# State and security crises in Nigeria's Fourth Republic (1999-2015): A paradox of democracy

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## Abstract

There is no contestation about the fact that the formation of state is essentially to serve the purpose of security of lives and properties of persons within the confines of its boundaries. The expectation of state to fulfill this purpose is greater in a democratic state because its mandate presupposes legitimacy that derives from popular participation and collective choice. This is contrary to the feeling of insecurity in an authoritarian state, which is characteristically predatory over the citizens whose interest it is meant to serve. However, this does not seem to accord with the reality in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, marked by her return from military authoritarian rule to civil democratic rule in 1999. In this paper, we assess how the Nigerian State has fared in its discharge of security obligation within the framework of democracy. Relying principally on secondary data, we come to the conclusion that, paradoxically, contrary to general consensus that lives are better secured in democracies, Nigeria's Fourth Republic has been a negation.

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## 1. Introduction

It has been asserted that a working theory of state must, in fact, be conceived in institutional terms, which is subject to a test of moral adequacy (Laski, 2004:25). It is therefore the degree of institutional adequacy or administrative performance that determines whether or not an entity qualifies as a state. Thus, by implication, a state may so be by having a definite territory, a people, a government, economy etc, but still fails the moral test of adequacy. In the institutional perspective therefore, what is important in defining a state is the degree to which the purpose of state as an institution is fulfilled. The query is 'why should all states be classified as equal when indeed they fulfill their obligations unequally?' Put differently, a definition of state must reflect its internal configuration.

One obvious consensus among the divergent perspectives of the purpose of state is that it is the formation of the people for their own benefits. More briefly but precisely, the state is a tool fabricated for the attainment of popular goals. Whatever purpose the state serves must therefore be to the interest of the people. It is on this ground that scholars base their argument that state is a means to an end. To the likes of Aristotle, Locke, Adams Smith and Spencer (Appadorai, 1974:39), state exists for the sake of that kind of life which is the end of man. The state, according to the Aristotelian philosophy, is a ladder collectively built by the people by which they should be conveyed to the aspired life which is unattainable through individual efforts. According to Locke, the state's obligation is ethical; to ensure the convenience of its citizens. To him, the great and chief end of men uniting into commonwealth and putting themselves under government is the preservation of their lives and property. Adams Smith opines that state has only three duties to which it should attend: the duty of protecting society from violence and invasion of other independent societies; secondly, the duty of protecting, as far as possible, every member of society from injustice or opposition of every other member of it, or the duty of establishing an exact administration of justice; and, thirdly, the duty of erecting and maintaining certain public works and certain public institutions. Herbert Spencer sums it up with the view that state is a joint-stock protection company for mutual assurance. This is the reasoning of Chaturvedi (2006:294) when he says

> [T]he original, primary, and immediate end of the state is the maintenance of peace, order, security, and justice among the people who compose it. No state which fails to achieve these ends in a reasonable degree can justify its existence. Secondly, the state must look beyond the needs of the individual as such but the larger collective ends of society- the welfare of the group. It must cater for the common interest and promote the national progress by doing for the society the things which the common interests require, but which cannot be done at all, or done efficiently, by individuals acting singly or through voluntary associations.

The state is therefore essentially and primarily a formation for the purpose of 'security' which is capable of ensuring the desired life. It is in this view that Laski (2004:25) sees state as an organization for enabling the mass of men to realize social good on the largest possible scale.

## 1.1. Methodology

This work is based on a methodology that is qualitative in nature. It dwells on historical and analytical technique, using secondary data, which include the use of archival materials, periodic publications, journals, relevant books on the subject matter, newspapers, magazines, official documents, seminar papers, academic research papers, libraries and the internet.

## 2. Background of study and statement of the problem

Insecurity or security crises in Nigeria have assumed a perennial character, the dimension of which can be appreciated when historicized and placed within the changing context. Its history dates back to the colonial period, and can be periodised into three principal eras- the colonial, the military and the democratic. Basically, the colonial state itself was a veritable source of insecurity owing to the incompatibilities it posed between state interests and national interests. As a matter of fact, the later was never a reckonable concept in the framework of colonialism which by its very nature was an imposition on the nationals and so lacked the required legitimacy as a state. The interest of the colonial state was primarily to extort the efforts and resources of the nationals, which was made possible by the removal of all visible opposition to its imposition through oppressive and coercive means, without regards to the wellbeing of the people (Tamuno, 1970). In strict security sense, therefore, the colonial state was a state of insecurity. As recalled by Okechukwu and Abubakar (2008), the security crisis in Nigeria has colonial origins, specifically in the nature of the colonial state, its legitimacy crisis and its preoccupation with 'Law and Order', which threw up a specific state superstructure, state personnel and institutions to achieve those objectives. The goal was to overcome the legitimacy crisis and to achieve the extractive, accumulation and taxation objectives of the colonial state.

