestals for the many localized conflicts which took place in both rural and urban areas in Eldoret. In fact, most of these conflicts went on at a low intensity level hence, pass unnoticed, but got noticed when they reached level of violence. Needless to say, these memories were carried over into the post-independence period and put into play during the clashes of 1992, 1997 and 2007.

One major issue associated with colonial factors causing 2007 PEV was land. The problem can be summarized as follows: Kenya became independent in 1963; at the most fertile areas that had been occupied by white settlers were handed over to the new government instead of the people who had lived there before. Besides selling pieces of this land on market terms, Kenyan governments have continuously allocated these areas to shifting supporters for patronage purposes. Moreover, because colonial laws were never fundamentally changed, there are no provisions for collective land rights, thus complicating ownership for communities that have traditionally been pastoralists (Human Rights Watch, 2008). The study discovered that, it is the outpouring of old ethnic tensions caused by colonialism that have been simmering underneath the surface and kept in check only by a strong central government. To others it is the resurfacing of factors that have remained unattended since independence. For example, after independence, a lot of people were left landless, either because their communal land was acquired by former colonialists, forcing the new independent government to respect the creation of "private property" boundaries, or because "alien" ethnic communities, for modern business purposes, started settling in land ancestrally held by other ethnic communities. Other tribes who are not Kalenjins have been invading land in Eldoret East district for the last 30 years while in many cases government authorities have practiced plain illegal allocation and misuse. These colonial injustices and unsettlement of issues piled up animosity in the hearts of people. During the 2007 election, this anger busted out in form of violence.

6.6. The media and hate speech

The media was playing a role towards the eruption of 2007 PEV all over the country. For example, during the 2007 election, a number of radios promoted 'chasing non-members of the community from their homeland'. Hate speech played a crucial role in inciting deadly violence. As the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Information and Communications, Bitange Ndemo, argued, "according to intelligence reports, the political violence that engulfed various parts of the country in 2007 and early 2008 was largely a result of the use of irresponsible and inflammatory language in the run up to and immediate aftermath of the elections" (Ramah, 25 October, 2012).

Local radio stations and other vernacular media bore particular responsibility for inciting violence through broadcasts that included the playing of ethnic war songs. One such station was the Kalenjin radio

station, KASS-FM. The Waki Commission found that, “a few days (before) the election KASS-FM announced that there would be rigging and in some of their open forums encouraged people to use the radio to incite people,” (Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Post Election Violence, 2008). Many people spoke on KASS-FM to announce that Kikuyu would be expelled from Rift Valley. One of KASS-FM’s journalists, Joshua Sang, is currently facing crimes against humanity charges before the ICC (Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11).

As found out in the study, respondents implicated all forms of media in creating an atmosphere where animosity and violence were likely by irresponsibly raising tensions between contending ethnic groups. In addition to incitement in the print and broadcast media, SMS text messages urging violence were widely circulated. One such SMS read, “no more innocent Kikuyu blood will be shed. We will slaughter them right here in the capital city. For justice, compile a list of Luos you know,” (Goldstein, 2008). It was shocking to find out that even after seven years have elapsed since the post election violence, one of the respondents was still having text messages in their phones even though the scene cited in the message was in Nairobi. This shows the power of media in either accelerating or decelerating violence.

From the study, the respondents noted that local leaders, TV and radio stations broadcasted hate speech. Local leaders also were blamed over the same. The respondents from both political and tribal divides confirmed that hate speeches from local and national leaders had already piled up animosity and hatred among the communities, and no matter the direction the elections were to take, war was eminent. On the same line, it was found out that vernacular stations fuelled the 2007 post election violence—just a grain. This is true as most respondents confirmed even though those in the media and human rights reacted angrily to this claims after the PEV, dismissing the claims as another attempt by a heavy-handed and embattled government to curtail freedom of expression, and punish media unsympathetic to its cause.

The propaganda that spread through the radio stations contributed to 2007 post-election violence where ODM supporters evicted PNU supporters from Rift Valley because the radio stations told them to do so. The community radio stations unanimously dictated to the masses in Rift Valley what to do with their PNU sympathizers. The reverse is true of PNU supporters who evicted their ODM supporters and sympathizers from Central, Nairobi and parts of Rift Valley provinces. Respondents further said that the ban on live broadcasting did not help the matter. Following the ban, most community radio stations merely relayed messages broadcast by BBC, CNN and Al Jazeera that showed violence taking place. The foreign media showed real time evictions of burning houses, scarred people on the move and even people hacked to death. When people saw their tribesmen being killed, they retaliated by attacking members of other communities living among them. Some stations relayed such gory stories they fuelled the 2007 post election violence in unexpected places far from the epicenter. This was further argued by some respondents that, such messages also fuelled revenge attacks by reporting the plight of the displaced, and their eventual return to ancestral homes.

In the opinion of respondents the media was the first to bring to public attention the tallying anomalies of presidential votes that led to the current political crisis in Kenya. They also showed live the sharp political divisions and fights at the ECK media centre, where the results were being read. Political bickering and election fraud were played live in Kenyan sitting rooms and public places. On the day of the General Election,

the community media scrutinized the performance of election officials. They broke news of late arrival of election officials and ballot papers. They prompted ECK officials to act.

