Chayanov’s “development theory” and Colin Bundy’s “African peasantry”: Relevance to contemporary development and agricultural discourse

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Abstract of Part One

This paper attempts to look at the work of Chayanov, in respect of contemporary development issues and reexamines his work (on the basis of the work of Teodor Shanin and partly by Hamza Alavi). Chayanov was considered during his time as the new Marx. His discourse and thoughts were fashioned upon the political economy and based on intellectual criticism of the USSR. He was sidelined by the then USSR and put to pasture by the many forms of repression in the then Soviet Union. His work bears utmost relevance to contemporary dialogue in respect of agriculture and development issues, in the context of the modern world. On the other hand the second part of the paper will look at Colin Bundy’s book The Rise and Fall of the African Peasantry. It is probably the most influential account of rural history produced in the 1970’s, and is hailed as a major reinterpretation of South African history, in terms of African agriculture which was considered as inherently primitive or backward and capitalism was hostile to peasants. Both parts of the paper look at the preface of the books written by Teodor Shanin and By Colin Bundy himself, in order to look at very important and vexing issues that permeate 21st century discourse on development and agriculture.

Keywords: Development; Agriculture; Peasantry; Reinterpretation; Political Economy; Contemporary Dialogue; Capitalism; Poverty; Legacy; Traditionalism.

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Note: This article is in two parts. The first part is on the works of Alexander, V. Chayanov as reviewed by Teodor Shanin and Hamza Alavi. See the notes on the reviewers in terms of their autobiographical sketches at the end of the first part of the article. The second part is on South Africa’s, “The Rise and Fall of the African Peasantry” by Colin Bundy (2nd edition) reviewed (1988). See the notes on the reviewer Colin Bundy in terms of his autobiographical sketch at the end of part two of the article.

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PART ONE

1. Introduction

The first English edition of The Theory of Peasant Economy made history. The reactions following its publication in 1966 were remarkably strong. The book has been quoted right, left, and centre, by those who gave it considerable thought as much as by those who clearly received only a grabbed version. Chayanov was hailed by some as the peasantry's new Marx. A hero-inventor of a radically new political economy. He was attacked with equal heat by the defenders of the intellectual old regimes. For a time Chayanov was high fashion but even when the swing of academic attention moved to new names and “fads” many of his books many and his book's questions, insights and even terms (e.g., "self-exploitation") have remained as fundamental points of reference of the contemporary social sciences, economics and noneconomic discourses. For that reason, the book made history also in the sense of acquiring a life of its own – an influence which shapes perception, focuses attention, defines plausibilities and programs, national as well as international.

The 1966 introductions and glossary by Thorner, Kerblay, and Smith did a fine job and their retention in the second edition makes further summation of Chayanov's career and of the book's content and preliminary criticisms. The article therefore focuses on this preface and on the book's own life and its place in the intellectual history of the dramatic two decades which followed 1966 and the subsequent scholarly as well as political attempts to come to grips with the so-called development theory. At the core lay the issue of general analytical approach and of general analytical approach and of attempts at conceptual retooling by the contemporary social sciences in the face of social reality which has proved most predictions consistently and dramatically wrong. This problem of theoretical inadequacies reflected in consistent failures of prediction and planned intervention has not gone away and, indeed, has since acquired new depth. Chayanov's theoretical contribution should be judged vis-à-vis, in terms of experience and usage as well as in the face of the contemporary projections of future, as a potentiality.

2. Usage, experience, meaning

The book’s “own life” meant necessarily that in encounter with its audiences, the significance of its different elements varied from that attached to it by its author. Application centered mainly on the rural conditions within the contemporary “developing societies.” The book was extensively used by analysts of different persuasions, countries, and academic disciplines. Its misconceptions were often as significant in effect as its Illuminations. Despite consequent variety there was a pattern to the ways Chayanov’s insights and examples were perceived and selected for use. The least utilized or accepted of Chayanov’s main suggestions were his consumption-needs/drudgery ratio, relating the operation of family farms to family consumption, labor, and demographic (or biological) regularities. Put in a rigorously scientistic form and accordingly mathematized, it was not substantiated by most of the available data drawn from Russia of the early part of the century or else
from the “developing societies” of today. Nor was it particularly illuminating in an analytical sense. The reasons were partly spelled out by Chayanov himself. His formulas assumed the easy availability of farming inputs other than labor, especially of land (to which complex equipment, fertilizers, and credit should be added nowadays). This had seldom been the case; indeed, it was decreasingly so. Also, the demographic determinants act relatively slowly compared with the current trends of social transformations. The growing complexity, heterogeneity, and changeability of contemporary agriculture and of the peasant ways to make ends meet would make this demographically related model very limited as against the factors which do not enter it: state policies and markets of goods and labor (by now worldwide), new agricultural techniques, the extra-village cartelization of supply, demand, and credit, or the social construction of new needs. What was to Chayanov “not the sole determinat” shrank to barely a determinat at all, at least in the short term.

It is not surprising therefore that the major case when the discussed formula was put to use (and bore interesting fruits) was in a study by a leading anthropologist of the past within the present, expressed in the ‘Stone Age Economic discourse of the gatherers and hunters. A broadly parallel suggestion that Chayanov’s needs/drudgery ratio may prove increasingly realistic as we proceed back along the history of rural Russia was indeed made by one of Chayanov’s Marxist critics already in the 1920’s. Following similar logic, D. Thorner suggested a higher significance of Chayanov’s “ratio” for the thinly populated areas while E. Archetti assumed it for parts of Africa when compared to other “developing societies “of today.

The general aspect of Chayanov’s analysis which captured contemporary attention was the depiction of a peasant family farms as an economic form which differs from capitalism (and cannot be treated as feudal or “Semifeudal” simply because is it noncapitalist). The analytical approach suggested was to begin the consideration of peasant agriculture from below that is, from the operational logic of the family farms rather than from the national and the international flows of resources, goods, and demands. Of the two parallel specifications explored by Chayanov’s book, the interpretation broadly adopted from his analysis of the particular economics structure and logic of the contemporary family farms was not the demographic one (related to the needs/drudgery ratio, with a possible autarkic extension of it). It was the one which defined a particular peasant economy by the characteristics of family labor and the relative autonomy of its usage at the roots of peasant survival strategies which are systematically different from those of capitalist enterprises. A diverse calculus of choices when production, land-renting, labor out-of-farm, and so on are concerned meant different patterns of operation of the farm enterprises as well as different extra economic corollaries and different outflows into the political economu at the national and international levels.

Evidence drawn from the “developing society substantiated this; indeed, there are difficulties in interpreting much of it in any other way. This evidence of documents,’ the capacity of peasants to out-compete the often well capitalized farming enterprises based on wage labor, to buy out large landholders, and to offer goods at cheapest price. Peasant farms often work at a consistent nominally negative profit yet survive – impossibility for capitalist farming. Maximization of total income rather than of profit or of marginal product guides in many cases the production and employment strategies of peasant family farms.and so on. The message is one of difference of operational logic, of output and of outcome as well as of the possibility, at times, of actual retreat of the classical capitalist forms of production in face of family farming. Chayanov’s work offered an anticipation and analytical illumination of all these. The growing
awareness of the significance of underemployment and employment patterns in the development of the contemporary rural economics facilitated the explicit as well as implicit popularity of this dimension of Chayanov's work. Two recent sets of studies exemplify the relevance of peasant farm particulars and their interpretation in the light of the dominant usage of family labor. Djurfeld, Taussig, Friedmann, and others have documented for different environments the tendency of agribusiness to withdraw from the process of production in agriculture, focusing their profit-making activities on credit, supply of inputs, contracting, and selling, while leaving farming to the small holders and "skimming" them rather than replacing them. Capitalist profit-accountancy prevailed over the capitalist form of production. Second, the recent studies of the paradoxical simultaneity of "critical shortage of labor" said officially to be endangered or even demolishing the agriculture of Egypt and of the parallel evidence of production figures directly contrary to it. Once the data concerning capitalist farming are selected from that of the peasant sector the initial puzzle dissolves. It is the capitalist farming which folds up despite the efforts of its owners and the government's attempts to help them survive. The family farms use family labor flexibly, draw on unwaged neighbors' help, and give priority to "home" when deciding on the times of family members' departure to work elsewhere (e.g., the Gulf) or to return. In result, family farmers advanced their global production as well as their share of land held and produce compared with the capitalist farmers-employers.