In the colonial state the notion of security was generally confined to 'state security', equated to national security, which was viewed as the security of those who occupied public office. Rarely was national security viewed as the welfare and happiness of the citizens, neither was security viewed as 'community security', 'societal security' or securing the 'common good', defined in the most generic way. In other words, security was viewed in purely state-centric and military terms and not in social and developmental terms; it is perceived as the maintenance of state sovereignty, not in the context of a common humanity and promoting the welfare of the people. In these circumstances, national security often undermines the security of the citizens. A cursory look at the Native Authority, the colonial machinery purportedly instituted for the protection of law and order, would lend weight to the argument that Nigerians were never secured during the colonial rule.

As observed by Okechukwu and Abubakar (2008), the Native Authority was primarily saddled with the responsibility of efficient tax collection and maintenance of law and order, where law and order meant compliance without question. Whereas Native Authority ideally should create proximity between people at the grassroots and government, bringing the agitations of the former to the attention of the later and encouraging cooperation of the former with the later, all for the wellbeing of both. What obtained in the colonial system was an anathema. As recollected by Mamdani, as an institution, the Native Authority bore

little resemblance to a local administration, say in Britain. Its personnel functioned without judicial restraint and were never elected. Appointed from above, they held office so long as they enjoyed the confidence of their superiors. Their powers were diffuse, with little functional specificity... Native Courts, Native Administration, and a Native Treasury – together crystallized the ensemble of powers merged in the office of the chief... these powers also included a fourth: making rules. As to the chief, Mamdani says "the chief is the petty legislator, administrator, judge, and policeman all in one. Every moment of power – legislative, executive, judicial, and administrative – is combined in this one official. Here there is no question of any internal checks and balance on the exercise of authority".

Rather than representing the interests of the people, the chief symbolized a contradictory amalgam of both arbitrariness and the quest to maintain 'law and order' through the control of the Natives. Therefore, what was to the colonial state a security measure was insecurity to Nigerians- as state agents became nothing other than instruments of suppression, oppression and intimidation. With decolonization, Nigeria was expected to emerge a better society bereft of insecurity tendencies, but realities since independence point in the opposite direction. We shall excuse the six years of the Abubakar Tafawa-Balewa truncated regime which, as claimed by the incursive men in uniform, was toppled on account of political inadequacies.

To expend precious time on recounting the absence of security in Nigeria during the military era is akin to flogging a dead horse. The years of military rule were characterized by gross human rights abuse and repression of political dissent. The respect for rule of law and due process were abandoned for naked abuse of power. The press reported several cases of people being harassed, detained without trial, tortured, extra judicially executed, brazenly murdered, discriminated against and some forcibly displaced from their homes. Successive military governments enacted decrees aimed at curtailing the enjoyment of fundamental rights and liberties by the people. The military regime's arrogation of judicial power and prohibition of court review of its action significantly impaired the authority and independence of the judiciary. The regime of late General Sani Abacha was probably the worst. It carried out widespread repression of human rights advocates, pro-democracy activists, journalists and critics of his government. Extra judicial killings, torture, assassinations, imprisonment and general harassment of critics and opponents were the hallmark of his administration.

All these culminated in the aspiration for democratic self rule. On May 29, 1999 Nigerians wrenched themselves from the claws of military authoritarianism that had held them in fear and insecurity for years. This new era is in Nigeria referred to as the Fourth Republic, the Third Republic having been truncated in 1992 by military incursion. The question that calls for answer, which this paper pursues to address, is whether or not the country has indeed experienced more security within the framework of democratic rule.

Before delving into the crux of this work, it is pertinent that we establish the idea of security and how we wish to understand and use it for the avoidance of ambiguity in this paper.