The community radio stations were also the first to report election results because of their proximity to polling stations and knowledge of the ECK officials on the ground. When ECK dragged their feet in releasing results, the community radios filled the gaps through continuous analysis and updates of new results from officials on the ground. Nevertheless, it should be noted that following the eruption of post-election violence, the community radio stations played important roles in promoting peaceful co-existence. For instance, they supported the “Chagua Amani Zuia Noma” campaign. The findings revealed that the community media fuelled the 2007 post-election violence ignored the role played by other mass media such as Internet, mobile phones and satellite communication. They said that overzealous propagandists and bloggers used Internet to disseminate hate messages. Political parties and their sympathizers created websites specifically for political campaign propaganda. Bloggers had a field day posting hate messages and propaganda. Short text messages in ethnic languages were circulated urging members of various communities not to vote for perceived enemies. Kinsmen used SMS messages to discipline and ostracize errant relatives with differing political orientation.

6.7. Land

Struggle for land was a key issue during the 2007 PEV. A number of groups were using the aggravated situation to counter their enemies to have land for farming. It should be observed here that land issue was a long-term conflict that came into play during the 2007 PEV. The manipulation of grievances over land ownership, access and utility remain central drivers of conflict in Kenya for many years. This is due to limited availability of arable land and a tenure system that is consistent with the country’s rising population and the demands of modern agriculture. Violence related to land in Kenya has tended to concentrate in the Rift Valley, often with the Kikuyu ethnic group on the one side and the Kalenjin ethnic group on the other. However, issues of land have been cropping up in other part of the country including Nakuru, Lamu, Mombasa and Kilgoris among others. Disputes over land ownership are historically related to colonial and post-independent regimes’ unfair taking and allocation of land (and the colonialists’ forceful resettlement of individuals from certain ethnic groups). Such disputes remain an unsolved problem that political leaders have also used to escalate ethnicity.

In particular, questions related to land distribution and ownership were found central in explaining violence in Eldoret East district during in 2007 PEV. Despite several attempts of reforms, land grievances dating back to the colonial era continue to constitute a major obstacle to peaceful cohabitation in Eldoret East district and in Rift Valley province at large. The respondents pointed out that land was a big issue and every conflict and violence which has ever taken place in Eldoret East district has always been associated with land. They said that all along since independence, the presence of non-Kalenjin communities in the region has been agitating the indigenous people. They feel that Rift Valley belongs to the Kalenjins and the settlers have come in, buying vast land and overtaking them in matters of farming. As much as this increases production, their presence is not welcome wholeheartedly. This explains why some Kalenjins were happy to join the violence since they thought by doing so, the other communities will leave hence occupy the land.

At least two dimensions are relevant when considering land distribution and ownership as a cause of political violence. First, many families can barely make a living from the small piece of land they own currently. As pointed out by one of the Kenyans consulted by the author, 'land is a national cake, and everybody should have at least a small piece. But where some have plenty, most have little' (Human Rights Watch, 2008). Shortage and unequal distribution of land can lead to dissatisfaction with governance and violence may be a means of expressing frustrations. Second, long-lasting problems of land ownership and distribution have created tensions between communities. It was established that in Eldoret East district, some Kikuyus have allegedly acquired land through connections to the political elite. According to the Waki Report (2008), the Kenyans who belong to the Kalenjin ethnic group tend to view the most recent election violence as a result of land injustices.

Generally, land and ethnicity was a key element during the 2007 PEV, since it was an emotive issue in Eldoret East district, be it over crops, grazing rights or sheer cattle rustling. In relation to this, the 1990's and 2000's saw ethnic violence erupting with ferocity and a mind numbing regularity not seen before in the region's 30 years of relatively peaceful independence history. Land was an underlying factor behind much of the organized violence in the Rift Valley, as well as being critical to the more localized ongoing conflicts in Mt Elgon, Eldoret, and Nakuru. In Eldoret specifically, it was found out that since the 1990s certain leaders had exploited grievances over perceived 'historical injustices' and poorly handled settlement schemes for electoral advantage. These grievances are perceived as favoritism and corruption by successive local and national governments in allocation of fertile land, including a refusal to prevent and reverse settlement of outsiders (notably the Kikuyus) in land originally appropriated from the local residents by the colonial authorities. This of course has occurred in a context of rapid population growth in what remains a largely agricultural society. 2007 PEV was thus, a result of a growing concern of the communities in the area over the years that sparked off due during the heated time of 2007 general elections.

6.8. Political incitement

Furthermore, political incitement was found to be one of the causes of 2007 PEV. However, identifying causes of politic involvement in 2007 PEV is a problematic task. Firstly, any attempt to 'explain' a phenomenon such as political violence can be subjected to the objection than attempting to establish causal connections to certain economic, social, or political realities is simply the wrong way of approaching political violence. Viewing political violence as an outcome of particular societal features easily gives way to the perception that the emergence of political violence is unavoidable. Nonetheless, the reversed position is also problematic. Mass violence is not simply irrational and unexplainable, and it remains a fact that political violence seems to occur persistently in some countries and not – or to a much smaller extent – in others (Anderson, 2008).