It means not a crisis for the agriculture of Egypt but its peasantization. (Insofar as capitalism is defined by its classical formula as commodity production for profit based on the use of wage labor, it is decapitalization as well.) One can multiply such examples. This may be the place to refer to two standards misreading of Chayanov linked to the issue discussed. First, his "analysis from below" – that is, the building up of the understanding of the social economy which commences with the operational logic of family farms – has often been treated as a substitution of the psychological and the subjective for the deterministic and the economic. This is wrong, for the material and structural determinants involved in the relations of production and exchange shape and restrict choices, even though more flexibility of possible and adopted strategies was built into Chayanov's explanatory scheme. What results is the combined explanation of some complexity, but the more realistic for it has to be explained. In general terms there is little particularly 'chayanovian' to it for a combinations of the "objective" and the "subjective" at the roots of human action has been assumed by a broad gamut of schools of thoughts (from Marx's "men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please, and so on." (To the contemporary phenomenological studies of intersubjectivity). The point is that an alternative general view, cross-cutting major conceptual divisions, adopts a different position. Within diverse schools of thought it assumed an archomdel of human action the determination of which is extra subjective only – a puppet theater model of humans in society, associated with philosophical positivism. This view is necessarily misleading if applied to Chayanov's explanatory scheme. Next Chayanov's term "self-exploitation" is often understood simply in its most direct sense of excruciating labor by underfed peasant families damaging their physical and mental selves for a return which is below that of the ordinary wages of labor power (equating it therefore with K. Kautsky's "underconsumption" and Lenin's rural "plunder of labor"). To Chayanov this is not the whole story for it must be read together with his concept of differential optimums," that is, his conclusion that in the different optimal sizes of enterprise and that the decrease as well as increase from these will make productivity decline. To this the social context of peasant farming and
especially the resulting availability of the family, kinsmen, and neighbors' aid and unwaged labor should be added. Family economy is to Chayanov not simply the survival of the weak through their impoverishment which serves super-profits elsewhere, but also, the utilization of some characteristics of farming and of rural social life which may occasionally give an edge to the non-capitalist world.

The continuity and relative wellbeing of family farmers under capitalism can be therefore postulated as a possibility while under capitalism, it can be therefore, be postulated as possibility while self-exploitations (and indeed exploitation) takes place, even though no conclusion about a necessary survival of such economic forms can be deduced or should be assumed within this line of thought. To return to the utilization of Chayanov's insights in contemporary scholarship, the effect of Chayanov's general view of "post-Euclidian" economics, which assumes the plurality of simultaneously operating economic systems and the need to match it by multiplicity of conceptual schemes, was characteristically ambivalent. It corresponded with the work of the more imaginative economic historians of precapitalism, especially K. Polanyi, but those who were ready to quote Chayanov as their authority on contemporary rural economics usually treated it with more respect than application. Disciplinary languages and academic training tend to disregard the submerged assumptions on which they are based with the conclusions drawn taken to be either universally true or universally false. In turn, eyes trained to universalist analysis of an ever-true homo economicus or of epochs which are uniformly capitalist or uniformly feudal tend to miss the centerpiece of Chayanov's assumptions, namely, that family farms are coincident with other economic "systems," responding to and/or being penetrated and influenced by the dominant political economy without their particularity dissolved (indeed, remaining particular also in their response). The consequent issue is not only one multiplicity of forms but also of what results from multiplicities of types of interdependence and of analytical categories engaged. Such a logic of composites was explored more recently in a debate between Marxists concerning the "articulation of modes of production," but it carried there a significantly sharper stress on the hierarchy of socioeconomic systems, on their domination and exploitation by each other (which Chayanov recognized but accentuated to a lesser degree). On the other hand, much of the "articulation" debate was caught in the deadly trap of "if not capitalist, then feudal" to peter out with little analytical consequence. An attempt to incorporate theoretically the particular logic of peasant economy inserted into a dominant political economy.

Finally, Chayanov's practical program of agricultural transformation was made remarkable little of directly, considering the extent to which both its positive and its critical parts were validated by further experience. Once again Chayanov's views on these matters were often misunderstood (and at times rediscovered through experience and background remained hidden.) Chayanov's actual program for the advancement of Russian agriculture, presented fully in the book which followed The Theory of Peasant Economy consisted of three interdependent conceptual elements: rural cooperatives, differential optimums, and vertical cooperation. The first adopted the experience of Europe, especially of Denmark at the turn of the century, while accentuating grass-roots democracy and a "peasants are not stupid," antipaternalist and antibureaucratic view. The second element has already been mentioned. The third one concluded with a suggestion for units of production for different branches of farming. It had also shown that, historically, while the concentration of landownership was insignificant, merchant capital penetrated and transformed peasant
agriculture through "vertical capitalist concentration" taking over selectively its extraproduction elements and concentration" taking over selectively its extraproduction elements and creaming off incomes (as in the U.S. Context where 6d5 percent of farmers’ income from sales was taken then by railways, banks, traders, etc). This process, however, is not a necessity. With the power of capital weakened by peasants can be established and even play a central role in the socialist transformation of society. Chayanov linked it to a powerful and remarkably realistic precritique of Stalin's type of collectivization, code-named "horizontal cooperation," which substitutes maximization for the optimization of the sizes of units and bureaucratization for the suggested management from below." The predicted result of such a "horizontal" reform was the stagnation or decline of productivity of the agriculture. "Horizontal" cooperation combined with the "milking" of the agriculture's resources for the sake of urban growth and the ordering about of peasants would prove as counterproductive as it would be antidemocratic. It would thus court peasant resistance or apathy and destroy the local store of irreplaceable agricultural knowledge and capacity for communal self-mobilization for which bureaucratic pressure from above would prove a poor substitute. Shortage of resources would then be supplemented by their wastage, exploitive hierarchies by new ones as pernicious but less competent. The typical misreading, especially by those who quoted Chayanov at second hand, tend to interpret his program as a dream of archaic peasant bliss stretching into the future, a “peasantism” from which no practical prescription for modern agriculture and rural change can be drawn. In fact the idea of peasant “vertical cooperation” included the need for large units of agricultural production and their further extension as the farming technology advances.

It even accepted the “Grain Factories” idea of the day, subject to the right technology. Outside his Travelsof My Brother Alexis (a novella defined by him as “a peasant utopia”), there was no “small is beautiful” message in Chayanov, only a sharp objection to a “the larger, the necessarily more effective” assumption then prominent, and a functional suggestion for a combined development intended to “optimize” the (following the agronomists best choice for any regional context of natural conditions and the available labor and technology) plus democratic decision making” from below.” A relatively slow pace of change can be deduced, related once again to the characteristics of agriculture as understood. Agrarian reformers of different persuasion have encountered and documented ever since the dangers of excessive speed and bureaucratic zest when the transformation of agriculture is involved. The peak of Chayanov's analytical work cam in the 1920’s, between the ages of 32 and 42, which for Russia will be mostly remembered as the years of the NEP – the new economic program which followed the revolution, civil war, and the egalitarian redivision of all Russia's arable lands by it's peasant communities. The main economic issues of the country's population held more than 95 percent of its arable land. This political economy was spoken of as one of its arable land. This political economy was spoken of as one of “state capitalism” and socialist control of the “commanding heights of the economy” within a population of whom were “middle peasants.” Prognostication and planning by the rural specialists of Russia was defined by considerations which with hindsight is often referred to as the issue of the Collectivization. Chayanov's treble alternative and his precritique are relevant to agriculture and ruralities quite unrelated to Russia or to postrevoluntary states with Marxists in charge, but it can be tested most substantively vis-a-vis the Collectivization debate and results. The last twenty years have seen a considerable amount of soul-searching and policy change concerning collectivized agriculture but nowhere
more than in Hungary. They first followed the Soviet “horizontal” pattern and after the 1956 revolution reorganized and tried it out again. What resulted was a decline or stagnation of agriculture and chronic shortages of food supplies (to rural population should be added). Neither mechanization nor the deportation of “Kulaks” and the arrest of the “saboteurs,” nor bureaucratic orders and campaigns solved the permanent agricultural crisis. Then the Hungarian leadership demonstrated the courage of retreat, made a clean sweep, and began in a totally new manner. Village-scale units were now combined with both multi-village and single family ones. Those deported from their villages were permitted to come back and often to direct cooperative production. External controls declined, compulsory sales were abolished, and “vertical” chains of mutually profitable production arrangements were set up and facilitated (e.g., a small holder buying fodder at a price satisfactory to him from the large-scale collective enterprise of which he is a member, to produce within his family unit meat which is then sold on a “free market” or under a contract).