## 3. Security

This is no doubt a contested concept. It is not uncommon to view security from militarist standpoint, wherefore it relates to the calculation of strength in terms of physical force, ability to ward off aggression or

wage war. Security in this vein hinges on the Clauswitzean and Machiavellian postulations on the strategies of war, where life is all about friendship or belligerence, alliance or adversary and, security therefore is contingent on the readiness for war (see: Cal Von Clausewitz, Niccolo Machiavelli). This comes within what has been described as state-centric or traditional approach to the conception of security. According to Ebohon and Ifeadi (2010:5), "the traditional approach views security from the reactive angle, purely of a military texture or calculus and the use of physical force to ward off dangers or aggressors". As the duo reason further, "state-centric notion of security is based on a short term view of forcibly eliminating all threats". But, in spite of the reasonableness of traditional approach, it fails to recognize non-military threats, such as unemployment, human-induced environmental pressure, resource war and crises relating to population explosion, displacement of refugees, poverty, diseases, injustice and cruelty to humanity (see Ifeadi, 2008:75-118). To wit, security must be seen beyond its traditional purview and has therefore come within what is now referred to as the *revisionist School of thought* which concerns with **total security** to include non-military sources of threat. To save us from the cocoon of traditional reasoning, security/national security must be stretched to refer generally to the condition or feeling safe from harm or danger, the defense, protection and preservation of core values, and the absence of threats to acquire values. Put simply, security is about survival and the conditions of human existence.

Former Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo (1999), admitting the importance of security, opines that security entails the ability of a nation to advance her interests and objectives, to contain instability, control crime, eliminate corruption and, above all, improve the welfare and quality of life of every citizen. According to Mohammed (2005), "National Security from any perspective is about safeguarding the interests of the citizenry and providing the type of atmosphere that is free of threats that could inhibit the pursuit of the good of all. It is about the processes and measures required to preserve law and order". National security is an important concern in the life of a person, group or nation. Brown (1982:21) holds that the concern for the security of a nation is undoubtedly as old as the nation-state itself. In the context of the nation-state, the central feature in the quest for national security is the concern for the survival, peace and progress of individuals, groups and the society as a whole.

We should include, however, that national security is construed in various (but not variant) ways, each of which emphasizes vital factors underlying the idea. Brennan (1962) holds that national security is the protection of national survival, while Ray (1987:248-249) says that national security is to be understood in terms of the desire and capacity for self-defence. Goldstein (1975:22) sees national security as closely connected to the preservation of the borders of a state and as mainly construed in terms of the power to maintain a government's sovereignty within its territory. According to Hare (1973:86-89), national security is to be construed as the confrontation of threats to peace in the society. The editors of the Africa Research Bulletin (2000) construe national security in terms of the avoidance of conflicts and confrontations, and the preservation of the lives of people in the society. They also see national security in terms of the capacity to achieve reconciliation among the diverse groups in the society. However, O'Brien (1995:100) in explicating a somewhat different idea of national security, referred to as an inclusive approach to security, argues that security is construed as more than just safety from the violence of rival militaries, it is the absence of violence whether military, economic or sexual.

From the foregoing, state's adequacy is testable on its ability to secure the rights, lives and property of its nationals and residents within its geographical confines. Therefore, where security is in deficit, the state tends to have failed in the administration of its security obligation and is exposed to the risk of damaging its national ethos. This is perhaps the basis of Laski's argument that a working theory of the state must, in fact, be conceived in administrative terms… because it moulds the substance of their (its citizens') lives, they have the right to pass judgment upon the quality of its effort (Laski, 2004:35).

## 4. Security in Nigeria since 1999

The transition in 1999 to civil democratic rule in Nigeria was greeted with popular enthusiasm and optimal expectation for freedom from danger to life and property, and the hope for an atmosphere conducive for the people to pursue their legitimate interests within the society. Among the generality of the people of Nigeria, the transition was a welcomed development, not only because it signaled the termination of military authoritarian rule, but more so because it was perceived as the dawn of an era of great optimism and the realization of the dreams of good life (Mijah, 2007). To put it more concisely, democratic self rule was thought to guarantee security and protection of life and property, and fundamental rights of the Nigerian nationals.