In any case, some skepticism is justified whenever studies pursue the 'explanation' or 'identification of causes' of a phenomenon such as political violence. In all forms of violence are said to relate to power, political violence has been defined as 'the commission of violent acts motivated by a desire, conscious or unconscious, to obtain or maintain political power' (Moser and Clark, 2001). It is therefore the pursuit of political objectives (and not the end result of gaining or not gaining political power) that is at the core of the notion (Hibbs Jr, 1997). Defining political violence is typically contingent on a typology that separates the

politically motivated from economically and socially motivated forms of violence. In this sense, political violence takes place in the collective sphere where acts of violence are typically committed by a multitude of individuals from one group against individuals from another group, primarily because the targeted individual happens to belong to this group. Political violence typically takes the form of murder, assaults, sexual abuse such as rape, forced pregnancy or sterilization (Moser and Clark, 2001).

During the 2007 PEV, the violence that sporadically erupted in various parts of the Rift Valley, the respondents confirmed that Kalenjins perceived other tribes as posing a grave threat to their ethnic community. They waged war against those that they deemed outsiders, specifically targeting members of the Kikuyu who had bought land and moved into the region. Members of the Luo, Kikuyu, Abagusii and Luhya were also attacked while similar violence occurred in other areas dominated by Kalenjins like Nakuru. In fact, respondents stressed that support and resistance to political leaders in Eldoret East district have often followed ethnic lines. When forming the local government, some political leaders have rewarded and ensured advantages to individuals from supportive ethnic groups, while marginalizing or excluding individuals belonging to ethnic groups associated with political opponents. Supporting this view, the Waki Report (2008) for example, notes how 'Moi rewarded his supporters, particularly the Kalenjin, through appointments to political offices and with jobs in the public service and the military'. The Waki Report (2008) also notes how during the 1980s and 1990s 'land grabbing and the allocation of public land as political patronage were part of the gross corruption of this period'. In this way, respondents noted that land allocation was often turned into a reward to 'politically correct individuals'.

Respondents cited that in Eldoret, like in many other parts of the country, political power had been perceived as vital for obtaining access to public goods, and the distinction between individuals benefitting or marginalized from such access is viewed in ethnic terms. Added to this, political leaders have always had a personal interest in obtaining power because large-scale corruption has become institutionalized. In a sense, gaining political office has been seen as 'a struggle for survival': if power is obtained, the perception is that access to sparse resources is ensured, and if not; marginalization and exclusion is reckoned to follow. Such acts of struggle have been causing tensions leading to conflicts and eventually conflicts in most parts of Eldoret region as whole. Another example, is that of an assistant Minister in the Office of the President vowed there would be "endless bloodshed" if a "stupid magistrate" ruled in favor of an opposition petition challenging the election of the head of State. Less than a week after this statement and after the opposition politician took his petition to court, violence broke out, targeting members of the opposition leaders' ethnic group. After spirited lobbying by the opposition and the Churches, the government acted decisively to stop it, but not before over 100 lives had been lost and thousands of people left homeless.

This is the ground work in which political will to solve and clean the past history still remains a challenge. Numerous arguments have been noted that there is lack of political will to solve ethnic conflicts that lead to 2007 PEV. For instance, two reports on the ethnic violence had shown clearly that politics had contributed towards 2007 PEV- one of the report is by a parliamentary probe committee and another by the National Council of Churches - recognized that the salient issues of land, ethnicity and economics had not been adequately addressed by successive Kenyan governments. Also, the reports pointed to the cause and effect pattern of incitement by politicians and the eruption of ethnic violence. Speeches at public rallies, ethnic

violence thereafter - politicians insecure in their political turf playing the ethnic card to shore up support and to consolidate their personal and party grip on political power and the benefits accrued (Moser and Clark, 2001).

The respondents reported that political incitement had led to eruption of the 2007 PEV in Eldoret East district. Some political leaders come to the rural areas, echo hate speeches and leave while ignorant citizens are left incited by these speeches. Coupled with their ignorance of patriotism and national hood, these citizens attack their neighbors without knowing that they are the ones to lose at the end of the day. Such as been the scenarios in Eldoret East district. Countless lives have been lost through violence incited by politicians. Evidence from a wide range of sources and respondents showed that the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district had been preceded by inflammatory speeches by politicians in which they had urged members or particular ethnic groups to take action against other groups which had not supported them during the elections. It was also reported that during the clashes themselves, some local community leaders had incited specific acts of violence. Some of the leaders had been arrested and charged with criminal offences but again released.