The agricultural results were dramatic, moving, moving the country rapidly to the top of the European league where increase in agricultural production and incomes are concerned, not only resolving the problems of supplies but establishing Hungary as an export of food. The case of Hungarian agriculture and any other experiments with Collectivization, positive and negative, in Europe as well as in Africa, and Latin America, acted as an important validation of Chayanov’s suggestions for agricultural transformation, of his prognostication, and, up to a point, of his pre general theoretical constructs and approaches. It was clearly not the issue of size or of collectivism or even Collectivization perse but of the actual form of rural transformation and new organization of production as well as the way it combines with peasants-versus-bureaucrats relations, flow of resources, and the substantive issues of farming (and its peculiarities as branch of production). In the face of all these issues, Chayanov’s and his friend’s superb understanding of agriculture, combined with that of rural society, made them unique. This makes his major project – what he called Social Agronomy – pertinent still. It is not that, on the whole, those who succeeded or failed have studies him directly in Hungary or elsewhere. Such lines are seldom clear. But they would (or will) benefit and could lessen some pains if they would or will do so. The fact that this part of Chayanov’s intellectual heritage is seldom considered or admitted has to do not with its content but with the nature of current ideological constraints to which we shall return. We still know much too little about Chayanov’s most direct topic of concern: the Russian countryside in the face of Stalin’s Collectivization. We do know that country to the ideological myth to follow, it was not a natural deduction from Marxism or from Lenin but a fairly arbitrary result of the 1926 – 28 failure of rural policies and of interparty factional struggle. It was outstandingly destructive of resources and humans, facilitated the brutalization of the country’s political system and contributed to the current inadequacies of Soviet studies of Collectivization, relevant once again to the last two decades or so, indicated clearly that the flourishing of TOZ, that is, the self-help teams at its beginning (“vertical” rather than “horizontal” in its implications), was effective and actually well supported by much of the Russian peasant population. It was the decision of “the Centre” to sweep aside practically overnight the TOZ as well as the socialist communes and every other regionally specific form of rural cooperation stemming from local initiative, and to impose the one and only form of a village-size Kolkhoz directed from above, which defined the destructive trend of the 1930s.
3. Methods and labels

As stated, the misconceptual role as the views he actually offered, and we have referred to a few of them. Two more, general in scope, will be considered to round out the picture: the status of conceptual models in Chayanov works and his neo-populist designation.

At the center of Chayanovs method of theoretical analysis, indeed, what made him the leading theorist of his generation, lie systematic exploration of alternative models and typologies. Abstraction and purposeful simplification are systematically used to define and test causal links. As is usual when theoretical models are concerned, purposeful simplification means the overstatement of some characteristics. The totally nonwage family farm and eight pure economic systems presented in the translation, find their farther equivalents in his experiments in the study of an Isolated State, the Nomographic Elements of Economics Geography, and even in his science fiction: The Travels of My Brother Alexis and the 1928 discussion of farming in a bottle of the future scientific production of foodstuffs. Chayanovs mastery and extensive use of Russian empirical evidence (and its wealth for the rural scene of the day), as well as his pronounced practical interests as an agricultural reformer, make many of his cursory readers miss the fact that his was an endless and highly imaginative experimentation with logic of analysis as a way to order the complexity of data in his grasp. He did not lack positive views of his own, made them clear, and can be criticized for them as well as for the methods he used to arrive at conclusions. This has been done by many, including the books first editors and myself, but Chayanov must be treated on his own terms, that is with understand of the way his mode of exploration and actual conclusion differed from each other. This is why it is unhelpful and often plainly ridiculous to express surprise or dismay at Chayanovs disregard of market relations, wage labor, or capital investment in the rural context. This “disregard” is a method, an analytical suspension used to explore casual links through the media of a conceptual model (which can be useful or less so) as to the issue of a conceptual model’s realism, that is, its match wit reality, it is important but provides only one element of theoretical thought. Chayanov experimented with a unicausal demographic model of agricultural development defined by population density and market relations intensity, and so on. Chayanov was also alone one of the leaders of the field of factual studies of market relations, monetarization, and wage labor, and was remarkably realistic when the day-to-day life of the Russian peasantry was concerned. Recent studies by Soviet and other scholars have indeed shown how he was right as to commodity production and very low use of wage labor in rural Russia.

Every model is selective, and Chayanov made his own choices on what to focus his attention and which causal links to “bracket” or deaccentuate. These were relevant, of course, to his views as well as to his conclusions. For example, Chayanov stated in a 1927 debate that he was only the beginning his own studies of peasantry’s socioeconomic differentiation. Considering what we know now about the relatively low class popularization of rural cooperation and optimal use of labor made good sense to a leader of a trend committed to the advance of what was called Social Agronomy. But it limited the grasp of what the exploitive potentials of simple cooperation, state/peasants interaction, and some other issues. (In parallel, the work, who adopted from his major critic Kritzman and his assistants, who adopted from the young Lenin the model of peasantry’s necessary polarization, Stalin-type collectivization without sufficient awareness of its agrarian
dimension and potential social pitfalls.) To recollect, one can criticize Chayanov for his priorities, or better still, consider their impact on his conclusions, but it is epistemologically naïve, blind to evidence, or overwhelmed by the ideological aberrations of “peasants”.

The positioning of Chayanov within an ideological context and vis-à-vis analityical and ideological taxonomies suffered mostly from two miscomprehensions. The first was less prominent, less significant, and less literate, resulting from limit in limited knowledge of Chayanov’s background, his range of publication, and from only cursory reading of Theorner and Kerblay’s efforts to present its picture. It assumed Chayanov’s singularity in inventing “chayanovism”. The other classified him as a Neo Populist and derived his main characteristics from it. The splendid tradition of Russian rural studies was rooted in the regional authorities’ (Zemstvo’s) 1860s to 1917 effort that was introduced mostly by enlightened nobles and their employees within the “rural intelligentsia” to take account of and to improve the livelihood of the plebian populations in their charge, which was mostly rural and peasant. Those studies reached maturity in late 1880 to 1906 (when Chayanov was being born or in school) to revive again after a failed revolution in 1990 – 14 (Chayanov began then, in 1912 at the age of 23, his spectacular public career.) As part of it, the conceptual family-farm focus can be traced back to A. Vasil’chakov’s book of 1881, the Budget Studies development and initial usage to F. Shcherbina in the late 1890s, the Dynamic (“cohort”) Studies to N. Chernenkov at the very beginning of the century, and the direct antecedents Chayanovs assumptions of structurally specific peasant economics to V.Kosinskiis book published in 1906. The expression “economics” is somewhat misleading, in fact, as was the usual occupational designation of most of those involved as “rural statisticians of the Zemstvo. What evolved were peasantry-focused social sciences in their broader sense, merging the contemporary western disciplines of economics, history, anthropology, sociology, demography, public medicine, agronomy, and ecology. Chayanov’s originality is not in question. But his significance lay to a considerable degree in abilities of synthesis and presentation. In the best style of Russian intelligentsia he was a very literate man: well read, fluent in a number of foreign languages, skillful in his analytical presentation, and besides and author of essays, five romantic novellas a la Hoffman, a guide to west European drawings, a local history of Moscow and a book of poetry.

The description of Chayanov’s work and of the views shared by the so-called organization and production school as neopopulist, especially when used as a synonym of programmatic “peasantism” idealizing or hoping for future peasant universe, is badly informed misleading. A multistage miscomprehension is involved concerning populism, neopopulism, and chayanov himself. First a few bothered to work out the actual characteristics of Russian populism over and above its description by political foes (especially Lenin’s attack on the SRs, which taken out of context, served its readers ill). Russia’s original socialism-for-developing societies and its remarkable contemporaneous message which raised for the first time the issues of Uneven Development, State Capitalism, party Cadres, or Social Ecology is often being reduced to socialist party of revolutionary type, its first urban Trade Unions and workers press, of that their Geneva branch permanent delegate to the General Council of the International was a man called Karl Marx, are simply left out of sight. The next stage in miscomprehension, the latter-day impact of populism – that is of its main theorists like Hertzen and Chernyshevskii and strategists like Zhelyabov or Kibal’chich of the peoples Will – is treated as if it could be disassociated from the rest of Russian intellectual history. To exemplify, Lenin’s
What Is To Be Done? Manifestly modeled in context and in name on Cherynshevenskii and the Peoples Will loses its intellectual roots becoming in turn a self-generated invention of a singular genius. The general interdependence of effected, the mutuality of borrowings, and the capacity to learn are “streamlined” to appear as a set of dogmatisms, eternally diverse and absolutely pure (and totally wrong, of course). Chayanov, being neither “a Marxist” or nor a good bourgeois, must be assigned to one of the intellectual chains. A game for those not overburdened by knowledge of the actual context of Russian history asserts itself then, a world divided into “us” versus “them,” while everything else is put into a leftover category of populism due to trigger off images of sitting on the fence, sentimental attachment to obsolete archaism, utopian dreams, and manure