However, the indications on Nigeria's security tabloid are not reflective of the desired results. Experience in the last decade does not seem to be in tandem with popular aspiration and expectation. Since the return to civil democratic rule in 1999, Nigeria has witnessed a continuous deterioration in its internal security. Belief in the philosophies and ideals of democracy among Nigerians appear to be dwindling and are being overtaken by feelings of regrets and disappointment. As observed by Igbafe and Offiong (2007), at the inception of the fourth republic on May 29th, 1999, the citizens of Nigeria heaved a sigh of relief that the reign of the blood thirsty bestial was over. This was because at last democracy had come after so many years of military interregnum. Many thought that with the inception of democratic governance these needless and mindless killings would stop. But this has been the antithesis. The fourth republic alone accounts for the highest cases of political assassinations in history. A statistical look at the cases of political assassinations that have occurred in the fourth republic alone reveals that it accounts for more than those of the first-three republics put together.

More perturbing, too, elements of insecurity have increased in number and in sophistication. In the words of Agbaegbu (2005), "Never in the history of this country, since the civil war ended in 1970, have we experienced the level of violence, threat to lives and property and intimidating moves to undermine our democracy".

## 5. Trends in Nigeria's security crises

Security crisis describes every variety of force, militancy, coercion, destruction and aggression directed against persons, properties, and symbols of perceived sources of discontent. This includes such phenomena

as riots, armed robbery, arson, guerrilla warfare, civil wars, coup d'état, assassinations, insurrections, rebellions, revolutions, kidnappings and the likes (Osita 2004:13). Lack of security for life and property has assumed a crisis dimension in Nigeria. Indeed, it has almost become an intractable problem since the return of civil democratic rule in 1999. As discovered by Hazen and Horner (2007:41), the overall level of violence in Nigeria has increased on the whole over the past several years, which gives support to the popular belief that violence has escalated since the return to democracy in 1999. To wit, we shall restrict ourselves to three major forms of security crises: political assassination, kidnapping and the Boko Haram problem.

## 5.1. Political assassination

Since 1999 the Nigerian state has witnessed unprecedented level of security crises. Security crises walk tall in Nigerian streets unmolested. Until Boko Haram took the dimension for which it is now known, the severest in this class was political violence. In the words of Mijah (2007), "the desperation for political offices and by extension for unrestrained access to state resources has also heightened feelings of insecurity in the country. In the build up to elections and as the jostling for power intensified, top government officials and prominent politicians are murdered or attempt made on their lives. As Igbafe and Offiong noted, the inordinate ambition of Nigerian politicians and the vigor with which they pursue it have made them to get to any length just to attain such power even if it meant taking the lives of those who may pose as hindrance in the pursuit of their ambition. It is regarded as a 'do or die' affair. That is, a must win situation… political assassinations have been the major outcome of political violence in Nigeria. The activities and actions of political individuals and groups are more centered on 'adoption of assassination' in settling political scores. They see the position or power as more important than the lives they take.

According to Ake (1995:16), in Nigeria as in other post colonial societies, the premium on power is exceptionally high, and the system lacks the institutional arrangement to moderate political competitions as a result of which political competitions tend often to assume the character of warfare. On this weight there has been series of politically motivated murders in the country. Among those killed were the then Minister of Justice, Late Chief Bola Ige and prominent national politician, Chief Alfred Riwane. Both former chairman of People's Democratic Party (PDP), Chief Audu Ogbe and the then chairman of Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF), Chief Sunday Awoniyi, escaped what was widely described as politically motivated murder attempts. Unfortunately, the wife of former Governor of Kano State, Alhaji Rimi, was not so lucky. She was murdered in her house in Kano in 2005. Equally significant is the murder of the National Vice Chairman (South-South) of the People's Democratic Party, Chief Aminasaori Dokubo, which took place in early 2004. The South-South Zone of the country, precisely Cross River State, experienced the spectra of violent death when Mr. Eyo Eyo was killed in his house in Calabar in April 2002. Eyo Eyo was an information officer attached to the State's Commissioner for Agriculture. He was said to have been killed by seven gunmen who also shot and critically wounded his wife said to be nursing a four month old baby (Edemodu, 2002). Another dramatic assassination is that of Marshal Harry, the National Vice Chairman for the South-South Zone of the largest opposition party, the All Nigeria Peoples' Party (ANPP). He was an important politician both nationally and within Rivers State, where he was known as a political "Kingmaker". Marshal Harry, ironically, had