6.9. Ethno-Political competition and discrimination

In continuance of the assessing the factors that caused the 2007 PEV, it was found out that Ethno-political competition and discrimination was among them. Kenya being a multi-ethnic society and many communities has lived in harmony for many years. In recent years, however, the dominant ethnic groups have been on the forefront in fighting for political power. This situation resulted into fighting to control the power. The relatively less dominant communities have been playing the card of opportunism. Many ethnic groups supported the armed struggle for independence in hope that they could regain their stolen lands. This expectation did not become reality. The situation has fomented anger, resentment, lust for revenge, and aggressive competitiveness that has overlooked the common good of the entire country. Frustration among the poor, both in urban and rural areas, has created a growing tendency to use violence as a viable means to correct the situation. When violent reactions emerge, under the influence of ethno-political ideologies, tend to take the form of ethnocentrism, the ideology that animates the competition between ethnic groups (Tarimo, 2015).

From the study, it was found out that many respondents were full of resentment because the property they had lost during ethnic violence that has hit Eldoret East district. Some had even lost their loved ones and their hearts were full of hatred especially respondents from communities who were not Kalenjins. On the other hand, some Kalenjins who were interviewed were also full of anger since they felt that their resources had been taken by other communities. Around five respondents were frank to reveal that their community had engaged in violence with hope that the immigrant communities will leave Eldoret East so that they inhabit the land and take possession of other resources. Hatred and anger was still in their heart since this did not materialize. They now claimed that their leaders lied to them. Some regretted having participated in violence and they never gained anything.

In relation to the forgoing, Tarimo (February, 2015) notes that Ethno-political competition, which has been alive since independence, has finally degenerated into ethno-political competition, discrimination, and

violence. Ever since the flawed election triggered a wave of ethno-political violence many people have been violently driven from their homes and many are now resettling in ethnically homogenous zones. Even some of the packed slums in certain cities have split along ethnic lines. Ethnic demarcation and regionalism, as promoted by ethnic leaders, revolve around the practice of ethnic discrimination. The phenomenon of ethnic discrimination comes into play when each region is identified with a certain ethnic group, and whenever political misunderstandings emerge those who are identified as foreigners are always forced to go to their ancestral land (Gettleman, December, 2008).

6.10. Negative stereotyping

Absence of efforts to debunk negative perceptions and ethnic stereotypes in Kenya was among the cause of 2007 PEV. There existed ethnic tension that led to bloodshed and displacements of Kenyans for many years. The Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission (TJRC) report states that, for a long time ethnic stereotyping had not only been used on the political arena to discredit politicians from other communities, but it has also fuelled targeted and barbaric forms of violence against members of such communities. Such violence was meted out especially during the 2007 PEV. This has seen labels been put on certain communities, portraying them in broad, often negative terms that generalize certain traits and apply them to all individuals belonging to the described community, regardless of how individuals perceive themselves (Parties to the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation March, 2008).

According to TJRC there have been negative attitudes towards individuals and social groups. For example, there has been a kind of perception about the pastoralists like the Pokot, Turkana as always being primitive. The Kikuyu on the other hand are seen as land grabbers and perceived as thieves while Luhya and the Kamba are at times referred to as liars and at times as very loyal. The Luos have been said to be proud while those in coast were deemed lazy people. It is a problem of perceptions, myths and stereotypes about each other. However, nobody has tried to debunk this hence people continue to grow in various communities who have been told that other communities behave in a certain way without taking time to find out if it is true. The report further argues that most of the negative perceptions and stereotypes that are present today in Kenya were initially propagated by the colonial government. Besides employing the 'divide and rule' tactic, the colonialist government also perpetuated ethnic stereotyping. (Parties to the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation March, 2008).

It further fault the colonial government's response to the Mau Mau rebellion included perpetuating stereotypes and dividing Kenyans based upon ethnicity. For example, the colonial government hired large numbers of Luo to work on white farms to replace the 'untrustworthy' Kikuyu and included disproportionately large numbers of the Kamba community in the army (Parties to the Kenyan National Dialogue and Reconciliation March, 2008). However, this has not come without an expense as ethnic stereotyping has been extremely damaging to ethnic relations in Kenya. Indeed, some ethnic groups partly attribute their historical economic marginalization to stereotypes that have all along been perpetuated about them. There is evidence that President Moi's administration took a page from the colonial government and used divide and rule tactics to pit ethnic communities against each other. This policy became particularly evident after the re-introduction of multi-party politics in the country in the early 1990s. The introduction of

multiparty politics and elections coincided with a wave of ethnic violence in parts of the country. Such issues found culmination during the 2007 general election which triggered the 2007 PEV.

The respondents of the study cited communities who had invaded Eldoret region, and pointed out that Kalenjins were looked at as somehow sleeping people and lazy and that is why they have been selling their land. On the other hand, the Kalenjins have been viewing the immigrants as thieves of their land. This kind of stereotyping along ethnic lines has been string hatred among the communities and most of the hate speeches experienced during the PEV were a result of stereotyping.