As to Chayanov, the easiest way not to dismiss outright his genius nor to surrender him to one; s direct ideological enemies is to define him as a Populist (with a prefix “Neo” added for the benefit of those of the main theorists of Russian Populism and from those who were defined in his generation as their most direct heirs be it Chernov, Aksentev, or Gershuni). Chayanov took his cues from the declared Marxists V. Kosinskii, V. Groman, and I. Gurevich (I must disagree here with Thorner, it was Gurevich who first suggested “demographic differentiation”), from the bone fide SR populist P. Vikhlyaev. His method and conclusions paralleled in many ways those of the Bolshevik Central Committee member of 1905 – 7 P. Rumyantsev and later work of similar persuasion by A Khrayashchev. His tolerance of different ideas was known; in the 1920s he helped the careers of N Kondratiev, the brilliant opioneer id the studies of global economic systems, as well as of the Marxist “young Turks” like V. Anisimov. He also often disagreed with those of his own “school,” for example, A. Chelinstev, but proceeded to work closely with them. There is no way to define his possible guilt by heritage or association.

The only way to resolve the question of Chayanov;s populations is to consider his actual views vis-à-vis the contemporary Russian Populists’ main articles of faith concerning rural Russia. He did not accept the view of some right-wing populists in the 1890s that capitalism must fail to establish itself in poverty-ridden rural Russia.He did not adopt the most significant proposition-cum-program of Populism’s left wing in 1906-22, the PSR, to turn peasant communes in control [f all available land into the core structure of post-revolutionary rural Russia. He shared with the Russian populists, but not only with them, the wish to have Russia transformed along lines which would see autocracy abolished and democracy established (with much peasant coloring to it in a population which was 85 percent peasants). The idea of ”service to the people” by the Russian intelligentsia was also “populist,” but by this time, not only so. Chayanov’s political party animus was low. In the dramatic year of 1917 he was closest to the popular Socialists, a mildly populist, markedly academic party of little following. Throughout his life he was to stay the nonparty Muscovite intellectual at his best: erudite, hardworking, broadminded, and deeply committed to humanitarian causes, scholarship, and 1920s by remarkable laxity toward him by the authorities (said to be ordered by Lenin himself). It was to cost him his life in the decade to follow and to end with his posthumous “rehabilitation” for what it was worth.

As to their goals and predictions, Bpletsheviks, SRs, and Chayanov believed more in peasants undifferentiated socioeconomic advanced or decline (“aggregate shifts”) versus capitalist and/or state capitalist economy than in the significance of interpeasant processes. He was at attacked because of that by
many of the Russian "orthodox Marxists", but some other "orthodox" Marxists, for example, Kautsky, were far from sure on that score. So were some of the Bolsheviks. Chayanov's distrust of the large is beautiful proposition accepted then by most adherents of progress did not relate this is to a peasantist dream a la Proudhon; in the hungry Moscow of war communism he depicted a small-holder's universe in a text described as "utopia" (peasant one at that), but suggested something very different in concluding chapter of the book he called in 1925 The Theory of peasant economy. One should best take as true Chayano's own explanation of his views as rooted in study of Russian agriculture of which he had so superb a knowledge. On balance Chayanov was being defined as neopopulist mostly by default, a short land description which hides more than it reveals.

Why then the persistence of the neither-us-nor-them neopulistdisignation in our own times? The reason lies in the ideological confrontations of our own generation to which the already discussed reductionism should be added. The admirers of Green Revolution who believe in its antisocialist potentials often interpreted the "form below" approach as "let it be as it is" for "those above" and then used "peasantism" as a handy ideological device to forget the agrobusiness. Once one moves from the form to substance Chayanov's is unacceptable to them: he is sharply anticipatalist, with no trust in "free market" processes, and devoted to the cooperatives' warfare against the "entrepreneurs". Moreover he was clearly loyal to the Russian postrevolutionary state, refused to emigrate, and even proposed temporarily in his career under the new regime. For the orthodox Marxists of the "developing societies" his method of analysis was equally unacceptable for it challenged head on Lenins 1899 study which had acquired the status of supramodel as to what peasant society is and/or is becoming. (Kautsky's position, definitely "orthodox" and legitinated by Lenin's admiring references, yet in no necessary contradistinction with Chayanov's view of peasant economy's possible survival under capitalism, is still barely known.) But the crux of the "need to define Chayanov as Neo-Populist lay there in the very assumption of one and only finite Marxism. As to Chayanov, he was neither "a Marxist" nor a rich farmers lover, but neither was he simply a Populist thereby. He learned from many sources but stayed his own man.

Why then did not Chayanov become a contemporary guru, a patron saint of a new sect of admirers who would use his books to enforce and validate their own separateness and ideological purity? He has been quited admiringly but nobody has claims his mantle while those called Neo-Populists have usually disclaimed such designation. The answer lies partly in the ideological dualizations described above but it was caused also by a fundamental limitation of Chayanov's mode of analysis, itself explicable in terms of the experience available when he wrote as against that of our own time. The most significant of the social transformations of the twentieth century was the advancing integration of increasingly complex social forms. Rural society and rural problems are inexplicable any longer only in their own terms and must be understood in terms of labor and capital flows which are broader than agriculture. To understand the diversity of the results of Colectivization one must look at the countryside as we'll as at industry and at political elite. And so on. Chayanov's analysis "from below" is incomplete not only because its author was a precluded from its completion. It cannot be completed by simply proceeding along the same road. Not accidentally it was his most exclusively family-centred model, the demographic one, which peasant economy does not merely accompany other economics forms but is inserted into and usually subsumed under a
dominant political economy, different in type. Also peasant economies are being transformed (or even reestablished) mostly by "external" intervention, especially by the state and the multinational companies, intervention which outpaced by far Chayanov's experience as well as his theoretical schemes. This makes combined "from above" and "from below" models necessary for further exploratory advance. In this, Chayanov's analysis did play a major but restricted role. In this, Chayanov's analysis did play a major but restricted role. Some of his views were clearly mistaken (and invalidated by further evidence), but in the main his weakness lies in an analysis which was not incorrect but insufficient. For the increasingly complex rural world of today it has clear limits, hence, no "chayanovism" but there are many of Chayanov's illuminating insights, explicit and implicit, in the contemporary rural studies.

4. Historiography and future

At its 1966 beginnings the effect of Chayanov's book's first English edition was the direct result of a major crisis, of what was called the Third World and of its conceptualization within the Modernization Theory and its political corollaries, conclusions, and predictions. The post-World War II rapid decolonization, Cold War, and the expanding U.N. As a focus of new hopes, have redrawn maps as well as redefined and dramatized the problem of world inequality between "the West" and what was then called "the Backwards Nations." This global gap between states and societies became a fundamental issue of the day. A new terminology was coming into being representing new concerns. The global gap was part of it. The confirmation of the "world" led by the United States with the one less by the Soviet Union (extending its impact to the native revolutionaries elsewhere) made the issues of the development in the Third World into a matter of utmost political urgency. Fortunately the solution seemed at hand - a take off into the self-sustained economic growth along the lines tried out by the forerunners of industrialization. Western-style parliaments, markets, ideas, and education plus some aid or loans and investments were to facilitate it all. An assumed natural law of social equilibrium was to secure international equalization, stability, and homogeneity (the larger the discrepancy the more powerful its tendency for self-eradication). Rationalization embodied in science was to help it along for it is seemingly faster to import experts and expertise than to produce them first hand. The assumedly inevitable Progress was to close the First/Third world's gap, to eradicate poverty and to keep revolutionaries at bay.