condemned the killing of Bola Ige saying it was a national calamity. In his words "the murder of chief Bola Ige has dented the image of this country. Our image has been shattered and it would be difficult for us to redeem it." After the 1999 elections, he was still a member of the Peoples' Democratic Party, PDP, and supported the Rivers State Governor, Peter Odili but he soon began to publicly disagree with Odili's policies and began a drive to ensure that he would not return to power in 2003 (Human Rights Watch, 2003). He also began campaigning against President Obasanjo, and helped form the Campaign for the Realization of a South-South Presidency (CRESSOP). The PDP suspended Harry in 2001 because of these "anti-party" activities and the next year he joined the ANPP, which had long fielded Mohammed Buhari, Obasanjo's primary competitor in the presidential elections and former military head of state from the North. Harry became the ANPP's national vice chairman, with responsibility for the South-South zone of Nigeria covering his home state of Rivers and several other states of the Niger Delta area. He was a strong supporter of Sergeant Awuse, the ANPP's candidate for Rivers governorship and a bitter opponent of Governor Odili. He was killed few weeks before the elections. His death has been linked to the bad feeling between him and the Rivers State government. Harry was killed in Abuja on March 5th, 2003. Igbafe and Offiong (2007) recounted that: "many thought that with the inception of democratic governance these devious and mindless killings would stop. But this has been the antithesis. The Fourth Republic alone accounts for the highest cases of political assassinations in history. A statistical look at the cases of political assassinations that have occurred in the Fourth Republic alone reveals that it accounts for more than those of the first three republics put together."

Gani Fawehinmi, Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) of blessed memory described the spate of political assassinations in Nigeria as the darkest and saddest event in Nigeria. According to him, what we have been witnessing recently is not democracy by politicians, but a mindless display of craziness by members of the political class, and unless quickly checked, the democratic edifice will surely collapse and we would have ourselves to blame for the unprecedented flow of blood that will follow (Ajani, 2001). Nigeria is dripping with blood. Our record of orderly transfer of power has not been a particularly happy one as it has been marked most times by violence and death. Indeed, political violence has been a feature of our behavior from the days of uncontrolled mayhem in Western Nigeria during the First Republic (1963) to later-day version of warring political brigade, fronts and vanguards. There are many illegally held guns in Nigeria and experience has shown that quite a number of armed groups and their collaborators are prepared to settle 'political scores' with immediate effects (Igbinovia, 2003).

## 6. Kidnapping in Nigeria

In recent time, in Nigeria, kidnapping has assumed alarming dimension, opening up opportunities and avenues for dangerous degeneration. Its occurrence and impacts started to be felt at the tail end of the twentieth century, basically as a strategy of war against oil exploration or what has been referred to as liberation struggle. Thus, whereas the phenomenon of kidnapping initially accompanied the Niger-Delta struggle, it ballooned to a national menace, consuming the fabrics of security in Nigeria. To this end, therefore, kidnapping in Nigeria can be examined on different platforms.

## 6.1. Kidnapping as a general liberation struggle

Early versions of kidnapping were believed to be part of a wider liberation call by MEND, the Movement for the Emancipation of Niger Delta, for the development of the region. It was then an activity with no monetary attachment as the key motivation factor and in most cases part of the outcome of a confrontation between MEND and oil interests or the Federal Government of Nigeria. The key grievances often times advanced by MEND for such confrontations involved three closely interrelated but analytically distinct issues namely: one, all laws relating to oil exploration and land ownership be abrogated to give the locals more empowerment to have control of their resources; two, the issue of natural resource control and self determination be recognized and operationalized as cardinal principles for the protection of their minority status; three, appropriate institutional and financial arrangements be put in place for the development as well as addressing the numerous environmental problems associated with oil exploration and exploitation in oil producing communities in the Niger Delta.

The refusal of the FGN to respond to these demands has been at the root of MEND's liberation struggle (Akpan and Akpabio, 2003). Kidnapping has come to play important role in such fights over the years. Initially, it could go without ransom (if the source of finance is guaranteed by their sponsors) but these days, some financial demands are made before release could be effected. Such ransoms seem to be useful in funding the organized groups involved. In the earlier cases, target victims are foreign oil company workers, although key government officials have been targeted as a direct confrontation with the FGN.