6.11. Government complicity in communal violence

This is attributed to the government official who uses their office to promote ethnic violence through social acts. Once again this was a long term issues that calumniated during the 2007 PEV. During President Moi's era, in the 1990s commercialized cattle rustling and other ethnic attacks for land and pasture in many parts of the Rift Valley were linked to high-ranking government officials. In the study, it was found out that the Kenyan government sometimes provides arms to local allies who were given license, sometimes with direct support from the police, to attack rivals. Several incidents were reported and when such occurred, the police were reluctant to intervene since they were the cause. Views from respondents also indicated that that some victims did not go to the police because they feared reprisals from those committing the violence or abuse at the hands of the police. Some victims said that when they attempted to report to the police, but they were asked for money, or were threatened with being implicated in some of the crimes they had witnessed. According to the report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence (2008), the police were responsible for 405 of the 1,113 death in the entire country. But remember these were only the documented figures but many atrocities were committed and they were never recorded.

6.12. Conclusions

From the foregoing discussion, it is disheartening to note that with multiparty politics, which started in 1992, selfish politicians and the political elite used the kind of diversity in multi-ethnicity to balkanize the people of Eldoret and plunge them into violence, culminating into the kind of political crisis that was witnessed in late 2007 right through to early 2008. This kind of negative ethnicity, which was overtly exhibited in hate speeches, took centre stage in the voting patterns that were witnessed in the 2007 general elections. Today, most people in Eldoret East district and Kenya at large know themselves as belonging to this ethnic community and not "the other". The whole issue of "Them" vs. "Us", or the politics of inclusion and exclusion has now unfortunately become more pronounced and magnified, and even in urban centers, most people now identify themselves first as belonging to a specific "tribal" community before looking at themselves as Kenyans. The whole idea of national identity has been relegated to the rear as ethnic identity takes centre stage (Yieke, 2010) Violence during electoral periods in Kenya has killed at least 4,433 people and displaced over 1.8 million since the introduction of the multi-party system in 1991(Human Rights Watch, 2008). The 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East district was as a result of a combination of factors, including politicization of ethnicity, colonial factors, corruption, non-adherence to the rule of law, a centralized and highly personalized form of governance, inequitable development, police failure, land scarcity, and a "winner-

takes-all” form of politics perceived as benefiting one ethnic constituency to the detriment of all others. Only the 2002 and 2013 elections have not been seriously marred by violence.

Other factors related to the clashes such as food insecurity, labour disruption on farms, industry and the public sector institutions, destruction of property, land grabbing, commercial disruption, breakdown in transport and communication, resource diversion, mis-allocation and unexpected expenditure, infrastructural disruption, inflation and fluctuation of prices, and environmental destruction.

7. Effects of 2007 post-election violence in eldoret east district

The eruption of 2007 PEV as discussed in the previous section was caused by myriad of factors. Subsequently, 2007 PEV had adverse effects on people, property, animals, environment and the economy. Even though the violence had some positive effects, negative effects were far much overwhelming. This section discusses the main negative and positive effects of the 2007 PEV with reference to Eldoret East District.

7.1. Negative effects

The 2007 post election violence brought about huge damage to the people, animals, environment as well as property in Eldoret East district. Following the announcement of the results of the December 2007 National General Elections, violent skirmishes and riots erupted in Eldoret East district and many other parts of the country that also involved destruction of both private and public property.

7.2. Loss of human life

During the 2007 post election violence in Eldoret East, thousands of persons lost their lives. In fact, there was an incident in which especially children and women were burnt in a church in Eldoret. The respondents lamented that six years ago during election-related violence in Kenya, young people brutally attacked and burned a church in Kiambaa - which housed ethnic Kikuyus who fled from their farms and houses. During the time of this study, memories were still fresh among the victims. The church burning was part of a wave of violence generally pitting Kikuyus, who are believed to have dominated Kenyan politics since the country won independence from Britain in 1963, against Odinga's ethnic group, the Luo, and other tribes who sided with him to oust what they considered entrenched Kikuyu power. The perceived importance of human life makes it imperative to consider the scale of violence in terms of the number of human death. The holocaust was so devastating, and thus an emotive debate because of the number of deaths incidental to it.

7.3. Destruction of property

Damage to property comes second, and so we get the analysis of economic loss. Kenya lost property worth billions of shillings as a result of post election violence. Kipkelion for instance, the crop destruction was record breaking. The Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence (2008) puts figures at "36, 566

bags of maize, 8,100 bags of beans, 800 bags of Irish potatoes, 40 tones of cabbages, 30 tonnes of kales, 20 hectares of sugarcane and 3,219 plants of coffee".

In Eldoret town and its surrounding regions including Nandi, Marakweti, Pokot, Mt. Kenya, Kitale among others, motor vehicles, farm products, shops, infrastructure, etc were razed down by rowdy citizens, who were crying for justice. Members from both political divides claimed that they were fighting for their rights. Most of respondents who participated in this study from non-Kalenjin communities said that most of their property was destroyed unselectively and in-discriminatively. Their trees were cut down crops were destroyed, vehicles were burnt, houses were reduced to ashes, the road network was destroyed, and even the railway line was undone in some places. I came across one respondent whose three vehicles were burnt down while another his schools was torched down to ashes completely. Some respondents who were in church during the 2007 PEV and the study too said that the loss they incurred will take a lifetime to regain back. They were living in poor conditions. Meeting their daily needs including adequate food, clothing, shelter, water, medical facilities and catering for the education of their children is a nightmare. They recalled those days before the 2007 PEV where they said life was good and comfortable. Their permanent houses were pulled down, iron sheets stolen alongside other valuables and even their livestock and poultry was taken away. Wealth which they had taken years to accumulate was reduced to nothing in just few days.