By the turn of the 1950s the optimistic assumptions were proving shockingly wrong. The "gap" was increasing. Pauperization advanced through most of the Third World. Postcolonial independence, economic spontaneity of local and international marlets, literacy campaigns, and charitable aid did not resolve" the problems of development." The West and especially its slow-to-take-the-hint colonizers and budding neocolonizers clearly faced situations no longer described as riots of despair but massive popular wars and coalitions between resentful governments of the "backward" nations: the Algerian war and the Bandung Conference of the Nonaligned Nations, Congo Vietnam, and a new UNESCO majority. On the intellectual scene Paul Baran. Gunnar Mydral, and Paul Prebish Savaged the Modernization Theory Prescriptions and methods. Against the old registers of correlates and determinants of economic growth came the new pessimism of
focussing at the bottlenecks explaining the growing gap in a catchy phrase which swept the world - the development underdevelopment. This was increasingly defined by the international dependency of the peripheries of the exploitative metropolitan centres. It was also defined intranationally by dependent plebeian populations which were structurally marginalized and excluded from the benefit of modernity - nowadays often called the subalterne classe. This conceptual box was increasingly being filled by peasants - the large majority of the population of the developing societies (the "backward nations of yesterday). But peasants appeared not only as victims or an object of development. The dramatic impression of the victory of Mao's peasantry revolutionary army was spreading and being reinforced by guerrillas all through the Third World. Also, the peasantry was increasingly being seen as a potential political actor - a subject of history. In the 1960s they came to spell new hopes of sweeping away oligarchy in Latin America, out-facing an imperial army in Vietnam, helping to balance failures of industrialization or of the egalitarian programme attached to the Green Revolution. Chayanov's emergence into the English-speaking world coincided with a dramatic "face to the peasants" realignment of attention which took place in the 1960s. The World Bank officials and Marxist revolutionaries, politicians and scholars, not forgetting the committed student masses, rapidly turned peasantologists. From a piece of anthropological exotica, peasants have moved into the centre of debate about the most significant contemporary issues. Overnight the discussion of peasantry in books, theses, and programs has shot up from next to none to hundreds and then thousands of items. The very word "peasant" became "hot" and "with it"; like sex and crime it was by now selling manuscripts to publishers and books to readers. The trouble was that this academic avalanche was theoretically very thin. The freshly collected "facts" about peasants. Mostly localized, and the speculations about them, mostly very grand and abstract, found themselves like Pirandello Characters searching for a conceptual framework which could relate and transform them into a branch of systematic knowledge. Of the available older writings of relevance only Lenin and Redfield could be put to partial use, while the more contemporary efforts to make theoretical sense of the peasants were only then beginning to come through.

Chayanov's book entered this void (together with Marx's Grundrisse presented first English by Hobsbawm in 1964, and a more conventional economics text by Schults published in the same year) The richness of the data and the sophistication of the methodology put forward by Chayanov, the sweep took the breath away from scores of peasantology beginners. Some declared allegiance, more used it to cut their teeth defending or reestablishing the orthodoxies of old, but the most numerous utilised Chayanov's evidence and insights in their own analyses schemes concerning peasants world over.

It would seem that the very positioning of Chayanov as "the man who knew about peasant" or his more literate designation as a social scientist who helped us see better the analysis of family farming. As a particular form or element of economy should lead to the gradual decline of his significance in the future. Peasants still form a major part of mankind but their numbers are stationary while their share in the population of the "developing societies" is rapidly in decline. They are also being "incorporated" while the livelihoods of those who survive as small holders increasingly include what has been considered as "nonpeasant" characteristics. A decline to a parallel deppeasantation of the social sciences can be predicted, with Chayanov assigned eventually to the archives. Or is it?
The crisis of the 1960s has not been resolved but has actually broadened in its substance and its implications. The predicament of the Third World, made morally unacceptable and politically dangerous by the way the better-off have prospered, extended into a socioeconomic crisis which includes "us". Massive structural unemployment at the lower pole of the First World has grown sharply and is increasingly being recognized as irreversible. A crisis of the Second World, both economic and moral, is visible and self-admitted, diminishing its ability to offer alternatives - the impact of a major model and determinant of development in the past generations is declining. All through the 1980s a parallel crisis of capitalism and its actually existing alternatives has been growing, economically and politically but also conceptually; we face a reality we increasingly know how to extrapolate or to grasp.

A central element of contemporary global society is the failure of the capitalist economies as well as of state economies to advance unlimitedly and to secure general welfare in ways expected by the nineteenth-century theories of progress, liberal and socialist alike. Control and extent of profits by capitalist multinational companies is advancing side-by-side with the retreat of standard capitalist forms of production and of social organization linked to the extension of "unemployment," of "informal economies", and other networks of survival. Sluggish state economies are intertwined with the massive "second" and "third" (or "black") economies, increasingly recognized as irreducible. While in the "developing societies" Islands of precapitalism disappear, what comes instead is mostly not the industrial proletariat of Europe's nineteenth century but strata of plebian survivors - a mixture of increasingly mobile, half-employed slum-dwellers, part-farmers, lumpen-traders, or pimps - another extracapitalist pattern of social and economic existence under capitalism and/or mixed economies are growing around the globe and one cannot understand without reference to this either the way national economies work or the way people actually live. While exploitive relations are preserved and enhanced, the functional organization of economy changes, extending rather than concealing those elements of it which call for modes of analysis alternative to those ordinarily in use. By now a new "green" radicalism has begun increasingly to respond politically to these experiences. New exploitative patterns, and conceptual insights. Theoretically the analysis of modes of incorporation by a dominant political economy is in increasinneed of being supplemented by the parallel study of modes of nonincorporations operating in the world we live in. It is against this context that Chayanov's analysis of alternative and complimentary economies, of family labor, of the nonmonetarized calculus of choices and of the patterns of physical production (rather than their prices only) of differential optiums of modes, and of utilities of cooperation - an analysis "from below" attempting to relate structure to choice - will have to find its future possible echo and uses, so will the method of exploring models of alternative realities and rationales. In fact there are still hundreds of millions of peasants and as many may exist in the year 2000 but, paradoxically, Chayanov's fundamental methods and insights may prove particularly enriching for worlds of fewer peasants as well as fewer "classic" industrial proletarians while the subject of his actual concern, the Russian peasantry, has all but disappeared. In no way would future theorizing be a simple replication of Chayanov, but it might carry important elements of his achievements and that of the Russian rural analysis of 1880s - 1982 as part of the body of new development theories aiming to understand more realistically our environments theories aiming to understand more realistically our environments and to improve future
worlds. Which will make a good epitaph for a memorial of a great scholar when his countrymen remember to build him one.

5. Chayanov’s concept of peasant economy

Most of those who are today seeking to understand the economic behaviour of the peasantry seem to be unaware that they are traversing much the same ground trod from the 1860’s onward by several generations of Russian economists. The problems that are today plaguing economists in countries like Brazil, Mexico, turkey, Nigeria, India, and Indonesia bear striking similarities to those that were the order of the day in Russia from the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 down to the collectivization of agriculture at the end of the 1920’s, to wit:

- How to transform traditional rural society so as to overcome the misery, squalor, and illiteracy of the peasantry;
- How to get the peasants to modernize their agriculture, especially their farming technique;
- How to carry out this transformation and modernization so as to permit – indeed, to facilitate the development of the entire national economy.

One of the first methods young Russian idealists tried for dealing with these problems was directed action. Hundreds upon hundreds of college students, doctors, nurses, university teachers – including economists and statisticians – quit their urban life and attempted to “go to them in person; revolutionaries among these idealists preached the virtues of socialism. The police smoked them out up, sometimes tipped off by the peasants themselves, suspicious of outsiders from other orders of society.

Chastened by their experiences, many of these action-oriented intellectuals deemed it wise, before undertaking further adventures in rural philanthropy, to obtain a more precise knowledge of village realities. Scored of them offered their services when in the 1870’s the new provincial reforms launched a vast program of economic and statistical investigation into peasant economic problems. It would be difficult to exaggerate the value of these field inquiries, which continued through four decades down to World War I. In sheer bulk, they add up to more than 4,000 volumes. These constitute perhaps the most ample single source of data have on the peasant economy of any country in modern times.

More significant than the quantity is the quality of these data. From the outset, the field investigators included some of the ablest men of the day. Sympathetic to the peasantry and anxious to gain insight into their problems, they were determined to carry out their inquiries with utmost thoroughness. In presenting their results, they took great pains to choose suitable categories and to design statistical tables so as to bring out clearly the basic relations among the various economic and social groups in the villages. Some of their reports were so striking that in 1890 the government passed a law forbidding any further inquiries into landlord-peasant relations, but, nonetheless, the work went on.