## 6.2. Kidnapping for economic reasons

Gerth and Mills (1948: 56-7) are of the opinion that kidnapping is regulated by the laws of demand and supply and is a type of social action that involves the calculation of the most efficient means to the desired ends. Kidnapping is a social enterprise and kidnappers are businessmen, they just happen to be on the illegal side of it... if you deprive them of the demand then there is not going to be any supply.

The beginning of 2007 saw the emergence of various other deviant groups by various names that hide under liberation struggle to commit economic crimes. It takes few persons to organize somebody's kidnap. In the event, the victim would be snatched and taken to a safe location. Such operation is always well- planned and well- executed. The family of the victim is then contacted and a ransom demanded, which is subject to negotiation. In this category, there is heavy financial motivation and the victims are always the "well-to-dos", political class, foreign workers, men and women and of very rich background, including children. Such cases include the kidnapping of six Russians working for an aluminum company at Ikot Ekpene. The white men stayed with their captives in an unknown place for two weeks before they were released. The kidnappers had asked for a ransom of N100 million before they would release their victims. Also, the wife of the Senator representing Ikot Ekpene senatorial district, Mrs. Comfort Etok, was kidnapped in broad daylight in Uyo.

## 6.3. Kidnapping as a political tool

This case qualifies for what Turner (1998) describes as "money and politics" where there are political motivations for kidnapping but where ransoms are also demanded. Such ransoms are often used to further

the political objectives of the kidnapping organization or simply to facilitate the survival of the organization. Recently, it is learnt that most top kidnapping operations are masterminded by government officials, opposition groups, unrewarded or uncompensated members of election rigging militant groups, among others. Kidnapping is then seen as instrument for political vendetta and settling of political scores. The operation is organized and targeted mainly at key serving politicians or foreign workers or contractors working directly for government. Once the victim is kidnapped, a high level negotiation is expected which will ultimately lead to a very heavy ransom. Such a ransom is used to further political goals, self –settling of aggrieved groups or a way of financially crippling a serving politician. The most notable kidnapping gangs in the Niger Delta today are "used and dumped" political thugs. Most of them were used during election and dumped at swearing-in still armed and without any compensation. On the strength of the sophisticated weapons at their disposal the members regroup themselves and target their political mentors or enemies. They specialize in high profile kidnapping that even surpasses the capabilities of the State security agents.

## 6.4. Kidnapping as a new habit of crime

The political importance of kidnapping activity has had a spill-over influence on the jobless youths and criminals who take it as a new substitute or complement to robbery and pick-pocketing. Such a group of kidnappers target not only prominent and well-off individuals but also ordinary citizens who possess little wealth. The common targets include every perceived person with prospects of high and lucrative ransom including teenagers, children and adults alike. For instance, in mid-2008, a teenage daughter of a popular Pastor was kidnapped and a ransom sought from the parents before her release. Robbers and other criminal groups have taken advantage of this as a new way of making a living or sustaining their living standard. The general feeling of the people now is not whether it will happen but when, where and who the next target would be (Akpan, 2010).

## 7. Bombings in Nigeria

The recent and most threatening security challenge in Nigeria is the suicide bombings (terrorist act previously unknown in the nation) by Jama'atul Alhul Sunnah Lidda' Wat Wal Jihad, a notorious militant Islamic group known as Boko Haram. The media on daily basis presents heart wrecking images of dramatic acts of bombings with impunity and horrific portrait of people maimed, burnt to ashes and properties completely destroyed by the Boko Haram insurgents; making everyone to live in constant fear, especially those resident in the northern region of the country (Ogege, 2013).

The Boko Haram insurgency has proven to be more lethal than the Niger Delta militancy; employing deadly strategy of suicide bombing of churches, mosques and attacking Islamic clerics in the northern region of the country. The first suicide bombings in Nigeria took place at the Police headquarters and United Nations Office in Abuja (Blanchard, 2014). Boko Haram was initiated in 2002 by a school drop-out Mohammed Yusuf in the city of Maiduguri as an unclassifiable Islamic sect seeking to purify Islam and spread it by force as well as eradicate western education and civil service across the northern states of Nigeria. At the initial stage, the

group leader established a religious complex that included a mosque and a school where many poor families from across the northern Nigeria and neighbouring countries such as Niger and Chad enrolled their children. Soon, the initially seemingly amorphous group began to work as a recruiting ground for future jihadists to fight the government. In a reprisal attack for the killing of its leader Yusuf in police custody on July 30, 2009, the sect under the leadership of Ibrahim Abubakar launched its first terrorist attacks in Borno State which killed four persons. Since then the torment of the sect has increased both in frequency and intensity to the extent of becoming a threat to the existence of the Nigerian State (Vanguard Newspaper, 2011).