7.4. Reduction in productivity

The political crisis that prevailed in the country did not only cause loss of human lives, livelihoods and properties, it also had significant impacts on the operations of many public and private sector institutions. The magnitude of the impacts may have been varied from institution to institution and from place to place. Nevertheless, the impacts reversed many gains that the country had made since independence. Various sectors were negatively affected. Water sector, for instance was affected in four main areas namely: Operations, equipment and physical facilities; Staff and their dependants; challenge in the provision of water to the IDPs. The impact was equally felt in agricultural sector. The impact was also greatly felt in tourism sector. In general the entire economy of the country was affected and further worsened by global recession (Onyango, February 14, 2008).

In Eldoret East district, the effect was felt greatly. Many settlers who had invested especially in farming were forced to close up their industries and farms and leave. This means that many people especially the youths were left jobless without any source of livelihood. Along the same line, many farming land was left desolate for so long without cultivation. By the time of the study, the researcher saw vast land uncultivated and was used only for grazing. This land was initially planted with crops before the 2007 PEV. There was a general decline in economic production as many of the potential farmers ran away due to insecurity created by the violence. In a state of insecurity, as was the case in the study area, agricultural activities were disrupted. In most cases, maize, coffee, pyrethrum, tea, sugarcane and other crops were either destroyed or abandoned because of the widespread violence caused by the clashes. In some areas, work on agricultural land stopped for a long time as farm workers stayed away for fear of being attacked by the clashing enemies. In fact, it was found out during the study that some respondents were staying in rental houses and had

engaged in small business as an alternative for farming. These respondents were living in pathetic conditions since their income was little.

7.5. Sexual and gender based violence (SGBV)

This was employed as a tool of intimidation, with reports of the threat of rape being used to chase women from their homes. Other cases of SGBV appear to have been opportunistic, perpetrated by gangs of youth in slums or targeted at women fleeing violence. Cases of ethnically motivated forced circumcision of males from mostly the Luo community were documented in Eldoret East and other parts of the country like Nakuru and Naivasha. However, the number of cases suggests that circumcision was sporadic rather than an overall trend in the violence. However, violence heightened it and people used it in causing terror and harassment along ethnic lines.

The clashes in Eldoret brought about a situation of gender and child vulnerability as with the case of Kiambaa church where almost all the 50 victims who were burned to death were women and children. Indeed, it is the children and women who suffered more during the period of the clashes. They were abused, violated, embarrassed and at times raped in broad daylight during the clashes. During the study, I came across one woman who lamented on how her daughter was raped in her presence. Another family too lamented seeing a whole family of mother and three children mutilated since they were too weak to run away from the reach of the attackers.

Additionally, the respondents who experienced the 2007 PEV further recalled some experiences during those days citing that in the internal refugee camps, there were inadequate rooms to accommodate thousands of the displaced families. The situation was horrible! Both men and women, together with children, were forced to share the often congested sleeping places in close proximity with one another with little or no privacy. Nature being what it is, there was uncontrolled, indiscriminate sexual behaviour, not only between adult men and women, but also involving sex abuse of young children, particularly girls. Some medical professionals who were part of the respondents and who had have been working in Eldoret East district for more than ten years said that, as a result of such immoral practices, sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS were passed from one individual to another, with children and women being the most affected victims of the circumstances.

The study established that the 2007 post election violence brought about assault of women, killings and theft. These interfered especially with children. One respondent estimated that over 500 children displaced were not going to school because their homes and schools were destroyed and some torched. They were trying to learn and cope with the extreme situation in the refugee camps while other victims for sexual violence were still living in bad situation especially those who contracted HIV/AIDS during the violence.

7.6. Injuries

During the 2007 PEV, injuries were also inflicted during the violence. A report by Kenya Human Right Commission (2008) confirmed that injuries were experienced during the 2007 post election violence. The respondents said that there was no communication during the 2007 PEV and movement from one place to

another was not possible. Many people nursed their injuries in homes since they could not access hospitals. These injuries were never recorded. In fact, some even claimed that there were hundreds of deaths which were executed by both police and people but were never recorded.

The causes of these injuries, just like the causes of deaths, are varied. Some were as a result of gun shots, sharp objects, and traumatic circumcision. The respondents of the study noted that the massive casualties were as a result of citizen against citizen and police brutalities along ethnic lines. From the study, many respondents seemed to concur with the view that this was a golden opportunity Kenyans got to sort them out, as issues of historical injustices had never found an opportunity to be addressed. The inquiries that were commissioned incidental to the 2007 post election violence came up with startling revelations, of which the citizens are keenly following. It is regrettable that the violence happened as respondents affirmed, but it is encouraging that Kenyans are now aware that impunity is an adversary to justice and good governance in any democratic system.