In the decades from 1880 onward, Russia’s leading economists, statisticians, sociologists, and agricultural experts assessed, analyzed, and fought over the materials furnished by the successive zemstvo inquiries.
Their articles and books provide the richest analytical literature we have on the peasant economy of any country in the period since the Industrial Revolution. Among the Russian scholars who participated in the debate over the zemstvo statistics, N.A Kablukov, V.A Kosinskii, A.N. Chelintsev, N.P. Makarov, and G.A. Studentskii standout for their attempts to formulate a theory of peasant economy. Alexander Vasilevich Chayonov, from 1919 to 1930 the leading Russian authority on the economics of agriculture, synthesized the theoretical ideas of his predecessors and contemporaries, and developed them along original lines. Translations into English of two studies by Chayanov form the core of the present volume.

The first and by far the larger of these works is Chayonov’s masterpiece, Organizatsiya Krest’yanskogo Khozyaistva, the title of which may be rendered in English as Peasant Farm Organization. It provides a theory of peasant behavior at the level of the individual family farm, i.e., at the micro level. The second, much shorter study – “ZurFrage einer Theorie der nichtkapitalistischen Wirtschaftssystem,” which may be translated as “On the Theory of Non-Capitalist Economic Systems” – sets forth the proposition that at the national, or macro, level, peasant economy ought to be treated as an economic system in its own right, as a noncapitalist system of national economy. The brief remarks that follow will be concerned briefly with Chayanov’s theory of the peasant farm, his micro theory, which Constantin von Dietz has termed the most noteworthy creative synthesis so far achieved in this field down to the present day.

6. Conclusion

The theory of peasant economy by virtue of the peasant farm bears relevance to the work of Chayanov and, to this end the first part of the two part series of these articles ends on this note. It is impossible to exhaust the work of Chayanov in an article of this nature. His intellectual analysis, thought processes and contribution to agricultural development remains relevant even today in the 21st century. The world was the loser on the basis that his work could have made a significant contribution to development at the time that his works were censored. The sure and certain way to misunderstand the peasant family farm, Chayanov held, was to view it as a business, that is to say, an enterprise of a capitalistic sort. To him, the essential characteristic of business firms or capitalistic enterprises was that they operated with hire workers in order to earn profits. By contrast, peasant family farm, as Chayonov defined them, normally employed no hired wage labor – none whatsoever. His family farms were pure in the sense that they depended solely on the work of their own family farm may surprise use by its narrowness when compared with the much wider usage of the term in recent decades. Present-day economists familiar with model building might assume that for this purpose.
NOTES ON THE AUTHORS

Teodor Shanin

He was ordained with the Order of the British Empire (OBE). Was born in 1930 in Vilnius in the Polish Republic and was raised in the Soviet Union and was an immigrant to Israel He was a British sociologist who for many years was a Professor of Sociology at the University of Manchester. He returned to Russia and founded the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences. Shanin is best known for his intellectual capacity and research activity in the field of the informal economy, the Russian Revolution, African development and most notably peasant studies. He worked with Hamza Alavi in 2003 and produced with him the manuscript and book: Introduction to the Sociology of “Developing Societies”.

Hamza Alavi

He was born in 1921, into the Bohra community (Ismaelis) in Karachi, then British India and today independent Pakistan and migrated to the United Kingdom, in adulthood. He was a Marxist academic sociologist and activist whose works concentrated on nationality, gender, fundamentalism and the peasantry. His most notable and celebrated work was his 1965 essay: Peasants and Revolution in the Socialist Register, which stressed the militant role of the middle peasantry. These middle peasants were viewed as the class in the rural areas which were the allies of the urban working class. He published with Teodor Shanin the classic on: Introduction to the Sociology of “Developing Societies.” In the 1960’s he was one of the co-founders of the Campaign against Racial Discrimination.

Alexander V. Chayanov

He was born in Moscow in 1888. Was the son of a merchant and excelled as an agrarian economist and scholar of rural sociology and was an outstanding advocate of agrarianism and cooperatives. He attended a Realshule (1899 - 1906) and the Moscow Agricultural Institute (1906 - 1911, beginning as an agronomist. He taught and published on agriculture until 1914, when he began working for various government institutions. After the Great October Socialist Revolution, he served on several Soviet Committees for agrarian reform and held lecturing posts. He was a proponent of agricultural cooperatives. He came into conflict with the Soviet Government and his views were sharply criticized by the dictator Joseph Stalin. However, he was later shown to be right about the problems with Soviet agricultural planning. In 1930 he was arrested. He was imprisoned and sentenced to five years in Kazakhstan labour camps. On October 3, 1937 he was again arrested, tried and shot on the same day. His wife was repressed as well and spent 18 years in labour camps and released in 1955. Chayanov's major works include, Peasant Farm Organization, published in 1925 and the Theory of Non-Capitalist Economic Systems was first translated into English in 1966. He wrote many other books and is a giant in respect of agrarian discourse. His ideas have survived him.
Chayanov’s Consumption – Labour – Balance Principle

The higher the ratio of dependents to workers in a household, the harder the workers have to work. Chayanov proposed that peasants would work as hard as they needed in order to meet their subsistence needs, but had no incentive beyond those needs and therefore would slow and stop working once they were met. The principle, which is called the consumption – labour – balance principle, is therefore that labour will increase until it meets (balances) the needs (consumption) of the household. This view of peasant farming implies that it will not develop into capitalism without some external, added factor. Furthermore, the peasant’s way of life is seen as ideologically opposed to capitalism in that, the family work for a living, not for profit. (The reader must read more in terms of practice and application of Chayanov’s Consumption – Labour – Balance Principal.

**PART TWO: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE AFRICAN PEASANTRY BY COLIN BUNDY**

1. Introduction

This section of the paper through the eyes of Colin Bundy, the author of the book the “Rise and Fall of the African Peasantry,” as reviewed by James Currey and David Philip who state that the book is essential for those who want to understand contemporary South Africa and its historical origins. This section of the paper attempts to locate its arguments and overview within the context of the first edition of the book, which was hailed as a major reinterpretation of South African history within the ambit of agricultural development, It criticized the prevailing view that African agriculture was inherently primitive or backward and attacked the notion that today’s poverty and lack of development are a legacy of African traditionalism. The paper therefore explores by using the preface of the first edition of the book and thereafter looks at the preface of the second edition, in order to elaborate on the distinctive pattern of capitalist development in South Africa, which proved hostile to the existence of such peasants. This process is therefore important to an understanding of peasants, capitalist exploitation, to development and agriculture, including South African history. In spite of the fact that the article uses the prefaces of both books, it is an attempt to reexamine these important debates from the viewpoint of influencing the South African government and its development and agricultural policy makers that much can be learnt from past history, given the poor development and agricultural implementation parameters in democratic South Africa.


The first book in the preface of Colin Bundy’s book in 1979 indicates that the discourse is about people definable as peasants. The nature of peasants and peasant societies and South Africa’s social and economic history on the other, are areas of study in which substantial changes and advances were registered since
1970. Use of the term peasant and the definition are incidental, but crucial. The redefinition of the focus of historical enquiry is therefore important for various reasons and, for purposes of African scholarship in terms of reviewing the past. There has to be a revolution in the study of African history for purposes of analytical knowledge. Richard Gray (1972) remarked that “to an extraordinary degree, South African historical research has fallen behind that of other African countries, let alone that of other modern industrial countries.” It is therefore important to concentrate on the nature of capitalist development and industrialization in South Africa. There has to be a committed concern about the persistence of poverty and the subordination of Africa. Thus the political economy, the formation of structure of classes, exchange and production, accumulation and expropriation must be understood.

The underdevelopment theory seeks to explain “the incorporation and subordination of peripheral colonial economies to those of the metropolitan imperialist centres of capitalist development by means of external dominance and internal dependence are maintained and produced” (Kadt and Williams, 1974; Allen, 1976). The reinterpretation of South Africa’s past has been shaped by colonial thought processes, prior to the existence of a body of African scholarship. In the 1960’s very rapid economic growth was concomitant with the extension and modernization of apartheid measures and the apparatus of oppression and repression. Walker, Macmillan and de Kiewiet (1965) brought new standards and techniques to the writing of history to South Africa and were the creators of the mainstream liberal historical tradition and concluded that the Imperial Factor with an elegy of the ideal: “that of a social and economic order in South Africa in which a greater tolerance of race, a more ardent trusteeship, a more inspired social wisdom should be the mark of the peace and unity and liberty for which the nineteenth century had suffered so grievously.” According to Macmillan (1930) and Horwitz, (1967) “It is obvious that the disjunction between racism and economic growth and the prerogative of political authority over the course of economic development is the prime force in producing a repressive society” The nationalism at the time of the English, Afrikaner divide was a cultural defense because of the rise of Afrikaner nationalism and against the English and a racial defense against the natives because racial discrimination had roots deep in Afrikaner experience and history and continued despite being politically unwise, economically unprofitable, and morally reprehensible. Thus apartheid is seen as extrinsic and inimical to economic growth; racism as an obsolete and dysfunctional element in capitalist society. There was an historical deafness by apartheid leadership to this aspect and thus declared a war against the law of economics. It failed to understand investment, industrialization and urbanization and was resistant to any forms of liberalism and cooperation” (Kiewiet, 1956: 16 – 73).