The current spate of bombing by Boko Haram started in December 31, 2010 outside a barrack in Abuja killing four civilians as part of retaliatory attacks for the death of Mohammed Yusuf, the spiritual leader of Boko-Haram, who was summarily executed by men of the Nigerian Police after he had been handed over to them by Nigerian soldiers in July 2009. In May 29, 2011 bombs were detonated in Abuja and Bauchi, killing 15 people during Goodluck Jonathan's swearing in as the new president. On June 16, 2011 Abuja Police Headquarters was bombed, killing at least two people, it was Nigeria's first instance of a suicide bombing. On August 26, 2011, 21 people were killed in a bomb attack on a United Nations compound in Abuja. December 25, 2011, 41 people were killed by Boko-Haram bomb attacks and shootings on Christian churches. On April 8, 2012, 38 people were killed following a bombing at a church in Kaduna. On June 17, 2012, 19 people were killed following bomb attacks against three churches in Kaduna (Ogege, 2013).

The bombings by book Haram insurgent continued in 2013, by March 18, between 22 and 65 people were killed in Kano by a car bomb. April 14, 2014, over 88 people were killed in a twin bombing attack in Abuja. On May 1 2014, 19 killed in Abuja by another car bomb. At least 40 people were killed by a bomb in Mubi, Adamawa State on June 1st, 2014. November 2014, a double suicide bombing in Yobe State killed over 15 Shiites on the 3rd and 46 students on the 10th. Over 45 people were killed by two suicide bombers in Maiduguri, Borno State on November 25. On November 28, 2014, at least 120 Muslim followers of the Emir of Kano, Muhammed Sanusi II, were killed during a suicide bombing and gun attack by Boko Haram insurgents in Kano. December 1st and 5th people were killed by two female suicide bombers who detonated explosions at a crowded market place in Maiduguri, Borno State. In 2015, February 2, a female suicide bomber attacked minutes after the president of Nigeria left an election rally in the city of Gombe resulting in at least one death and eighteen people injured. On July 6, two bomb attacks on the central Nigerian city of Jos left at least 44 people dead (BBC News, 2015).

In conclusion, the Boko-Haram crisis has indeed destroyed lives and rendered many persons as IDP's (Internally Displaced Persons) in the North-Eastern region of Nigeria. The high incidence of bombings and sporadic attacks on security buildings and its officials is one which has greatly impacted negatively on the economic growth of the country.

## 8. Recommendations and conclusion

Successive governments have used various approaches to manage or control the security crisis, yet no solution is in sight. The methodology has remained the same: vote more money to purchase vehicles and

equipment, recruit more policemen and give orders for arbitrary arrest, urge all arms of security and intelligence to collaborate in ways that permit those dealing with intelligence and counter-intelligence to dabble in security matters and vice versa, as is the case between the Nigerian police and the State Security Services (SSS). The failure in these approaches to security issues has called into question its continued employment. As such, it is incumbent on us to begin a more rational, objective and perhaps more pragmatic voyage in search of answers as well as solutions to our security questions and problems. We should start to seek alternative, democratic, people-friendly and more inclusive means of tackling Nigeria's security crisis. But in order to develop and implement effective security system and control programmes as well as effective administration of criminal justice, there must be reliable and valid data on the trend, extent and pattern of security crises in a society (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2005:9).

From the foregoing, it is obvious that Nigeria's failure to fulfill its supreme obligation, security of lives and properties, to the citizens and residents within its boundaries is more evident under democratic dispensation than it was in the military regime. This situation does not accord with theoretical leanings that democracy enhances good life. Within the common discourse on foreign policy, for example, it is assumed that democracy and development are antidotes to security crises- more democracy and more development will reduce occurrences of terrorism (Patrick, 2006). This leaves us with no other conclusion than that democracy within the Nigerian context is a paradox.

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