7.7. Displacement of people

The violence led to widespread displacement. As of 27 February 2008, Kenya Human Right Commission (2008) noted that there were many IDPs in organized sites, whilst a similar number of displaced were living in host communities. Some of the respondents, who participated in the study, had been displaced from their original homes where they lived before the 2007 PEV. They had now settled near towns where they felt that security was at least fair. Respondents moreover said that many people from non-Kalenjin communities had left Eldoret and returned to their ancestral homes since they lost all they had. The experience they went through could not allow them continue staying in Eldoret East district. During the 2007 PEV, there was massive exodus of people from the rural areas to towns. Many people left the rural areas of Eldoret and moved to Eldoret town while others went to Kitale town. Those who moved are now living in rented houses and this comprises the majority number. For those who were rich, they bought plots in towns and constructed and they are living there now.

For the Kalenjin communities, the movement was reverse. Some people from this group bought the land which was being sold by the departing communities. They thus resettled in the rural areas where they are now farming. Others who were living and farming in leased farms were displaced completely and having lost all they had in terms of crops and animals, they had to move either to their ancestral home or into towns to begin a completely different life all together.

7.8. Alteration of land tenure system

According to this study, one of the long term economic consequences of the clashes unearthed was the fact that land ownership patterns have been permanently altered. During the 2007 PEV, many houses were torched down and their owners were forced to leave Eldoret. There was massive exodus of non-Kalenjin communities to their ancestral homes. Many were forced to sell their land to the locals. Because of the economic situation by then, it was hard to find one potential buyer. So, people were forced to subdivide their estates into smaller portions before selling them out. This led to land fragmentation. Vast farming lands

which once existed in Eldoret East are no longer there. Only a few farms can be seen running in tens of hectares.

For the respondents who were visited, most of them had between one hectare and five. They said that before the 2007 PEV, people used to own more than ten hectares of land but the fear of fresh violence has forced them to sell part of their land and invest in business and in buying land in their original home. This implies that fear of fresh attack still abides in their mind. For those who were in remote places, they either abandoned their land or sold it out. In fact, most respondents affirmed that they sold their land and now they lease land to carry out farming. In other places, the government bought vast land from people and subdivided among the displaced people who were living in IDPs camps. Generally, there was large scale subdivision of land, leasing, resettlement and relocation and this led to purely different kind of land tenure system.

7.9. Food shortage

Food shortage was one of the far reaching economic consequences of the clashes in the study areas. Respondents said that there was a high drop in food production, food supply and raw materials for the agro-based industries such as sugar, tea, coffee, and cereals. As a result of food shortages, many clashes victims experienced famine and this necessitated the appeal for local and international food aid and relief.

7.10. Health related problems

As found out from the study, the first-hand accounts as given by respondents who experienced the clashes, victims in the affected areas were extremely disturbing as far as health was concerned. The thousands of displaced families, having lost their shelters and food supplies, had to camp in over-crowded temporary shelters organized through donations and support from various organizations, such as the Catholic Mission, Red Cross, NCKK, Action-Aid Kenya and the UNDP among others. These camps were established haphazardly all over the clashes zones and had poor ventilation. The grossly inadequate water supply and sanitation facilities, coupled with overcrowding, made these camps ideal conditions for major outbreaks of communicable diseases such as meningitis, typhoid, upper respiratory tract infections, cholera and other related diseases. The mixing of people with cattle, sheep, chicken, goats and other domestic animals was in itself a health hazard.

More so, a good number of Kenyans who had HIV had lived with hope with the introduction of anti-retroviral drugs and therapy, however, the IDP situation made them lose hope. There are currently very many Kenyans living with HIV, who are in refugee camps (Nangulu July, 2007). During the 2007 PEV, some fled from their home to other places in fear of attacks. The study found out that a good number of people living with HIV virus were living in these camps and had lost contact with their HIV patient support centers. At these centers they were getting drugs and counseling. The situation led to relapse on drug adherence and could lead to more deaths or secondary infection out of trauma and loss of hope. Positive clients who were at home were also unable to access hospitals since the roads were insecure or they lacked economic power to pay for transport. In reality, the researcher came across people living with HIV/AIDS who were in pathetic conditions and could not access medical attention at all.

7.11. Effect on schools

In all the districts within our study areas, there was a mass exodus of non-Kalenjin teachers who feared for their lives while teaching in the Eldoret district since this region was hostile to them. Since then, many schools have had to do without the services of experienced teaching staff and the effect of this problem on the performance of examination classes was very serious. The clashes prevented some of the primary and secondary school graduates from continuing with higher education and training because of financial constraints caused by the menace. Apart from the pupils losing their text and exercise books and uniforms, they often went hungry and often fell sick because of food insecurity and poor living conditions in the makeshift camps and schools.