During this time Oxford histories as the apogee of the liberal school of South African scholarship argued that the focus of research, especially in Britain had altered and was couched to reevaluate the structural characteristics of the Southern African political economy and asked whether the dynamics of modernization will in fact dissolve racial oligarchy. They argued that it was necessary to see the South African conflict in terms of class conflict than in terms of the traditional racial dichotomy. The basic assumption was that all of Southern Africa was involved in one economy. Thus historians were led to a reexamination of the dynamics of contact and conflict between pre-colonial modes of production in the ‘tribal’ economies and the growth of capitalism (Kallaway, 1975). Among the topics investigated were, the nature and relationships of pre – industrial societies, the development of the mining industry, the history of migrant labour, the changing role
of the state, tensions and accommodations between international and national capitalist interests, the complex interaction between race and class conflict, and the historical nature and function of segregation and apartheid. There was also some attention given to social change in the rural areas. It chronicles the history of African agriculture in South Africa and no systematic account exists elsewhere, concentrating upon the years 1870 to 1913. “This was the crucial period in the transformation of the bulk of the rural African population from their pre – colonial existence as sub – subsistence inhabitants on eroded and overcrowded lands, dependent for survival upon wages earned in ‘white’ industrial areas and on ‘white’ farms. Other historians have stressed the destructive impact of colonial rule upon ‘traditional’ African agriculture, which was negligent and technologically backward, telling a ‘story of continuous depression and disintegration” (Kiewiet, 1936). The issues are very complex but, a definition of peasant that draws notice to relations with other groups in the political economy, at a given time has an analytical and expository purpose, in fact to distinguish peasants individually and the peasantry as a class from pre – colonial cultivators, from capitalist farmers and from the rural proletariat.

The emergence of a peasantry and the proletarianization are social processes that overlap and commences more or less simultaneously. With an emergent peasantry, an important internal dynamic was its propensity to stratification, the breakdown of redistributive tenets and institutions, and the generation of new social antagonisms. At one end of the process large peasants became successful landowners and farmers; at the other end, small or marginal peasants were separated from the means of production. Crucially, they lost access to enough land to subsist, almost as soon as the peasantry emerged as an identifiable element in the political economy. The pace of peasantisation and proletarianization was affected by the political intervention of non – peasants, of groups with superior access to power in the colonial state. The commercialization of white agriculture, an increasing demand for cheap labour and the changing market mechanisms and arrangements combined to effect deterioration in the peasant’s access to markets in terms of trade and command over the disposal of surplus production. These factors reinforced and perpetuated peasant disabilities due to geo – physical, natural and demographic causes. At the same time the peasant’s capacity to generate a surplus and the opportunities for accumulation were diminished and the peasant’s integration into the national and international economy placed serious limitations in the form of rents, taxes and other fees. In totality and in sum, the formation of a peasantry did not cause African proletarianization and poverty in South Africa, but vitally affected their nature and timing. It obscured its later decline. It is important therefore to project upon the course and causes of South Africa’s development as well as the cause and causes of its level of underdevelopment. The concentration of Bundy’s work is upon the Cape Colony or Province because of the transition from pre – colonial cultivator to peasant to rural proletarian is clearly observable and because of greater available literature.

The first edition was interpreted to be an emergent ‘radical’ or alternative critical history of South Africa and thus the revision took place with two main intellectual discourses in the form of Africanist and Marxist. There was conceptual damage in the superstructure in respect to underdevelopment theory. Weighing the criticisms Bundy was persuaded to write the second edition of the book. The book retains the redeeming features and is an intellectual product of its time and place. In this regard it is still relevant to contemporary issues that concern development and agriculture, post 1994 and under democracy in South Africa. The major criticisms were as follows:

- Analytical weaknesses in dealing with pre-colonial, pre-capitalist societies;
- Difficulties in characterizing accurately the effects upon pre-colonial structures and relationships of colonial capitalism;
- Problems of periodization that relate to the rise and fall of peasants;
- The limitations of underdevelopment theory, especially its preoccupation with exchange rather than production relations.

But it must be remembered that this book reconstructed the dimension of the past and contributes most significantly to South African history. Marks (1986) points out that “the book was part of a broader intellectual development: it assisted in what has in some sense been a shift in paradigm in South African studies.” The criticisms of the first edition that have been enunciated above are discussed hereunder.

3.1. Pre-colonial and pre-capitalist societies

The book’s failure to identify adequately the production relations or internal dynamics of the African pre-colonial societies; it lacked an adequate theory of pre-capitalist modes of production. The colonial economy stressed redistributive tenets and institutions and observers stated the egalitarian nature of those societies. This was at the cost of any sustained examination of cleavages and conflicts within those societies and, their intensification over time. “There is little or no attention to tensions between chiefs and commoners, between elders and younger men, or between men and women. No recognition of tendencies to differentiation within precapitalist societies in terms of unequal holdings of livestock and land. The failure to consider these axes, actual or potential conflict obscured a number of dynamic tendencies in such societies” (Kimble, 1982; Lewis, 1984). The failure to explore class relations for the social formation as a whole is replicated at the level of the productive unit. “The absence of clarifying the meaning of homestead as the productive unit and the relationships of the homestead was not analyzed. An analysis of the head of the family retaining control over labour is not discussed. Insensitivity to gender issues. The peasantisation thesis had to be recasted in light of the questions about domestic struggles in peasantized societies” (Bozzoli, 1983). The book did not identify the diversity among Southern Africa’s pre-colonial societies and by the same token there was no explanation as to why some traditional structures were reinforced, but others undermined, by the penetration of merchant capital. A shaky grasp on the dynamics of pre-capitalist society inevitably weakens any attempt to theorize its articulation with capitalist colonial society.
“The resilience of certain aspects of pre–colonial relations, the transformation of others, and the ability of merchant capital to accommodate itself both to persisting and to changing forms are dealt with only partially and fitfully. Instead of identifying processes of this sort, explanation of social change tends to lean on the individual voluntarism of African initiative” (Kimble, 1982). Even today as Marks (1986) observed that “the implications of a materialist analysis of class and race for pre–colonial societies have been only partially realized.” All of this may help explain, even if it does not diminish, the shortcomings of the treatment of pre–capitalist society.

3.2. Too short a history? The periodization of peasancies

How and when did peasants come into existence in South Africa, and when did they cease to exist? The question has been posed with reference not only to this book, but to the wider body of Africa peasant studies, and takes issue particularly with the definition of African peasants proposed in 1971 by Saul and Woods” (1971: 105 – 106), and adopted by Bundy in the book. Slater and Ranger (1978: 99 – 133) both acknowledged the “merits of the definition because it foreclosed the long, formalist debates about whether or not there was a peasantry in Africa, and satisfied the criteria of comparative peasant studies and was also congruent with African realities. It also restricted the creation of the peasantry too narrowly to the period of formal colonization.” The definition of Saul and Woods states that African cultivators, were made into peasants by colonialism acting in the interests of capital and that the trouble is that African rural economic history is increasingly difficult to squeeze into this particular framework “The definition of the peasantry sets up a false dichotomy between pre–colonial society and peasant society. The peasants are not the products of the pre–colonial society. They are the products of the forces of colonialism” Keegan, (1980). But it was not only the birth – date and method of delivery of the peasantry that was questioned; there was also dispute over its death certificate. When it came to the closure of the peasant option, several reviewers felt that Bundy overstated the case for the decline or disappearance of the peasantry; and “the cut of date of circa 1913 is an over – simplification because many of the forms of production characteristic of earlier decades co – existed with mass labourmigrancy and that some peasants clung tenaciously to that status for much longer” (Kimble, 1982).