According to some of the teachers who were interviewed, as a result of the clashes in Eldoret East district, many schools did not re-open for the new term because of insecurity after the 2007 PEV. It was also established that displacement affected earning and examination performance by mainly with overcrowding of classrooms causing a shortage in learning materials. The teacher respondents indicated that there was high level of overcrowding especially between standard one and four. The teachers said that this was because the children were small in size and it was easier for them to squeeze in a smaller place while the bigger ones required their own desks. On the same note, some teachers indicated that displacement also led to pupils missing school for long periods of time causing inadequate content coverage and poor examination preparation.

It was stressed that loss of family members affected classroom learning and performance in examinations. Pupils were many times traumatized because they had witnessed a lot of violence. Trauma interfered with the teaching and learning and hence performance in examinations. The respondents further indicated that the loss of family property led to financial difficulties among other things. The pupils were left without their basic necessities and hence fared poorly in the classroom. The respondents said that displacement due to the post election violence disrupted learning as the pupils had to change schools to safer areas. Joining new schools abruptly also caused overcrowding in the classrooms and interfering with the pupil: ratio. The pupils also missed out on school time because of the displacement and thus missed out on the content that was taught while they were away. Catching up was difficult and could have affected the preparation and handling of the KCPE examinations.

The findings also revealed that families lost their property and hence their source of livelihood. It resulted in difficulties in providing for the basic needs of their children as well as the learning materials. With lack of essentials, it was hard for the pupils to do their best in their class work as well as examinations. The experiences of losing family members during the violence traumatized many children and interfered with their learning process. The study also found that resettlement gave the pupils a sense of security as they had a permanent shelter. However, for most of the families the financial problems were still there as most of the parents' and care givers' efforts to pick up in small businesses were not so fruitful. The levels of poverty in the camp are still very high up to date implying that getting the basic needs is still a problem. Even though the general KCPE performance has been on the increase for the last two years due to pupils' determination to learn despite the obstacles, the success is not worth celebrating.

7.12. Environmental consequences

The 2007 PEV had also effects on the environment. Large areas of forest land were set on fire as part of a defensive strategy taken by victims of the clashes, to deny their attackers hiding grounds. This development in the long run leads to catastrophic effects on the environment of these areas. In fact, these areas are some of the densely forested zones in Kenya and some are important rain catchments areas. The consequence of massive destruction of forests as was witnessed during the clashes in the mentioned areas would therefore affect the pattern and intensity of rainfall and subsequently affect the viability of rain-fed agriculture and water supply in these zones.

For instance, Mt. Elgon is the major source of perennial rivers such as Kuywa and Kibisi, which flows into Nzoia River that draws into Lake Victoria. Any effect, therefore, on the Mt. Elgon water catchment area will have negative consequences on Lake Victoria and its surrounding.

7.13. Fear of fresh ethnic violence

It is true that fighting has subsided from its peak immediately after the elections in mid 2008. However, there are always conflicts here and there manifested in forms of murder of individuals, stealing of cattle between communities, grumbling of land and other natural resources like pasture. From the study, it was established that tension still remains high between political opponents divided along ethnic lines. Residents in Eldoret East district are concerned that some families displaced by the conflict have been unable to return to their homes simply because many people's homes were burned down and they fear that the same me happen again.

Those who lost their property and loved ones still feel bad over the loss and the spirit of revenge abounds in their hearts. Through discussion with some of them, it was revealed that the memory of the loss was still fresh in their minds. They talked as if the 2007 PEV happened just the other day. It will require much effort to wash the brains of the people from the incidents of 2007 PEV.

7.14. Positive effects

Although the study as pointed out in depth the negative effects of 2007 PEV, it is clear that there are some few benefits out of it. This could be either on lessons learned or policy implications that could be made. For instance, some respondents who did not cherish animosity but value development, peace and reconciliation felt that the 2007 PEV violence should have been considered positively. Some of the respondents noted out saying 'It should not be regrettable, but be looked at as an opportunity for the political, social and economic system to be reconsidered.' To them, it happened so that Kenyans could in order to learn and avoid such bloodshed and conflicts.

The 2007 PEV provided a platform for the problems that have bedeviled the country since independence should to be addressed following the recommendations made by both the Commission of Inquiry into the Post Election Violence and the Independent Review Commission, which concentrated more on the security system, and the electoral body, among other institutions. Since the violence, Kenya has established a firm structural foundation, which was laid on a new constitutional dispensation. A strong chief executive, whose

authority is derived from the constitution, was formed, the current system of power sharing was done away with and at the moment, much of the authority and severity of the country is in the hands of the people. The issue of government being weak and ineffective is now checked by the county governments. No institution is usurping the powers of the other, may it be parliament, judiciary or the executive, thus creating clear boundaries in leadership. A minister now can be taken to court by a common citizen, election fraud can be petitioned, and incompetent government workers are sent home each day among other changes. The land issue which has been a cause of conflicts for so long is slowly being addressed, and the policy on nationalization of land is openly debated. It is irony for many Kenyans being squatters in their own country will soon be history if only corruption will be tackled since other institution mechanisms are at work.

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