A review by Lewis (1984), did more than question the dating of the emergence or decline of the peasantry: it disputed the basic chronological framework of the process as a whole. Lewis challenged what he calls the basic thesis of the Rise and Fall: the African cultivators responded to market opportunities in the late 19th century to a degree that ensured a brief period of prosperity. he argues that Bundy was wrong about the causes, extent and timing of the increase in African agricultural productivity in the Eastern Cape before 1879.” The increase of population density in the Ciskeian locations after the 1879 rebellion and the effects of drought saw an abrupt end to the period of general increase in the size of the total product of most households. There is much in this that is cogent and valuable in terms of criticisms in areas already identified as conceptual weaknesses in Rise and Fall: its presentation of pre – capitalist societies and its focus on exchange relations at the expense of production. Thus there is an important revision of the chronology of rural history in the 19th century Xhosa Ciskei, which the criticisms bring forward and assisted Bundy in
reshaping the 1988 new edition of the book. However, it must be noted that Lewis's criticisms do not really provide an alternative chronology for South African rural history. All of this was due to specific local political demographic circumstances which Lewis does not consider in respect of the penetration of merchant capital and by the loss of land and cattle to the colonists even before actual military conquest; and between 1856 and 1858, in cattle killing and this was one of the most destructive sequences experienced by any Southern African society. To generalize an alternative chronology to the basic thesis of Rise and Fall, which according to Bundy (1988) "locates the main period of peasant production in South Africa after 1870, seems risky from the Ngqika Xhosa case – study at best and perverse as worst."

3.3. 'Underdevelopment' theory: exchange versus production

Most critics agreed that Bundy’s review of the Rise and Fall was a brilliant application of theory of underdevelopment" (Jordaan, 1980). Cooper (1981) and others identified some frailities in Rise and Fall concerning itself to trade and markets, with the circulation and exchange of commodities and indebtedness and the narrowing of possibilities for accumulation" (Cooper, 1981. On the other hand can it be posed to Cooper that it was unnecessary top understand the dynamics of economic systems as outlined by Bundy without penetrating into the organization of production and the nature of class structures. It must be clearly understood that, it is a tendency of history to deploy underdevelopment theory to stress the inevitability of the subordination of the periphery to the meteropole, and by corollary to pay structures and class conflicts in the peripheral society. It must also be appreciated that Bundy did not explore class struggle, but acknowledges that the question of differentiation and stratification are the processes which shape the formation of social class. There is therefore, no need to castigate Bundy on these grounds.

3.4. The case for a second edition

There is no doubt that there is a diversity of agriculture’s uneven development, not only in South and Southern Africa but in many parts of the developing world. "The depiction of social class relations in the countryside has been enriched by the use of new sources of evidence, especially through oral history (Beinart et al, 1986). In the light not only of all the criticisms that have been sustained, what justification is there for the appearance of a second and unrevised edition? Bundy himself explores this question (1988) by stating that “First and most important, while recognizing that significant regional variations complicate the chronology, and accepting that complex processes of transformation are oversimplified and blurred, it seems to me that the fundamental findings and arguments of the book still hold. It demonstrates the existence in the 19th century of an innovative and dynamic African peasantry, and indicates some of its main features: a response to the growth of markets in food crops and wool, technical adaptation of household production, and a diversification as well as expansion of agricultural output. It establishes something of the range and diversity of the experience, notably in its inclusion of various categories of tenant peasantry. And it posits a direct relationship between the fortunes of African peasants and the wider political economy: specifically, it argues that the existence of such peasantry became incompatible with the distinctive pattern of capitalist development in South Africa. That is, the growth of the peasantry was reversed after the gold mining
industry developed its voracious appetite for cheap labour and the produce market finally made capitalist forms of production on white-owned farms economically viable, and its reversal required not only the grabbing of immense quantities of land, but the determined intervention of the state to keep land from the hands of the most successful African farmers and to drive smaller-scale tenant farmers into wage labour” (Cooper, 1981; Bundy, 1988).

Rise and Fall was part of a substantial historiographical shift in Southern African studies. In its challenge to prevailing dual economy models, and its rejection of the view that the impoverishment of the reserve areas of South Africa stemmed from innate ‘traditionalism’ or backwardness of African cultivators, it contributed to a much wider criticism of conservative and liberal historical scholarship. In its attempts to apply some of the concepts of political economy, the formation and structure of classes, the penetration of new relations of exchange and production, the processes of accumulation and expropriation, it was directly influenced by a new generation of Marxist scholars. “In other words it restores history and from those who possessed this history and to restore it to those who did not and from whom it was taken away from” (Trapido, 1980). “It was influenced by the rising tide of comparative peasant studies and thus helped to place the history of rural societies firmly on the agenda of South African scholarship” (Ranger, 1981). It galvanized researchers and secured the evolution of South African agrarian history. This is an easy book to criticize, but Bundy’s work has contributed to and stimulated so much movement and development in Southern African agrarian research in recent years. It has shaped our perceptions and questions in respect of the development and agrarian discourse and assisted us all involved in such research.

4. The African peasantry as an anomaly

Having detailed and in some ways chronicled Bundy’s work through the process of review, a very brief analysis on the concept of the anomaly of the African peasantry is warranted. In this regard there is no difficulty in identifying the problems of the present emergency facing development in Africa. This crisis is due to extended drought, unfavourable terms of trade, rapid population growth, and urban policy bias via the process of modernization, bloated and sluggish bureaucracies, and military dictatorships, authoritarian and repressive regimes, and so forth. These factors have no doubt, contributed to and exacerbated the current predicament in Africa. But at the bottom of all these is also the truth that African politicians and the African elite, together with their bureaucracies, overlook the determinant of the way agricultural production is organized on small farms employing simple technologies and faced with the vagaries of climate. “Therefore, there is a need for more respect for, and better understanding of, how the African peasant looks at the world and the ways in which the limits inherent in the structural set-up could be transcended and transformed in South Africa” (Karodia, 2008: 101). South Africa is today a net importer of food because government and farming is engaged in commodity production on the misguided principle of export orientation, in spite of the fact that it cannot meet domestic demand for food as seen by the stark poverty in South African households, particularly the majority of Black households. “The low productivity of peasant agriculture, as measured in terms of yield per unit of land, is manifested in the discrepancy between rates of output and to be achieved
elsewhere. In other words peasant agriculture has not been supported because policy makers take an arrogant view of peasant agriculture. Peasants are rarely the beneficiaries of productivity-enhancing research. The fundamentals of a peasant household as not only a production unit, but also a social organization of some complexity has not really been factored into policy discourse in South Africa” (Karodia, 2008: 102).

The question always arises how far members of the household are willing to accept more work on the land. Chayanov (1966: 68) argued that “as a peasant family grows in size, the working members of the household have to spend more time supporting dependent consumers” This was applicable to the Russian peasantry, because much of the domestic work had been rationalized and there was time to engage in increasing ‘self–exploitation.’ Household division of labour placers a limit on how far male members are willing to work on the land. Social mobility and migration to the urban areas is more extensive today than it was in Chayanov’s Russia. It is thus not surprising that a study of household economies in Southern Africa (Low, 1986) showed that “peasant household members tend to translate their lower productivity gains into labour savings on the land rather than more time in the production of more crops. Thus they have chosen to escape the drudgery of farm work in favour of other employment, even if it is not clear that such work offers higher pay.” The point is being underscored that, there are more doors open to the contemporary African peasant than there ever were for the Russian peasant that Chayanov studied.

5. Conclusion

Both the papers in this series of two articles brought to the fore the ideas of Chayanov and Bundy in respect of the discourse of development and agriculture. The idea was not to reexamine their work but to stimulate more reading and understanding of the fundamental issues of history, with the idea of stimulating readers to reexamine their work, in order to understand and apply their concepts to contemporary development and agriculture. It is hoped that readers will get hold of the works of Alexander Chayanov and Colin Bundy, in order to broaden their own insights to these two great writers.

NOTES ON THE AUTHOR

Colin Bundy

Colin Bundy is one of the foremost history writers in South Africa in respect of historical development issues and the historical agricultural debate that has permeated South Africa from the inception of British colonialism and apartheid. He also goes beyond these periods in respect of prior historical analysis even before British colonialism and apartheid. The processes that Bundy engages in and explores shows the distinctive pattern of capitalist development in South Africa which proved hostile to the existence of peasants, and a massive onslaught came to be launched on the position of African peasant producers. This process is vitally important to an understanding of the South African past and present. His work therefore is pioneering.
Colin Bundy was a Professor of History at the University of Cape Town and the University of Western Cape in South Africa. He is now retired but maintains his association with these universities, as a visiting scholar. He is internationally known and respected for his works and his innate academic excellence and intellectualism.

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References

Notes: These references are provided by the writers themselves as notes to the text and have been used in putting the paper together in a coherent manner, primarily using them as sources for the compilation of the paper.


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